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From the Editor
The first forum, War Colleges: A Debate, for the Winter issue of
Parameters concerns the effectiveness of America’s war colleges. In
“Taking the War Colleges from Good to Great,” Richard Hooker Jr.
argues the country’s war colleges do not compare favorably in either
rigor, admissions standards, academic programs, or competition to
other professional schools. In “Making War Colleges Better,” Richard
Lacquement Jr. takes the opposite point of view, claiming America’s war
colleges can always improve, but generally have been quite successful.
Our second forum, Lessons from Afghanistan: Part II, features three
articles discussing the lessons some of America’s allies and coalition
partners drew from the campaigns in Afghanistan. Sten Rynning
covers “Denmark’s Lessons,” arguing Danish civil authorities failed
to establish an effective bridge to the lessons learned by their military.
Harald Høiback addresses “Norway’s Lessons,” claiming the nation’s
military forces learned the lessons of counterinsurgency well, indeed.
But now they must relearn how to fight conventional wars as they have
a legitimate threat to their border. Rhys Crawley considers “Australia’s
Lessons,” urging civilian and military leaders to adopt a whole-ofgovernment approach and to limit reliance on Special Forces soldiers.
The third forum, Strategic Lieutenants, examines what several of
NATO’s military academies are doing to prepare their prospective
officers to function in the complex strategic environment of today. Scott
Silverstone’s “Educating Strategic Leaders at West Point” discusses
how the US Military Academy has revamped its curriculum to prepare
its cadets for the challenges of contemporary warfare. In “Educating
Strategic Lieutenants at Sandhurst,” An Jacobs considers how effective
the Royal Military Academy has been in delivering lieutenants capable
of performing well in complex operational environments and
understanding the strategic implications of their decisions. ~AJE
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War Colleges: A Debate

Taking the War Colleges
from Good to Great
Richard D. Hooker Jr.
“Our PME systems have to embrace change or risk irrelevance.”
General Martin E. Dempsey
“PME has stagnated, focused more on the accomplishment of mandatory
credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity.”
Secretary James Mattis, 2018 National Defense Strategy

S

can the literature these days and you will see a welter of
commentary about professional military education, most of
it focused on the war colleges.1 The war colleges share many
positive virtues and are justly proud of their contributions, but all
have areas that can be improved and strengthened. Compared to other
professions like law, medicine, and engineering, military professional
education lacks the rigor, strict admissions standards, flexible and tailored
academic programs, and competition found in the best professional
schools. In an increasingly dangerous and complex world, the nation
deserves even more from the military leaders our war colleges produce.

The Common Experience

First, it may be useful to describe and understand the war colleges
as they are today. Each service has one, and there are two joint war
colleges—the National War College and the Eisenhower School for
National Security and Resource Strategy—grouped under the National
Defense University (NDU) in Washington, DC. All have some unique
aspects but, in general, the student experience is similar. Each has a
10-month program leading to a master’s degree focused at the strategic
level and also confers a joint professional military education (JPME)
credential required by law for promotion to general/flag officer rank.
Students at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in Norfolk, Virginia,
part of National Defense University, as well as the US Marine Corps,
Navy, and Air Force students at the NATO Defense College in Rome
also receive war college credit. Furthermore, selected officers have
opportunities for yearlong war college fellowships at think tanks and
prestigious universities.
War college students are typically midgrade officers marked out
for promotion from the different services as well as a mix of civilian

Dr. Richard D. Hooker
Jr. is a university
professor at the National
Defense University. He
previously served as dean
of the NATO Defense
College in Rome, a chair
at the National War
College, and an assistant
professor at West Point.
He holds a MA and a
PhD in international
relations from the
University of Virginia
and is a 1981 USMA
1     The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Dr. Mitchell Zais in preparing this article. graduate.
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and international students. Seminars are composed of a dozen or so
students and are led and supervised by one or more faculty members.
The Socratic method is often used to stimulate discussion and inquiry.
Students typically undergo a standard core curriculum augmented by a
few electives.
Curricula are strong on classical theory and are fundamentally
sound, but not always as current as they might be on topics such as
space, cyber, or weapons of mass destruction. All war colleges feature
graduation rates at nearly 100 percent. Class rankings and academic
performance have no impact on future career prospects. Required
reading loads and writing requirements are modest compared to leading
civilian institutions, and the workday is short, sometimes ending
at midday.
War college faculty are a mix of active duty military personnel and
civilians hired on fixed contracts, balanced by interagency civilians
detailed from the Department of State, intelligence community, and other
governmental agencies. Military faculty members serve as “professors of
practice,” bringing recent experience from the field or fleet and ideally
modeling what students can aspire to be after graduation. They are
usually O-6s, which translates to the rank of colonel in the Army, Air
Force, and Marines or captain in the Navy and Coast Guard, who are
war college graduates. They often lack the academic credentials of their
civilian peers, creating a tiered system dominated by civilians, who write
most professional military education critiques. Retired military officers
(sometimes with a PhD) make up a third, hybrid faculty with a foot in
both camps.
War college civilian faculty members are well-paid and enjoy a
faculty-student ratio of a single teacher to three-and-a-half-students,
ensuring a comfortable workload. Civilian faculty members often stay
for many years, and contract renewal rates are high. Compared to faculty
at civilian graduate institutions, there may be less gender and ethnic
diversity at the war colleges.2 Brilliant young academics are rare, and
civilian faculty members in their 60s or even 70s are common. Though
some are noted scholars, many war college faculty members do little or
no research. War colleges are led by active duty general or flag officers,
supported by civilian deans who are often retired military officers with
doctorates.

A Better Experience?

When compared to top-quality civilian graduate programs, the most
striking difference at the war colleges is in rigor. Former Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey emphasized this
point when he rewrote the NDU mission statement in 2011.3 Graduate
2      Joan Johnson-Freese, Ellen Haring, and Marybeth Ulrich, “The Counter-Productive ‘Sea of
Sameness’ in PME,” Joint Force Quarterly 74 (3rd Quarter 2014): 59.
3      Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), National Defense University Policy, Chairman of Instruction (CJCSI)
1801.01C (Washington, DC: JCS, September 2011).
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students at top civilian colleges progress through a stressful program
with high admissions standards. These programs require lengthy
papers; frequent, graded presentations; and heavy reading, and they
have demanding professors. In general, the war college experience does
not. Students in these civilian programs may be significantly younger
than war college students, despite the intensity of the programs and the
advanced nature of the material covered. Yet the demands placed on
them are significantly more stringent.
The approach found in the best civilian graduate schools is mirrored
in the service academies. There the competition for admission is among
the most demanding in the nation. Cadets and midshipmen are relentlessly
graded and rank ordered to determine their future career fields and
assignments. Midterm and final examinations as well as lengthy term
papers are standard. By any measure, the service academy experience is
demanding and marked by rigorously enforced high standards.
These examples share traits with other institutions such as law,
business, and engineering schools that provide professional preparation
and accreditation. Their acknowledged excellence in education stems
from a number of factors, including ample resources, quality faculty,
talented administrators, demanding programs, and supportive alumni.
But there are at least two other factors that contribute to their excellence.
First, top academic institutions are invariably marked by competition.
Quality institutions compete for students, faculty, and resources—and
among themselves for academic ranking. Their students compete
ferociously for honors designations and PhD program admissions that
will mean much in later years. In all walks of life, fair competition
encourages excellence and separates high performers from the mean.
Second, academic excellence is rooted in incentives. In programs with
real rigor, poor performers are weeded out, while top performers can
expect more and better opportunities. Linking future opportunities to
present performance is ubiquitous in American society. In PME at the
war college level, these attributes are weak or not present.4
The lack of competition and incentives in the war colleges is all the
more remarkable given the professional environment from which their
students are drawn. Military officers live and work in a highly competitive
up-or-out professional milieu from the time they enter precomissioning
programs. Civilian students from government agencies come from
similar organizational cultures. Proven performers are rewarded with
promotions, awards, and selection for command. Yet at the war college
level, students do not really compete with each other, and the colleges
have no need to compete among themselves for graduates or resources.
Performance, whether strong or poor, has little or no correlation to
future assignments, promotion, or command selection.5
4      Christopher J. Lamb and Brittany Porro, “Next Steps for Transforming Education at National
Defense University,” Joint Force Quarterly 76 (1st Quarter 2015): 40–47.
5      Joan Johnson-Freese and Kevin P. Kelley, “Meaningful Metrics for Professional Military
Education,” Joint Force Quarterly 84 (1st Quarter 2017): 65–71.
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Contemporary Complications

Defenders of the current system sometimes argue the war colleges
are schools of practice—in a sense, trade schools—and thus should not
be held to high academic standards.6 Through the 1980s, for example,
war colleges did not confer academic degrees. Today, however, all
students receive an accredited civilian master’s degree. Accordingly, the
principles of academic selection, competition, and merit seem just as
applicable to senior practitioners of the military profession as they are
to the legal, medical, and engineering professions to which the military
compares itself. The growing intersection between purely military affairs
on the one hand and political economy, technology, international law,
and diplomacy on the other suggests the comparison is not spurious and
the institutional processes that support excellence in other professional
schools should apply equally to the war colleges.
A complicating factor is that the war colleges have little control over
admissions. From one point of view, military students are of uniformly
high quality in that most will be promoted to colonel or equivalent,
and virtually all generals and admirals will come from their ranks. By
definition, this represents a significant quality cut. From another point
of view, students are selected for attendance by their service or agency
without regard for academic qualifications other than a bachelor’s
degree, which might vary widely in quality. Most students will not
become general or flag officers.
A typical war college seminar may include an air force fighter pilot,
a navy submariner, an army tank officer, and a marine infantryman—
fields from which the great majority of future general or flag officers
will be drawn. But it might also include a personnel officer, nurse,
military lawyer, chaplain, and acquisitions officer. These professional
backgrounds differ substantially. Academic backgrounds also vary
widely, from Ivy League and service academy graduates with master’s
degrees already in hand to graduates of third-tier colleges who have
not been in a classroom for decades. This wide variety forces the war
colleges to teach to a mean that does not challenge top students and
militates against order-of-merit rankings, since some students are
clearly disadvantaged academically from the outset. In fact, “Students
who were unlikely candidates for graduate study in the first place will
pass with good grades alongside their more exceptional colleagues, with
little distinction between their final records.” 7 In particular, meeting
the aspiration to produce well-educated and capable senior leaders is
hindered by the lack of an academic baseline from which to begin.
Another complication is while the war colleges describe themselves
as strategy schools, most students will never be strategists. Many
are disqualified by their career specialty. Lawyers, medical officers,
chaplains, weather officers, personnel officers, and many others who
6      Johnson-Freese and Kelley, “Meaningful Metrics.”
7      Joan Johnson-Freese, “The Reform of Military Education: Twenty-Five Years Later,” Orbis
56, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 148.
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regularly attend the war colleges will never serve in a strategist position
or professionally apply a curriculum heavy on Thucydides, Machiavelli,
Jomini, or Clausewitz. Most war college students will not be promoted
past the rank of O-6 and have only a few years remaining before
retirement. It is certainly true that tactical or operational excellence is
probably enough for most officers. But the relative few who will become
service chiefs, combatant commanders, or senior strategists (such as
two- and three-star directors for strategy, plans, and policy) must operate
as true strategists at a very challenging political-military interface. The
colonels and one-stars who support them must be strategists as well.
The foregoing suggests multiple tracks offering a more flexible
approach are better suited to the existing war college student population
and will better serve the interagency and joint warfighting communities.8
Student choice, based on background, interests, and future career
aspirations also accords better with midcareer adult learning as described
in the current literature.9
As some have pointed out, comparing war colleges to civilian
institutions is not a perfect fit.10 War colleges have a specific purpose,
somewhat different from other graduate institutions, which accounts for
their hybrid governance structures among other variations. Nevertheless,
they are graduate academic institutions accredited by civilian bodies
and organized along traditional academic lines. They award approved
civilian graduate degrees, and participate fully in broader academic
consortia alongside civilian counterparts. War college faculty members
frequently cite civilian institutions as models when arguing for academic
tenure and greater control over curricula. Though there are differences,
there are many similarities. The contention that the differences should
somehow excuse a lack of rigor therefore seems a stretch.
Relatedly, the literature on JPME often makes reference to a supposed
anti-intellectual bias on the part of senior military leaders that accounts
for the lack of rigor in the war colleges.11 One study of promotion and
command selection boards across 13 years even concluded officers with
higher cognitive or intellectual abilities were significantly disadvantaged.12
At the top, officers with superior academic qualifications—such as
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Rear Admiral William
James Crowe Jr., former Supreme Allied Commander Admiral James
G. Stavridis, former Air Force Vice Chief of Staff General Robert H.
Foglesong, former Commander US Central Command General David
    8      Patrick M. Cronin, “A Strategic Education: The Ends and Means of the Intellectual
Battlespace,” Marine Corps Gazette 94, no. 6 (June 2010): 10.
   9      Michael A. Beitler, “Midlife Adults in Self-Directed Learning: A Heuristic Study in Progress,”
in Expanding Horizons in Self-Directed Learning, ed. Huey B. Long (Norman: University of Oklahoma,
1997).
10      George E. Reed, “The Pen and the Sword: Faculty Management Challenges in the Mixed
Cultural Environment of a War College,” Joint Force Quarterly 72 (1st Quarter 2014): 15.
11      Reed, “Pen and the Sword,” 15; and Johnson-Freese, Haring, and Ulrich, “CounterProductive,” 148.
12      Everett S. P. Spain, J. D. Mohundro, and Bernard B. Banks, “Intellectual Capital: A Case for
Cultural Change,” Parameters 45, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 83–84.
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Petraeus, former National Security Adviser Lieutenant General Brent
Scowcroft, and former National Security Adviser Lieutenant General H.
R. McMaster, all of whom hold PhDs—do exist. Still, it is clear, tactical
and operational experience and successful service with higher-level staffs
carry far more weight than academic achievement. Officers noted for
their intellectual accomplishments, even when accompanied by extensive
and successful service in the field or with the fleet, can be suspect if for
no other reason than they are outliers from the norm. Though tactical
and operational excellence are, and should be, requirements for future
success, demonstrated intellectual capacity at the strategic level should
also be necessary for our most senior leaders.
Modernizing or transforming JPME is wrenching and hard.
Proposals to modernize or transform the war colleges typically excite
strong opposition from entrenched faculties. Yet momentum continues
to build as the field evolves and as the conduct of war transforms. Ideally,
moving from good to great at the war colleges would involve retaining
what is best and improving the rest. If so, what can be done to make
good institutions even better?

Recommendations

Despite the blunt assessment of PME in the 2018 National Defense
Strateg y, our war colleges offer invaluable opportunities to network
and learn from peers—a year set aside for reflection, professional
development, and personal growth; fundamentally sound core curricula;
varied and cutting-edge elective offerings; individual attention from
professors and mentors; and superb facilities and campus settings.
Every war college also boasts some outstanding teachers and scholars.
Unquestionably, the war college year provides valuable learning
experiences at an optimum point along the military officer’s career
timeline. Building on these positive aspects, here are some steps that
can take the war colleges to the next level of excellence.
The pool of war college students is a good place to start. Military
students are typically selected on the basis of performance as staff
officers and commanders, generally without reference to academic
preparation. Some have proposed altering the student pool by granting
greater admissions control to war college staff and faculty. This would
undoubtedly enable a better student baseline, but face opposition
from service personnel managers. Noted academics have suggested
restricting resident attendance at war colleges to those officers who pass
a qualifying examination.13 An alternative is a diagnostic examination
upon entry to determine placement in different tracks based on prior
academic preparation, student interest, and likely future assignments as
well as potential for promotion to general/flag officer.

13      Williamson Murray, “Transformation and Professional Military Education: Past as Prologue
to the Future,” in National Security Challenges for the Future, ed. Williamson Murray (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 14–15.
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The National Defense University’s Joint Education Transformation
Initiative, undertaken at Dempsey’s behest, attempted to do just that
in 2014.14 Early versions suggested at least three tracks for war college
students based on their interests, backgrounds, and potential: a standard
war college track, a more challenging graduate program requiring a thesis,
and for a select few, an honors or PhD program. But faculty resistance
successfully blunted these proposals and NDU war colleges remain, at
least for now, substantially unchanged. To achieve real progress in this
direction, strong and sustained support not only from the chairman
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff but also from the Department of Defense
and congressional oversight committees will likely be needed. To quote
Robert H. Scales, former commandant of the US Army War College,
“Real PME reform can only happen through the blunt instrument of
legislative action.”15
Applying some of the same principles that we see in the service
academies and civilian graduate programs could also produce more
qualified and capable war college graduates. Class rankings that are
entered on transcripts and in academic efficiency reports represent a
first step in the direction of rigor. Tying war college performance to
future selection for assignment, command, and promotion would be an
even larger step. Even modest attrition in war college graduate programs
would signal greater emphasis on serious preparation for higherlevel responsibilities in the military profession. As an approximate
benchmark, law school academic attrition rates (defined as disenrollment
for not meeting academic standards) averaged 6.46 percent in 2016–17,
according to the American Bar Association. Law students, of course,
are subjected to stiff admissions requirements. Testing by examination,
analogous to the comprehensive examinations required in civilian
graduate programs, for admissions, program placement, and graduation
would go far to determine the exceptional performers we need to defend
the nation going forward. All of these will meet resistance, yet all rest
comfortably within the norms of academe.
Every war college faculty boasts some superb professors who would
stand out at any institution. But in general, the war colleges are not
ranked among the very best for the excellence of their faculties.16 While
most military faculty are O-6s—and war college graduates—almost
none will be selected for promotion to general/flag officer. In this
sense, the military services are “voting” for less-than-stellar programs
by not sending a proportional number of their best to JPME institutions.
Military faculty members are overwhelmingly successful, hardworking,
and conscientious officers devoted to their work. But their selection as
military faculty indicates they are out of the running for advancement.17

14      Gregg F. Martin and John W. Yaeger, “Break Out: A Plan for Better Equipping the Nation’s
Future Strategic Leaders,” Joint Force Quarterly 73 (2nd Quarter 2014): 39–43.
15      Robert H. Scales, “Too Busy to Learn,” Proceedings 136, no. 2 (February 2010): 5.
16      Johnson-Freese, Haring, and Ulrich, “Counter-Productive,” 145–46.
17      Murray, “Transformation,” 12.
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Though this has been the norm for many years, at one time our staff
and war college faculties provided the seed for the most senior ranks.
During World War II, for example, 31 of the 35 most successful corps
commanders had previously taught in a service school.18 If JPME is as
important as we believe, a move in this direction would send a strong
signal.
For their part, while some civilian war college professors enjoy
national reputations in their fields, most do not, and others actively
eschew scholarship as a distraction from the teaching mission. This
dilemma deserves a more in-depth discussion. The war colleges typically
offer attractive six-figure salaries compared to a national average of
$64,000 for other full-time social science faculty with comfortable
workloads. Furthermore, NDU has de facto tenure with a 90 percent
contract renewal rate compared to 24 percent of civilian faculty who
were tenured in 2003.19 Opportunities to conduct research are ample.
Classroom sizes are small and administrative requirements, despite
occasional grumbling, are less than those at counterpart civilian
institutions. What then is the problem?
The answer is probably that the academic aspirations and
reputations of the war colleges are somewhat lower than leading
civilian graduate schools, and the very best academic talent is therefore
not drawn to them.20 War colleges modeled on top graduate schools
would probably draw top academic talent. An infusion of younger
and midcareer academic talent, to complement experienced military
and civilian practitioners would bring innovation and fresh insights to
war college faculties that could use them. But first, academic standards
should be raised to approximate the best professional institutions. This
would likely attract top faculty.
One further point may warrant discussion. The Socratic method
described above has become an article of faith at all war colleges, and it has
much to offer. What it does not do particularly well is require emerging
senior leaders to address and solve complex problems under pressure.
The importance of this trait for senior leaders was communicated to
Congress in 2010 in the regard that some commanders “consider[ed]
their staff officers lacking in certain critical abilities necessary to perform
their jobs effectively.”21
Solving complex problems was once the hallmark of the American
JPME system, nowhere more so than the US Naval War College before
World War II. There the faculty and student body worked out most
18      Scales, “Too Busy to Learn,” 2; and David W. Barno et al., Building Better Generals (Washington,
DC: Center for a New American Security, 2013), 21.
19      US Department of Labor, 2017; Mark Purcell, “‘Skilled, Cheap, and Desperate’: NonTenure-Track Faculty and the Delusion of Meritocracy,” Antipode 39, no. 1 (2007): 121–43; Robin
Wilson, “Tenure, RIP: What the Vanishing Status Means for the Future of Education,” Chronicle of
Higher Education, July 4, 2010; and American Association of University Professors, 2016.
20      Reed, “Pen and Sword,” 16.
21     Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Another Crossroads? Professional Military
Education Two Decades after the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel (Washington, DC: House
Committee on Armed Services, April 2010), xiv.
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of the technical and doctrinal innovations that led to victory in the
Pacific Ocean.22 War college commandants and deans must continue to
strengthen the simulation, war gaming, and exercise components of their
curricula accordingly, with special emphasis on individual assessment by
senior mentors. Done correctly, this approach could complement the
seminar environment nicely.

Concluding Thoughts

The intent here is to provide a friendly critique of our war colleges,
which are national treasures with much to be proud of. Even so, national
security is a harsh business. Virtually every major military decision in
time of war will be made by a war college graduate. The quality of
those decisions will be measured by victory or defeat and by dead and
wounded. In few other professions, perhaps none, is the need for highly
skilled practitioners so clear. If so, the standards for graduation from
our most senior military schools should be demanding and exacting. If
the profession of arms is a true profession, then it should approach its
professional education, certification, and credentialing accordingly.
This logic argues against an industrial age, one-size-fits-all war
college where every student follows the same track to guaranteed success.
One need only read the memoirs of former general and later President
Dwight D. Eisenhower and other military giants of his generation to
see how exclusive our staff and war colleges used to be, how intense
the competition was, and how useful these experiences were to their
future success. They were laboratories for world war, and because of
them, despite the military poverty and scant resources that existed
in the interwar period, the United States was able to field a cohort of
extraordinary senior military leaders that enabled victory.
In closing, the following comment from a respected scholar with
serious credentials in both JPME and civilian settings puts it well:
Actually . . . I wouldn’t choose between the two at all—I’d build an
institution that combines the best attributes of both. I’d pull together the
selfless loyalty, discipline, devotion to service, and teamwork of PME along
with the academic freedom, rigor, respect for scholarship, and job security
of civilian academe. Then I’d recruit the best military and civilian faculty and
students I could find to run and participate in it.23

As our security environment increases in complexity, the best
possible investment we can make is in leader development. The chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has made this clear. The war colleges today
provide a valuable and important service to the nation. They are ideal
platforms to take senior-leader development to the next level. These
suggestions hopefully contribute to that end.

22      Murray, “Transformation,” 4.
23      Audrey Kurth Cronin, “National Security Education: A User’s Manual,” War on the Rocks,
June 17, 2014.
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Making the War Colleges Better
Richard A. Lacquement Jr.

N

o surprise. I am a big fan of war colleges . . . particularly the
US Army War College (USAWC). The United States needs war
colleges, all six and then some, to develop national security—
especially military—expertise to serve US interests and values. All the war
colleges are joint. But to the extent they differ, each has a comparative
advantage our joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
endeavors need.
More precisely, the separate war colleges represent specialized
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, economic, and national policy
expertise while promulgating common joint elements. In typical US
military manner, this joint-but-not-unified approach to senior-service
war college education leads to healthy competition. In some regards,
such an approach is not efficient (like jointness itself). But effectiveness
is the more important standard for analyzing war colleges.
War colleges make exceptional contributions to American national
security through the leaders and ideas they produce. We should
strengthen war colleges’ effectiveness through improvements to faculty,
curriculum, and outreach. We must pursue improvements to the broader
framework of talent management affecting how we select and prepare
faculty and students as well as managing how faculty members and
graduates subsequently serve society. My aspiration is that dialogue
will advance war college endeavors, with close attention to the dynamic
international security environment.
This article has three main components. The first lays out the
argument for war colleges, emphasizing answers developed at the
USAWC regarding what we think it takes to effectively meet American
society’s security needs. The second picks up the challenge from
Hooker about “Taking the War Colleges from Good to Great,” a useful,
somewhat incomplete, and sometimes off-the-mark contribution in
which I find more to laud than criticize. The third and final section
offers additional recommendations toward making war colleges better.

Mission and Structure: The Why and How of War Colleges

Let us put the war colleges in context before focusing on how to
improve them. The mission of war colleges is to educate and develop
senior leaders for service in high-level national security assignments. War
colleges are professional schools situated within an extensive ecosystem
of professional military education (PME). Each was created by one of
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the US government’s military departments to meet vital professional
needs, and they are funded and staffed for parochial but society-focused
reasons.
The Navy Department established the Naval War College in 1884.
The War Department established the USAWC in 1901, and the Industrial
College of the Army Forces—now the Eisenhower School for National
Security and Resource Strategy—in 1924. General Eisenhower, then
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, established the National War
College in 1946. The War Department established the Air War College
in 1946, and the Marine Corps established Marine Corps University in
1991. Their missions, as with their parent organizations, aim to serve the
American people—their ultimate clients.
These six war colleges are not the only source for senior-level military
education. There are a handful of smaller programs that provide joint
senior-level education required for promotion to US military general/
flag officer ranks. The US Army also has a program for selected officers
to participate in fellowships for senior education that do not result
in joint professional military education (JPME) credit. To be eligible
for promotion to general/flag officer, USAWC Fellows must attain
JPME II credentials, most commonly through a 10-week program at the
Joint Forces Staff College.
Unlike most civilian academic institutions, war colleges are not
structured to compete for students and measure value in an open
employment market. Rather than enticing students to choose a school
to develop skills for future employment, war colleges start with students
who are already established professionals within the organizations that
fund and populate the schools. As such, the students are not the clients.
Rather, the students embody the expert talent PME programs further
develop to meet the needs of society—the true client.
War college personnel, facilities, and other resources come primarily
from tax dollars via the Department of Defense (DoD) budget.
Consequently, war colleges are guided by professional obligations to
society’s national security needs rather than the needs of individual
students or other market or business demands. This is a significant point
in that it affects almost everything about the manner in which policies
govern faculty, students, and curricula.
War colleges focus on the expert knowledge professionals require for
established military jurisdictions of practice—such as war, deterrence,
stability operations, and support to civil authorities, among others—and
adjudicate new jurisdictions such as cyber and space. Academic rigor
promulgates professional expertise. But the programs are not primarily
academic. With a step or two of logic, however, we may confidently
state students attend war college due to our society’s national security
requirements.
Befitting professional schools, faculty predominantly come from
national security community backgrounds. Faculties include active
and retired military and civilian national security professionals and are
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supplemented by civilians with academic credentials in related fields
of study, such as political science, especially the subfields of security
studies, foreign policy, American politics, and regional studies; history,
especially military; psychology, especially leadership; and business
management, especially resource and human capital management.
The preponderance of students are senior-level military officers—
primarily grades O-5 and O-6. War colleges include similarly
high-ranking military officers from allied or partner nations, and senior
civilians from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and other organizations in
the Department of Defense. Other national security professionals from
non-DoD executive departments, most prominently the Department of
State, intelligence community, and Department of Homeland Security,
also attend. The US, allied, or partner-nation governments pay for their
senior professionals to attend war colleges. Students do not pay tuition
to attend. To the degree students incur a personal cost, it is commonly in
terms of additional time they must serve their organizations subsequent
to attendance. In the Army, for example, this amounts to an additional
year of active-duty service obligation.
Student selection, which is typically competitive, is primarily a
function of each organizations’ personnel systems and policies. In the
competitive up-or-out world of US Army officers, thousands of officers
are assessed as lieutenants. About 16 years later, less than 15 percent are
competitively selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel (O-5), the
most junior rank at which an officer may be competitively selected for
war college attendance. By about 22 years, less than five percent of that
initial cohort earn promotion to colonel (O-6).
The war colleges have a dual nature. They produce both leaders
and ideas. War colleges do not promulgate a fixed, unchanging body of
knowledge merely to be mastered and applied. Yes, there are many lessons,
insights, frameworks, rules, theories, doctrine, and readily applicable
techniques that guide war college graduates’ discretionary judgment.
But no, war colleges have not solved national security equations once
and for all. Moreover, the equations themselves shift as some variables
decline in significance, although very few disappear completely, and new
variables emerge. The vast number of variables relevant to professional
judgment create a premium for generalists to serve at the apex of their
professions without discounting essential contributions of specialization
among and within organizations.
The priority of the three important factors contributing to the
mission of war colleges is faculty, curriculum, and then outreach. But
all three are indispensable to success and none can be neglected. The
faculty is the center of gravity for understanding the needs of the
national security profession, identifying and developing appropriate
expertise, and promulgating this expertise through the education and
development of future leaders. The faculty and staff work closely with
stakeholders who represent society, primarily within the executive and
legislative branches of government but also at the state level.
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The curriculum represents the body of expert knowledge that rising
national security professionals must master to meet their responsibilities
to society. The curriculum is a living body of expertise. Faculty and
students have a responsibility to learn and master that expertise and
challenge, research, and innovate to ensure expertise remains relevant
to society’s interests and values within a dynamic security environment.
The third is outreach. Students and faculty must stay connected
with those they serve. It is important for war college students, staff,
and faculty to understand the strategic environment and its challenges.
Faculty and students engage in outreach to provide insights, perspectives,
and recommendations to shape policy and strategy.
The war colleges are not the only institutions that provide national
security education. Within the Department of Defense, the Naval
Post-graduate School, the Air Force Institute of Technology, and some
other DoD education and development institutions also provide joint
education at the senior level. But no major counterpart to DoD education
and development exists elsewhere in the executive branch. The State
Department, for example, has some educational programs for midcareer
professionals but nothing as extensive as JPME.
The civilian academic community also has an array of academic
programs that provide education, and some development, relevant to
the national security establishment. Public policy programs and business
schools may address academic topics relevant to national security
professionals. But these programs are not sufficient for society’s national
security needs.
High-quality public policy schools, such as Princeton’s Woodrow
Wilson School and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies, offer wonderful graduate programs that predominantly support
the development and certification of junior students who aspire to
become professionals in the public service realm, including the national
security community. Business schools, such as the University of
Pennsylvania’s Wharton School and Northwestern’s Kellogg School of
Management, provide valuable complementary programs that deal with
large enterprises in the market-driven economy. Yet both public policy
and business schools typically cater to individual student customers.

The Challenge: “Taking the War Colleges from Good to Great”

Hooker’s welcome addition to the literature is a praiseworthy,
thoughtful analysis. I strongly agree with the overall theme and the
spirit behind Hooker’s recommendations to make war colleges better.
Furthermore, the categories he concentrates on—students, faculty, and
curriculum—are important. I also agree the focus must be on what the
nation and its taxpayers deserve.
The author provides helpful suggestions—greater attention to war
college faculty assignments and composition; strengthening faculty
teaching, scholarship, and service; greater attentiveness to student
selection; better tailoring war college opportunities to accord with
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student and organizational demands; and continued attention to war
college curricular rigor and scope, including how to keep pace with key
contemporary challenges. I also endorse Hooker’s implicit point that
academic and professional standards are complementary. On the other
hand, I find his focus on academic rather than professional standards
unbalanced.
My strongest critique is that Hooker introduces major distortions
by emphasizing academic over professional standards. Academic and
professional standards are not mutually exclusive. But the distinction is
important. Part of the problem is Hooker unduly focuses on unspecified
civilian academic programs as the primary comparison for war colleges.
Generally he tends to focus on the master’s degrees war colleges award
in drawing comparisons to civilian programs.
This comparison between civilian and military education is
inapt for two main reasons. First, even when comparing war college
curricula with other civilian professional programs such as business,
law, medicine, and public policy, a salient difference exists in the nature
of the body of knowledge such programs impart to their professionals.
Most professional schools focus on a well-defined, specialized body of
knowledge within which the judgment of professionals is delimited—
medical professionals and health, legal professionals and law, business
professionals and profits. Such programs focus on specialization.
For the military, the development of senior professionals focuses
on a broader and more general body of knowledge encompassing a wide
array of human dynamics and fundamental threats to life and security
in a context of actual or potential violence. The closest parallel to war
colleges may be public policy schools that weave interdisciplinary
economics, governance, and politics. These may have been the schools
Hooker had in mind—but he should be specific. Military services have
long included such schools as part of professional development pathways.
I graduated from one myself, and I know many other war college faculty
members—civilian and military—who are products of such programs.
Second, with few exceptions, civilian graduate programs are
designed for students seeking basic professional qualifications (law
school as a means to practice law, medical schools as the means to
practice medicine). The same is generally true of business and public
policy schools where the preponderance of students are in the entry or
early stages of professional careers, and these schools serve as venues
to develop basic expertise for careers of practice. Nevertheless, there is
sometimes a parallel between war colleges and business or public policy
schools when the latter provide programs for midcareer professionals. A
more appropriate comparison is likely that of war college graduation rates
and retention with such midcareer master’s programs rather than with
either undergraduate- or entry- level professional graduate schooling.
Several points in the article beg for correction or clarification.
Among the minor points in need of correction or elaboration
are assertions about jointness, program length, competitive selection,
TOC

20

Parameters 49(4) Winter 2019–20

academic standards, elective choices, the value of war college experience
to future student and faculty assignments, and one-size-fits-all
characterizations.
To start with, all war colleges are joint—not just National and
Eisenhower. For the services, JPME credit may not be the predominant
focus, but it is a statutory requirement as it is for National Defense
University programs. Hooker also only references the 10-month
programs common to resident education across war colleges and fails to
recognize the nature, structure, and contributions of distance programs,
such as those at the Naval War College, Air War College, Joint Forces
Staff College, and the Army War College that support a substantial
population of reserve component students associated with the federal
reserves and National Guard. Furthermore, although not necessarily
available to all distance students, a substantial subset of students in the
Army War College’s 2-year distance education program also earn JPME
II qualifications and a master’s degree—just like students in the resident
program.
The assertion students do not compete for admission to war
colleges is only partly accurate. True, there are no individual application
requirements similar to military service academies or typical civilian
undergraduate and graduate programs. Conceptually, such programs
differ from war colleges as gatekeepers to particular professions. In
contrast, war colleges focus on developing and educating seasoned
professionals for additional responsibilities. The dominance of
professional, organizational imperatives in the war colleges’ missions
have few parallels to civilian programs.
As noted earlier, in a broader context, war college students do
compete for attendance. The competition for war college student
selection is institutional. The services typically compare performance
and potential across officers’ entire careers when deciding who to select
for war college attendance. For the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps,
the selection is centralized. For all students, selection for attendance is
made by organizations or countries to which student quotas have been
allocated. Prerequisites of rank (O-5 or O-6) and the possession of a
bachelor’s degree mark a high baseline for the quality of the student
body.
I find the assertion about war colleges not meeting academic
standards puzzling. As Hooker points out, the master’s degrees war
colleges award are accredited by the same regional accreditation bodies
as civilian graduate schools. Further, all war colleges must continue to
meet civilian graduate degree standards to retain accreditation, just as
the USAWC did in 2019 to fulfill the Middle States Commission on
Higher Education requirements for eight more years of accreditation.
The claim war colleges fail to accommodate student choice also
seems off the mark. True, the interests of the organizations selecting
midcareer professionals for war college attendance dominate. And
selections are governed by a quota, particularly among the military
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services, to ensure all war college student bodies have an appropriately
joint, interagency, and multinational character. But for many individuals,
personal preference is a major factor. Talent management opportunities
include the choice of which war college an individual attends.
Once students arrive at a war college, they have many other choices.
And each war college has dynamics to reconcile such student choice
with institutional requirements. All offer elective courses as part of
their educational programs. At the USAWC, in addition to electives,
there are several special programs subject to competitive selection in
which more than a quarter of students participate. Although the core
curriculum demands the majority of students’ time, we have found
several ways to tailor each educational experience. We intend to expand
such opportunities in coming years.
Major offerings include the Carlisle Scholars Program (defense
research and writing); the Advanced Strategic Art Program (nationallevel military policy, strategy, and campaigning); the National
Security Policy Program (the nexus of national security policy and
strategy development); the Advanced Defense Management Program
(DoD resources management); the Joint Land Air Sea Space exercise
(JLASS-EX) that culminates with a war game involving students from
several war colleges; the Futures seminar that supports the Army’s deep
futures wargame (Unified Quest); and the Eisenhower Series College
Program (an array of high-quality national security engagements around
the country).
I disagree with Hooker’s assertion that student performance at a
war college does not matter. Nevertheless, I am aware of the broader
conventional wisdom that a competitive selection to war college is
more important than attendance itself. But I do not think conventional
wisdom holds up across the board. Related to this, the claim that class
rankings are not used on transcripts and evaluation reports is not true
for all war colleges.
At the USAWC, class ranking has been part of both the resident and
distance programs since 2013. Our current system, aligned with recent
changes to the Army’s official academic evaluation report, identifies the
distinguished graduates—the top 10 percent—and superior graduates—
the next highest 20 percent of the class. The academic evaluation report
is the official rating entered into an Army officer’s personnel file upon
completion of a major academic program. The new version of the form
for USAWC attendees includes a section that requires a rank-ordered
forced distribution designation (distinguished graduate, superior
graduate, graduate) in a very similar fashion to the forced distribution
selections on an Army officer evaluation report. The Naval War College
has also identified class ranking—the top 5 percent graduate with
highest distinction and the next 15 percent with distinction.
The claim that war college performance has no impact on an
individual’s future career is hard to confirm. As one input among
many in a typical individual’s career file, I suspect the real answer is
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idiosyncratic by organization. My observation of student interest and
attention to overall war college academic distinction and other honors,
writing awards for example, suggests students themselves often perceive
such distinctions as valuable for enhancing their career prospects.
The Army academic evaluation report, in addition to noting
distinguished and superior performance, allows recognition of focused
work in areas of concentration, such as regional studies and special
programs, and provides space for narrative comments on awards and
other accomplishments. What difference do such items make to boards
and assignment officers? I have plenty of anecdotal evidence such
information has been perceived as important. I can attest to efforts at
the USAWC that have influenced officer assignments (most often for US
Army officers) based on student performance at the college. Establishing
better fidelity appears to require further study. But a blanket dismissal
strikes me as off the mark.
Regarding faculty, Hooker makes a statement I have heard often that
may capture a partial truth. He cites evidence that “almost [no faculty]
will be selected for promotion” and asserts services do not value war
colleges. Again, lore and conventional wisdom, whatever the original
source, may capture some truth. But this is a question that begs for a
baseline. Let us start with the obvious fact many war college military and
civilian faculty are already senior leaders. Colonels and Navy captains
(O-6s) are senior ranks. Many State Department faculty hold one- and
two-star equivalent ranks of counselor or minister counselor. Active and
retired members of the senior executive service—general/flag officer
equivalents—are also well-represented among war college faculty.
Turning to nongovernment civilian faculty, war college faculty exhibit
profiles of rather remarkable senior professionals.
As to the matter of promotion after a faculty assignment, I believe
more research might be in order. What number would constitute more
than “almost none”? I have personal experience within the past eight
years with five US Army general officers who served as war college
faculty (Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson and Brigadier General
Patrick J. Donahoe at the Naval War College as well as Brigadier General
Brian Cashman, Brigadier General Susie S. Kuilan, and Major General
Gregg F. Martin at the Army War College).
Nevertheless, I agree with the more general point that service on
a war college faculty should be more career enhancing. Services would
do well to think of war college faculty as a “second graduating class”
deserving greater consideration for future promotion and assignments.
This approach would be in line with how duty as a service academy
instructor can have beneficial results and in line with positive examples
of general/flag officers in World War II who had faculty experience
before that war.
Regarding the national standing of civilian war college professors,
I again challenge Hooker to be more rigorous. My anecdotal evidence
suggests very impressive junior scholars exist across the PME enterprise.
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Of course, given war colleges are primarily schools of professional
education and practice, dismissing senior practical experience of both
civilian and uniformed faculty seems inappropriate. Many civilian
faculty are widely respected in senior government circles—the primary
audience for the war colleges’ graduates and ideas.
The “industrial age, one-size-fits-all” critique appears to be a
strawman that falls apart with just a quick glance across the literature
Hooker cites, and a brief read into each of the war college’s programs.
The six war colleges are certainly not cookie cutter replicas of each
other, and they do not all follow the same developmental models. As
pointed out earlier, they represent many healthy competitive features of
jointness itself.
I have visited, attended, or studied several civilian public policy
programs—the closest civilian counterparts to war colleges—and the
war colleges compare favorably. Both sets of programs are very much
of the current age and confront the challenges of information, of
technology, and of intertwined, interdisciplinary subjects that make war
and other major governance issues such wicked problems. Maybe it is
just me, but the industrial age metaphor does not resonate.
I found another minor point confusing if not inaccurate: one of
the first endnotes states, “Civilian faculty members write most PME
critiques.” My quick tally of sources cited by Hooker in the body and
notes of the article yields a heavy majority of individuals I would
categorize as military or military faculty, including epigraphs at the start
of the article from retired Army General Martin Dempsey and retired
Marine Corps General James Mattis. Personally, I find it appropriate
and healthy that military professionals are active in critiquing and
challenging professional military education.
Some other minor points beg for clarity. I concur with Hooker’s call
to consider better ways to build experiential learning such as increased
simulation, war gaming, and exercises into war college curriculum.
But he does so without evidence or baseline as to what is already
happening. I am familiar with evidence, especially at the USAWC,
that reflects increased experiential learning through staff rides, war
games, simulations, case studies, exercises, and a variety of roll-playing
activities. I have heard and read passionate pleas for greater attention to
certain techniques—such as the use of board games, strategy exercises,
and decision-forcing case studies—that helpfully contribute to debates
over how to invest our students’ educational time. But the debate is a
broader one that constantly seeks to balance myriad techniques—some
as ancient, yet still as relevant, as Socratic dialogue.
Many foregoing points are directed at assumptions, assertions, or
conventional wisdom that have questionable validity. I challenge them.
But I do not dismiss them. Hooker raises important questions worthy
of additional research and comparison across the war colleges. Overall,
Hooker deploys the points in the service of worthy recommendations to
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strengthen the quality of war college faculty, students, and curriculum—
objectives for which I count myself an ally.

Assessing the Situation: What Needs to Change?

As with any profession, expertise and practice must evolve as society’s
needs change. Tools, techniques, and context for applying violence to
impose one’s will upon others are not static. Hence, war colleges cannot
be static and thus risk stagnation. Furthermore, war colleges do not
stand alone. Within the defense establishment, war colleges are vital
segments of a vast training, education, and development community
that combines features tailored for parochial service responsibilities
nested within a common, overarching, joint professional framework.
Within US society, imperatives of healthy civil-military relations require
American military professional education to nest within the broader
national community, as one among many professions American society
needs to survive and thrive.
War colleges seek to prevent war but must prepare their graduates
to use violence or coercion successfully for security, liberty, prosperity,
justice, happiness, and blessings better associated with peace. War as an
instrument of protecting or realizing these higher aspirations draws on
specialized knowledge and expertise requiring deep study. Indeed, the
core professional expertise in the instrumental use of violence makes its
mastery through education much more desirable than its development
through practice.
Hooker offers valuable recommendations. Having reviewed recent
literature on PME in general and senior-level (war college) PME in
particular, my sense is we are ripe for a comprehensive review to assess
existing programs and to consider new approaches aimed at making war
colleges better.
What would a comprehensive review look like? Frankly, some of it
already happens routinely. The Military Education Coordination Council
(MECC), overseen by the Joint Staff, is a collaborative body empowered
and motivated by the Goldwater-Nichols reforms to improve jointness
across professional military education. Across the war colleges, PME
leaders compare notes with other American PME institutions and with
allied and partner counterparts around the world.
Responding to the 2018 National Defense Strateg y and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford, the MECC
is working to revamp the Officer Professional Military Education
Program to focus on learning outcomes, continuing a trend that has
been building in PME and the American higher education community
more generally. Complementary pairing of military and civilian
accreditation processes induces a healthy dialogue between communities
of national security professionals and representatives of other fields
of expert knowledge associated with higher education. Additionally,
MECC members are working to frame a new vision of PME and talent
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management that directly answers the challenge outlined in the 2018
National Defense Strateg y.
Additionally, drawing the threads together from the foregoing
sections, improvements should focus on how war colleges contribute
to talent management and should include several important endeavors.
War colleges should increase their emphasis on faculty quality,
particularly military faculty, as a means to improve student learning
outcomes. Additionally, we should do more to highlight faculty
experience—the tremendous value of our “second graduating class”—
who have much to give back to the profession in future strategic and
operational assignments.
We should, for example, take advantage of the authority to extend
select faculty military officers beyond mandatory retirement dates to
draw additional benefit from their professional seasoning. In addition
to rotating more faculty back to strategic and operational assignments,
we should identify serving national security professionals—military
and civilian—who should be given extended time to conduct teaching,
scholarship, and service using the war colleges as their home base.
War colleges should develop more fidelity about the experience,
talents, limitations, and interests of incoming students as a means for
assessing what might best assist them to meet the profession’s evolving
needs.
War colleges should more clearly understand student talent to better
tailor war college curricula to their anticipated future responsibilities
and assignments. We should start by giving greater recognition to our
students’ senior-level experience and expertise.
Program improvements should better leverage state-of-the-art
insights on educational methodologies, tools to assess strengths
and weaknesses of incoming students, and ways to incorporate
student preferences. We should consider increasing ways to focus on
individualized needs through mechanisms such as specialized elective
programs and areas of concentrations that better match students’
anticipated future assignment paths and interests. Given improvements
to collaborative tools, it may even make sense to share more experiences
across the war colleges using online, resident, or blended methods, as is
already the case with the JLASS-EX.
Finally, keeping faith with the war colleges’ roots as extensions
of military staffs, we should retain and even strengthen the manner
in which faculty and student compositions—such as research papers,
projects, war games, briefings, and outreach—contribute to exploration
of and possible solutions to real-world problems. We should continue
to provide relevant support through integrated research projects,
connections to wargaming efforts (such as Unified Quest), and through
our war college students’ and faculty members’ routine engagements
with national security leaders across the entire joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational spectrum.
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Conclusion

Professional military education has always focused on professional
practice rather than basic research, the acquisition of knowledge, or
the self-actualization of students. It is effective only if it contributes
to achieving American national security aims. National security issues
are exceptionally complex. War colleges are among the profession’s
key mechanisms for analyzing issues and working to develop effective
solutions. Fundamentally, I concur with Hooker in his aspiration to
make war colleges greater. But I disagree with him about how much the
war colleges should look like civilian academic institutions. Although
there are useful lessons and common approaches PME and civilian
academia can share, none of the civilian programs I am aware of are
adequate substitutes for any of the war colleges. I also do not envision a
civilian program that should be.
The United States possesses a marvelous constellation of civilian
and military educational institutions that stand among the best in
the world. Stepping back to view officer professional development
in its fullness, the complementary nature of contributions from both
civilian and military education is an obvious benefit to society. The war
colleges, along with the service academies, command and staff colleges,
and several other professionally focused educational programs, should
remain instruments with which the US military develops its professionals
to meet American national security requirements.
The armed forces should not outsource this interdisciplinary
obligation. America’s armed forces are able to tap the world’s best
civilian higher education system to supplement professional education
requirements. But the armed services have the fundamental responsibility
to educate and to develop their own professionals—military officers—
most prominently. Strong and healthy war colleges, driven by professional
imperatives and supplemented by academic virtues, are crucial to
America’s national security.
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ABSTRACT: This article argues despite opportunities to
learn valuable strategic lessons from Denmark’s effort in the
Afghanistan War (2001–14), Danish civil authorities implemented
a comprehensive approach policy that failed to establish a bridge
to lessons learned by the military. Denmark’s experience in the
Afghanistan War demonstrates promises and perils of lessons
learned processes.

I

n the dynamic security environment of the post-Cold War era, the
small nation of Denmark has exploited its political-military agility to
craft distinct contributions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and argue that operational impact matters more than sheer size.1 The
so-called comprehensive approach to civil-military cooperation—the
Danish and NATO version of whole-of-government policy—is a
case in point. It was conceptualized during the Afghanistan campaign
as a way to shape all strategic, operational, and tactical lines of effort
into a multinational framework, and Denmark leveraged its tight-knit
government community centered in Copenhagen and its can-do, activist
strategic culture to be at the forefront.
Despite the promise of the comprehensive approach, however, the
civilian government failed to learn strategic lessons. This failure can
be attributed not least to the fact that the effort in Afghanistan was
overwhelmingly military, whereas the comprehensive approach policy
was civil-military. From the decision to deploy a battle group, and then
put it in command of a specific and difficult territory—the Nahr-e Saraj
district, comprising the commercial center, Gereshk, and part of the
green zone along the Helmand River—the military went all in, adapting
to counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare.
Other government agencies and especially nongovernmental actors
have been less enthusiastic participants on the ground in Afghanistan.
The fact that the celebrated comprehensive approach worked better in
Copenhagen than in Helmand leads us to another source of failure,
namely, the limited energy a nation can derive from its self-image. Danish
officials like to convey that their country is a small, smart, and tough
country. Lessons learned processes likely to confirm this self-image tend
1     The author is grateful for the insightful comments from two anonymous Parameters reviewers;
to Sibylle Scheipers and Hew Strachan for inviting this contribution to an Afghanistan workshop
held in St. Andrews, Scotland, in January 2019; to Jens Ringsmose for constructive discussions; and
to Julie Homegaard Milland for valuable research assistance. Where reference is made to Danish
publications, the author has translated Danish titles into English.
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to gain political support, whereas processes that are likely to challenge
it do not.
Ultimately, Danish decisionmakers have proven unwilling to initiate
learning processes that challenge the country’s underlying culture of
informal and reactive leadership. Danish security and development
organizations have learned from the Afghanistan War, for sure, but as
Danish civil authorities have preferred to play to their own perceived
strengths while ignoring politically difficult issues, the overall result is
impoverished learning. The Danish case thus illustrates the promises
and pitfalls offered by lessons learned processes. Organizations need
them, but political masters struggle to define and connect them. To
paraphrase a US lessons learned inquiry, Denmark is a case study of
how easy it is to encounter lessons but how difficult it is to learn—
digest and implement—certain lessons, especially strategic ones.2
This article explores the Danish case of learning selective lessons,
tracing the interaction of national policy, military efforts, and the
comprehensive approach.

Political-Strategic Lessons

As the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission
concluded in 2014, the political parties behind defense agreements,
which compose the large majority of parties across the political spectrum,
initiated a formal lessons learned process culminating in mid-2016 in a
set of three publicly available reports.3 But because this process focused
on comprehensive and coordinated action to stabilize fragile states, it
was not a comprehensive evaluation of Danish policy and Afghanistan
engagement but of a narrow facet of the effort.4
The first report, managed by the Danish Institute of International
Studies, a think tank under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Denmark (MFA), addressed the sum of international experiences with
comprehensive approaches (also known as whole-of-government or
defense, diplomacy, and development) to stabilization. It did not evaluate
Danish policy in particular. The second report, led by development
consultants hired by the MFA, explicitly addressed only the Danish
development aid to Afghanistan. The third report, managed by the Royal
Danish Defense College, assessed civil-military cooperation projects
managed by the Ministry of Defense. As civil-military cooperation is
a circumscribed set of activities, the report de facto dealt with a mere
€ 1.1 million of € 1,533 million in Danish military expenditures related
to Afghanistan—0.07 percent.
The limited scope of the report could be, at least in part, a reflection
of the political process of establishing the lessons learned mandate in the
2      Richard D. Hooker Jr. and Joseph J. Collins, eds., Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2015), 4–5.
3      Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier (DIIS), Afghanistan: Lessons Learned 2001–2014, Report
1 (Copenhagen: DIIS, 2016); DIIS, Afghanistan: Lessons Learned 2001–2014, Report 2 (Copenhagen:
DIIS, 2016); DIIS, Afghanistan: Lessons Learned 2001–2014, Report 3 (Copenhagen: DIIS, 2016).
4      DIIS, Mandate for Lessons Learned Process (Copenhagen: DIIS, 2014).
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first place. Several issues plagued negotiations over the mandate, finally
adopted in November 2014 as ISAF was about to terminate its mission.
The left-wing Socialist People’s Party, part of the center-left government
majority, wanted a comprehensive assessment, but one that highlighted
the virtues of a comprehensive approach. Right-wing parties saw this
as critical of the military effort and were reluctant to support such a
comprehensive assessment. Partly for the same reasons, the parties split
on whether a lessons learned process should take place at all, and if so,
whether civil servants should run it or involve independent experts.
Consequently, the broad and independent format of the three lessons
learned processes did not really address Denmark. They were written by
independent consultants who were also recipients of ministry-controlled
development aid, suggesting the possibility of less-than-independent
findings. In military affairs, lessons were written in-house and concerned
an exceedingly small proportion of the civil-military cooperation effort.
Significant political concern regarding political-strategic lessons
learned from coalition conflicts in the early twenty-first century was
evident in a parallel process that began in June 2012 and concluded only
in February 2019. This process concerned the lawfulness of war in Iraq
and the handling of detainees in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The original
design of this parallel process aimed, in part, to hold accountable Danish
decisionmakers and officials who might have acted wrongfully.5
Comprised of parties that had opposed joining the Iraq War in 2003,
the center-left government that took office in October 2011 initiated
this political-legal search for justice. A judicial commission of inquiry
did proceed. But the effort was heavily politicized and undermined
support for a comprehensive mandate behind the aforementioned three
reports. Following a change of governments in June 2015, the judicial
commission was closed. In the spirit of consensus in May 2016, however,
the parties agreed to revive the commission but now as an historical
inquiry into “the decision-making processes” that led to Danish military
participation in interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.6
The revived but delimited inquiry of 2017–19 was mandated to
balance political sore spots: the decision to become involved in the
Kosovo conflict (1998–99), made by a left-wing government, and the
decisions to join the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, made by a right-wing
government. In theory, the blame would be spread equitably. Moreover,
the inquiry was limited to the process that led to Denmark’s decision
to use armed force, not the subsequent war itself, leaving a politically
convenient black hole of political-strategic learning.
The conclusions of the historical inquiry, in particular, amply
demonstrate the discrepancy between parties’ behavior when in
5      “Mandate for Inquiry into the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Danish Ministry of Justice
(MoJ), April 11, 2012.
6      MoJ, Agreement on Independent Historical Inquiry into Denmark’s Military Engagement in Kosovo, Iraq,
and Afghanistan (Copenhagen: MoJ, 2016).
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government and when in opposition.7 On the one hand, the inquiry
highlights the considerable degree to which shifting Danish governments,
rhetoric notwithstanding, have pursued foreign policy activism from the
same baseline—balancing support for the United Nations, the United
States, and NATO. On the other hand, it highlights how political games
result not only in the aforementioned discrepancy in behavior but also
reveal a dearth of formalized national security policy prioritization.
National security policy is developed and implemented informally and
adaptively, which keeps strategic issues fluid and allows Danish political
parties room for maneuver. The downside is a lack of a disciplining
framework to identify political-strategic priorities and draw lessons.
While dissent among political parties is normal in democracies, the
informal Danish political culture of domestic contest and competition
has proven stronger than the imperative to draw from and to embed
strategic lessons in a formal document of national security strategy.
The three aforementioned reports, along with the historical inquiry,
unsurprisingly, have not led to a course correction in strategic policy.
Rather they have fueled an ongoing game of political contestation. The
rationale of Danish decisionmakers—Denmark is better off reacting to
events—has limited value for political-strategic learning and indirectly
pushed the military, foreign policy, and development communities to
focus on lessons relevant for their particular domains but not necessarily
relevant beyond them. We shall explore each domain in turn.

Military Lessons

Denmark’s engagement in Afghanistan started in December 2001,
following a parliamentary decision to contribute aircraft and special
operations forces to the international coalition.8 Given the size of the
country, Denmark’s contribution grew to considerable proportions,
especially from 2008 to 2012, when the country deployed a battle group
to Helmand province. Today, engagement continues in the form of a
reduced training and capacity-building mission.
The Danish military effort in Helmand province was considerable,
sustained, and consistently enjoyed greater public attention than civilian
development aid, even as the latter increased along with the military
effort. In 2008, Danish annual development aid, both multilateral and
bilateral, to Afghanistan reached a level of € 65 million, which has largely
been sustained. Notably, Denmark did not shy away from “walking the
talk” as it deployed and sustained a military contribution beyond the
capacity of most other similar states. Militarily, Denmark deployed a
battle group to Helmand from 2008 to 2012, deployed a total of 18,376
personnel through the ISAF years, and sustained 43 casualties.
In January and February of 2006, the Danish government proposed,
and parliament made, a decision to deploy Danish troops to ISAF
7      Rasmus Mariager and Anders Wivel, Why Did Denmark Go to War? (Copenhagen: Rosendahls
a/s, 2019).
8      Danish parliament decision B 37, December 14, 2001.
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Regional Command South and in support of the British provincial
reconstruction team (PRT) in Lashkar Gah, Helmand province.9 With
this decision, Denmark shifted its profile from one of dispersal to one
of concentration, and it gained territorial responsibilities of its own in
the Nahr-e Saraj district.
Previously, Denmark had contributed around 50 troops for
ammunition and mine clearing in Kabul, 50 troops to the German
PRT in Feyzabad, 10 troops to the Lithuanian PRT in Chaghcharan,
and 6 troops to the Swedish PRT in Mazar-e Sharif. Politically, these
contributions reinforced Danish commitments to NATO and individual
NATO allies and partners. But beginning in 2006, Denmark shifted to
a lead role in the stabilization of a high-risk district.
Denmark rotated a total of 17 task force teams to Helmand
province. At its peak, from 2009 to 2011, each team was comprised
of approximately 700 personnel, and the Danish effort through the
ISAF years totaled nearly 20,000 personnel (see figure 1). The peak
years of dead and injured soldiers were likewise defined by the Helmand
campaign. Team 3 of 2007 lost 1 soldier. The next seven teams lost a
total of 34 soldiers before casualties declined well into 2011 (see figure 2).

Figure 1. Number of Danish soldiers deployed to Afghanistan, 2002–1710

Figure 2. Number of Danish soldiers deployed, killed, and injured in Helmand,
2006–1411
9      Danish parliament decision B 64, January 12, 2006.
10      Forsvarsministeriets Personalestyrelse, “Afghanistan,” May, 2019.
11      Forsvarskommandoen, “Danish soldiers in Helmand: Helmand Teams: Team 1 through
Team 17,” Danish Defence: Because Something Is Worth Fighting For, December 9, 2019.
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The adaptability of Danish forces is evident in this shift from
dispersed and protected deployment to the war effort in Helmand. Several
things are notable. One, the defense agreement of 2004 had a “first
in, first out” emphasis reflecting current thinking in the United States
and NATO on reaction forces and expeditionary warfare. Denmark did
organize a branch of its armed forces for international operations in the
early 1990s. But it was not until 2002, when NATO enlargement to the
Baltic states provided for a safe regional space, that the full Danish force
was geared to international operations.12 Danish land forces were then
organized into a standing first brigade for reaction and a second brigade
for training and mobilization.
The Helmand campaign undid this organizational design,
demanding a new design whereby sustaining a rotation of teams gained
priority over first in, first out. Battalions were preferred, and brigades
had no real function. Moreover, a deployed headquarters had to be
developed for the larger and more complex functional requirements of
territorial management. Finally, troops had to learn COIN warfare and
interact with the full range of civilian actors in the battle space.
Adaptability can likewise be found in the Helmand effort in
the shift from a dynamic, counterforce campaign to a more classical
clear-hold-build campaign fashioned around principles of COIN
warfare. While the distinction is relative, the period from 2006 to 2008
represents a highly dynamic facet of the campaign where Danish forces
joined the platoon house strategy of the British, got into the heaviest
fighting any Danish force had experienced since the German-Danish
War (1864), and ultimately deployed Leopard 2 main battle tanks from
Denmark to Helmand to deliver precision fire and generally dominate
the opponent. In the spring of 2009, Danish forces also participated
in Operation Panchai Palang, an offensive operation to gain control
of central Helmand. Still, by this time, a new US administration and
shift of ISAF command signaled a turn toward a less offensive, more
engaging COIN strategy.
Gradually, the Danish task force shifted from patrolling along the
Helmand River green zone to consolidating its presence in Gereshk
and partnering with the growing number of Afghan soldiers and police
forces in its area. Danish forces maintained a patrol base line in the
green zone. But from early 2012, gradually transferred responsibility
to Afghan forces. In fact, Operation Panchai Palang was intended to
clear key Taliban strongholds and enable this strategy of transitioning
to Afghan lead. Thus, in the operation’s wake, in the fall of 2009 and
early 2010, the forward operating bases were given Dari names. By
February 2012, Danish forces relinquished their commanding role to
focus on partnering and training. A special operations forces task force
deployed to Helmand in 2012 to accelerate capacity building among the

12      Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Sten Rynning, “Denmark: Happy to Fight, Will Travel,” International
Affairs 95, no. 4 (July 2019): 877–95.
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Afghan forces, leading to the unit’s first loss of life in an operation north
of Gereskh.
The army concluded its lessons learned process in March 2016 with
generic lessons applicable to deployments to Afghanistan, the Baltic,
or elsewhere:
• The military requires a mandate with a clear campaign plan, an
assessment of the capacity for force buildup in the mission area, a legal
framework for handling detainees and for employing local labor, a
memorandum of understanding and technical arrangements with host
and partner nations, and the integration of information operations in
army education.
• The military requires support for developing a full-spectrum
force capable of meeting unexpected circumstances, similar to the
aforementioned deployment of Leopard 2 battle tanks to Helmand
and the widespread introduction of tactical and subtactical drones for
surveillance and reconnaissance in Afghanistan, which also influenced
the post-Afghanistan force-on-force environment in Europe.
• Denmark requires an adjusted organization capable of better
synchronizing deployments with key allies and partners and capable
of deploying female engagement teams.
• The military education programs need to tailor staff officer education
to distinct institutional contexts of Denmark’s allies. Particularly, the
introduction of military English would support joint operations with
the United States and Britain. Enhancements should also include
a more stringent use of lessons learned processes and integrate the
home guard where applicable.
• Denmark requires fielding enough equipment for training and
deployment to meet such missions as those in Afghanistan as well as
ensuring redundant capacities for force-on-force scenarios in Europe.
• Denmark requires robust leadership capable of initiative and with the
ability to entice similar influence up and down the chain of command.
For context, Afghanistan was a company commander’s war, and
European defense and deterrence brings brigade-level leadership back
into focus.
• The military should tailor human resource policies to identify distinct
leadership profiles for training and capacity building in advance
of operations.
• The military should commit to maintaining six-month deployments to
preempt deployment fatigue. These efforts should reflect the uniquely
straining experience of sustaining task forces in Iraq and Afghanistan
over several years.
• Denmark needs an operational and readiness culture that
institutionalizes and maintains the ability of troops to endure camp
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conditions by improving training facilities at home and by increasing
access to facilities in partner nations.
• Denmark should strive for a maximum level of interoperability with
allies, including close allies such as Britain, to align understanding
of comprehensive approaches like those used in Helmand province
more easily. This capacity should also lead to more proactive use of
liaison officers.13
As mentioned, the army lessons are formulated in generic terms and
concern its organizational, tactical, and operational issues. The army has
drawn lessons and shaped them to a changing security environment and
is now in the process of implementing—actually learning—the lessons.
As such, it is a promising case of lessons learned. Neither the government
nor parliament, however, has requested strategic lessons, thus weakening
civil-military integration and preventing critical dialogue on strategic
objectives, ways, and means in national decision-making.
As we saw, the official lessons mandate of 2016 deliberately excluded
the full military effort from the learning exercise, confining politicalmilitary learning to the very narrow civil-military cooperation sliver of
the campaign. We thus return to the particularities of Danish defense
policy-making. Parliament’s decisions regarding defense resource
allocations also function to define the primary tasks of the armed forces.
In mid-2012, as Denmark relinquished command of the Helmand task
force, the defense budget was cut by 15 percent, and the depth of the
battalion structure was reduced from six to three, precluding any type
of Afghanistan-style campaign, and instead, preparing the army for
European defense operations.
These cuts were thus enacted not in respect of lessons identified but
as a consequence of political fatigue with the Afghanistan campaign and
a desire to reduce the military footprint to the benefit of other government
programs. Later, in January 2018, as Denmark was confronted with
further NATO regional defense and deterrence demands, parliament
increased the budget 20 percent, reinforcing the type of brigade-size
autonomous capacity NATO was requesting.
These increases reflected strategic concerns—with Russian
aggressiveness and the imperative for allies to deliver on NATO’s
Defense Investment Pledge, the so-called two percent commitment (to
bring defense spending up to two percent of gross domestic product)—
but were not in any particular way connected to the military lessons
drawn from Afghanistan. These lessons, drawn just two years earlier in
2016, addressed crisis management operations as opposed to regional
defense and deterrence, and they lacked a connecting bridge to the
political realm of strategic lessons learned.
In sum, the army has drawn considerable tactical and operational
lessons, and parliament has shaped budgets and overarching priorities
13      Danish Army, Army Report on Ongoing Development of Force Contributions (Copenhagen: Danish
Army, 2016).
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to its liking. But strategy documents bridging the political and military
levels—a safeguard against a jumble of politics, policy, and wishful
thinking—are absent.14 While consistent with the Danish political
preference for informal and adaptive policy, it stands as a warning for
Denmark’s next employment of military force.

Comprehensive Approach Lessons

The comprehensive approach as a tool for coordinating and
integrating relevant actors and policies in support of stabilization has
been a Danish priority since 2003. But the comprehensive approach
policy has also become a malleable tool—both for demonstrating a
political desire for broad-based stabilization policy in an era of protracted
and politically contentious armed conflict and for actually offering
improvements in security, development, and governance on the ground.
The comprehensive approach is thus both aspirational—some would say
symbolic—and a policy tool. As such, it has gone through several phases
and is likely to continue to change.
Version 1.0 of the comprehensive approach evolved from 2003 to
early 2009. Denmark was a front-runner in placing “Concerted Planning
and Action of Civil and Military Activities in International Operations,
or CPA,” as the idea was originally called, on NATO’s agenda.15 As
NATO deliberations slowed, however, so did implementing the approach
in Denmark where the key ministries—Foreign Affairs and Defense—
did not take ownership of the issue. Further, the key Danish military
effort in Iraq was not amenable to substantial civil-military coordination
on the ground on the outskirts of Basra. But the transition out of Iraq
from 2006 to 2007 and parallel entry into Helmand province offered
Denmark a fresh opportunity to engage the policy. In 2006, at its Riga
summit, NATO agreed to develop a comprehensive approach policy but
then needed to work out details and implications.
In the following years, the political momentum behind the
comprehensive approach increased, and Denmark spotted an opportunity
to be influential. Critically, a new US policy, based upon the US Agency
for International Development experience as it applied to comprehensive
conflict analysis, led to the United States establishing an interagency
system to manage contingencies.16 By August 2009, the United States
was able to present a fully integrated civil-military campaign plan for
Afghanistan.17 Inspired by this process, NATO adopted a substantial,
comprehensive approach policy in 2008, which included both generic
and Afghanistan-focused directives. Denmark was following suit, and a
preparatory commission delivered a framework policy of comprehensive
14      Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
15      Kristian Fischer and Jan Top Christensen, “Improving Civil-Military Cooperation the Danish
Way,” NATO Review, no. 2 (Summer 2005); and Peter Viggo Jakobsen, NATO’s Comprehensive Approach
to Crisis Response Operations: A Work in Slow Progress, DIIS Report 2008:15 (Copenhagen: DIIS, 2008).
16      White House, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,
National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) (Washington, DC: White House, 2005), 1.
17      US Embassy, Kabul and US Forces Afghanistan, United States Government Integrated CivilianMilitary Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan (US Embassy, Kabul and US Forces Afghanistan, 2009).
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and integrated action that informed parliament’s 2009 defense agreement
for 2010 to 2014.18 In 2010, NATO allies agreed to put crisis management
on par with collective defense tasks in the Strategic Concept, formalizing
the window of opportunity for small allies to seek outsized influence on
Allied affairs.19
To gain it, Denmark had to shift course. Version 1.0 of the
comprehensive approach policy had become characterized by grand
ambition and poor implementation. Policy development took place in
the MFA by designated personnel from the ministries of Foreign Affairs
and Defense under the guidance of a ministerial oversight team. The
intention was to set up an MFA Stabilization Department modeled on
the British Stabilization Office. In the interim, the team pursued its
mandate to generate projects for the comprehensive approach as it applied
primarily to Afghanistan, but also to East Africa, and include these
projects in the Helmand plans and other official strategy documents of
Denmark. While well-intentioned, this setup failed to deliver a unified
policy platform for the political parties in parliament and instead got
mired in a range of bureaucracy and organization that de facto impeded
interdisciplinary planning and action.
Sensing a moment of opportunity, Denmark turned to version 2.0 of
its approach. It benefited from the establishment of the aforementioned
Stabilization Department in August 2009, the political energy that flowed
from the US-led surge in Afghanistan, and the commitment of allies such
as Denmark to follow suit. Thus, the new department could focus on
the development of an ambitious, comprehensive approach concept that
integrated military, civilian government, and nongovernmental actors in
a single policy framework in the context of hostile armed conflict.
The diplomat who ran the Stabilization Department during the critical
opening years from 2009 to 2010, Rolf Holmboe, pinpoints a number
of factors that allowed Denmark to help shape NATO’s comprehensive
approach policy in Afghanistan. First, comprehensiveness began in
the political arena where a broad majority in parliament supported
comprehensive foreign policy priorities and the full chain of command.
Second, a culture of cooperation and trust had gradually emerged among
the two key ministries and the defense command. Third, Denmark was
both small and smart—it benefited from its tightly knit informal network
among senior civil servants and managed to maintain its culture of high
trust. This enabled coherent policy initiative in multilateral negotiations.
In short, Denmark had a firm idea of where to go (comprehensive
approach policy) and was liberated from “policy mafias”—pursuing
sectarian issues such as development or military security—that, in
Holmboe’s experience, characterize larger countries such as Britain and
the United States and complicate negotiation mandates.20
18      Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD), Danish Defense Agreement (Copenhagen: MoD, 2009).
19      NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2010).
20      Rolf Holmboe, interview by the author, January 23, 2019.
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This Danish moment of policy shaping influence could only last
as long as the surge in Afghanistan. Beginning in 2013, Denmark
had to consider if version 3.0 of comprehensive approach policy fit a
non-Afghan centric world. Distinctively smaller in scale and ambition,
Version 3.0 shifted the center of gravity from crisis management to
crisis prevention. Similar policy debates within Allied governments
and the United Nations centered on nebulous concepts of stabilization,
resilience, and the need to counter violent extremism. Danish policy
calls for a much smaller military footprint largely related to capacity
building, and thus training of local security forces. It does not aim to
coordinate development policy with nongovernmental, humanitarian
actors.21 Version 3.0 is thus distinctively civilian and governmental.
Revealingly, the 2018–23 defense agreement entered in January
2018 does not at any point refer to “comprehensive approach” but
rather to capacity building. Moreover, humanitarian organizations
are kept separate from the military effort.22 The aid and development
community was always skeptical of tight coordination and cooperation
with the military on the ground and felt affronted by the ambitious policy
outlined from 2009 to 2011.23 As Holmboe puts it, MFA policy today
aims to separate humanitarian work from ministry-led development
and governance efforts, leaving that work to nongovernmental and
private organizations.24
Current MFA policy is less ambitious and high-minded than during
the peak ISAF and COIN years in Afghanistan: it is not captured in
one learning document, like in the army, but spread throughout various
policy documents related mostly to African crisis-prevention efforts.
While the MFA continues its efforts on the ground, only in a narrower
MFA framework, does the political level seem content to wave the
symbolic flag of comprehensiveness in Danish policy and claim the
mantle of balanced foresight into conflict prevention, as opposed to war
and armed conflict. As should be clear from this discussion, though,
the Danish comprehensive approach policy has gone through both
armed and unarmed phases and is today distinctively less comprehensive
compared to version 2.0. Denmark’s engagement in conflict areas
remains, as always, dependent on support from allies and partners.

Conclusion

In March 2012, then Foreign Minister Villy Søvndal argued in an
op-ed that now was the time for Denmark to once again think and act
like a small state. According to his sentiments and those of the left-wing
government that took office in October 2011, Denmark had veered too
21      Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Justice, Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement
in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World (Copenhagen: Danish Government, 2013).
22      MoD, Defense Agreement 2018–2023 (Copenhagen: MoD, 2018).
23      Astri Suhrke, When More Is Less: The International Project in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2012); Peter Gill, Today We Drop Bombs, Tomorrow We Build Bridges: How Foreign Aid
Became a Casualty of War (London: Zed Books, 2016).
24      Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Justice, Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement.
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far in the direction of military and strategic activism, beginning in Iraq
and continuing in Afghanistan, and had lost sight of a wider and softer
engagement favoring international rules and institutions. Consequently,
the 2013–17 defense agreement cut the defense budget by 15 percent.
In September 2015, a few months after taking office, the right-wing
government commissioned a seasoned diplomat, Peter Taksøe-Jensen,
to sort out Danish foreign policy and security priorities in order to put
the spotlight on Danish national interests. According to this perspective,
Denmark had closed one chapter on ambitious Afghanistan-style
crisis management policy and another on social-liberal and neutralist
foreign policy with a cosmopolitan flavor. Instead, Denmark needed
to recommit to strategic activism, bolster its commitment to national
and allied defense, such as that of Greenland and the Baltics, and avoid
overstretch. As a result, the 2018–23 defense agreement increased the
defense budget by 20 percent.
Political leadership matters for large states and small. In the
Danish case, the scope for such leadership was always contextual. In
Afghanistan, counterterrorist policy, detainees, and civilian casualty
policy divided parliament, and thus inhibited leadership. Meanwhile,
stabilization and support for Afghan development enjoyed widespread
support and emboldened it. Thus, the comprehensive approach became
a rallying cry on the Danish political scene because it served to build
consensus and move the country beyond the divisiveness of the Iraq War
(2003–11) more than it served as a tool for coordinated action on the
ground. Therefore, the comprehensive approach served as a symbolic
framework within which Danish political interests could come together
and claim leadership.
All countries experience partisan politics. But in the Danish case,
it has resulted in a peculiar type of informal national decision-making
that bolsters flexibility for the top echelon of the government and
enables political blame games in the electoral arena. There is obvious
political convenience in this, but a major drawback of informality is that
it effectively breaks the political-strategic learning process that renders
strategic ambitions, ways, and means explicit and anchors them in
documents that pull in, rather than pull apart, political-military lessons.
The military, as well as the development community, did the heavy
lifting in Afghanistan and have drawn separate lessons. The army, which
bore the brunt of the hardship in the ISAF mission, has identified a range
of tactical and operational lessons it is now pursuing in a new framework
of both regional defense and deterrence and continued international
operations. The development community and thus the MFA inherited
the celebrated comprehensive approach policy and reduced it to a mostly
diplomacy-development engagement for preventing crises, primarily in
Africa, from escalating. As such, Denmark has learned some selective
lessons and steered clear of others. This application has helped the
country move forward but also exposed it to new risks.
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ABSTRACT: This article argues Norway’s minor role in the
Afghanistan War (2001–14) included opportunities to learn
about the evolution of military deployments over the course of
a prolonged counterinsurgency-focused conflict, the civilian and
military dynamics, and the political challenges of contributing to
such a conflict.

A

fter the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in
September 2001, Norway expressed sympathy for the United
States and took precautionary measures to avoid being attacked.1
Not knowing whether this had been a single burst of hyperterrorism or
the start of a bigger wave, the United Nations Security Council, where
Norway had a seat in 2001, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
soon expressed their support for the United States. Whether Norway
should do anything concrete, apart from showing solidarity through
words and resolutions, was an open question.
On September 10, 2001, the day before the attack, the Norwegian
Labour Party of then Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg lost the general
election. Two days after the attack, outgoing minister of defense Bjørn
Tore Godal, stated it was unlikely Norway would participate in any
operations to find and punish the terrorists.2 The government also said
NATO’s decision to invoke Article 5 did not automatically imply Norway
would participate in any of the organization’s missions connected to the
attack. This surprisingly outspoken reluctance on the part of Norway
was noted in the United States: the New York Times reported Norway had
officially distanced itself from NATO’s solidarity decision.3 Parts of the
Norwegian media also criticized the outgoing Labour government for
not standing by Norway’s most important ally.4
The Norwegian government had several reasons for its reluctance
in this matter. Primarily, it was unclear if the Americans would ask for
assistance in Afghanistan. Perhaps, instead, the United States would
request European nations increase forces in the Balkans to relieve
American troops there. Second, Norwegian armed forces were rather
stretched after another round of post-Cold War cutbacks. Most of
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1     The author wants to thank Dr. Paal Sigurd Hilde, the head of the secretariat that supported from the University of
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Glasgow. He served as
2      Olav Bogen and Magnus Håkenstad, Balansegang: Forsvarets omstilling etter den kalde krigen (Oslo: the military member of
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4      Bogen and Håkenstad, Balansegang, 146–49.
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Norway’s expeditionary military hardware was, or had recently been,
deployed to the Balkans. Third, it was difficult to imagine Norwegians
fighting alongside American soldiers in central Asia. What was actually
at stake for Norway in Afghanistan? Expeditionary warfare in that area
would be unprecedented and completely out of the Norwegian character.
All this changed, however, when the new government assumed control.

New Government and Political Determination

On October 19, 2001, the new center-right coalition government
took office. The new government’s primary security policy concerns
became virtually the opposite of the previous Labour government. What
would happen to Norway’s interests and position in NATO if it did
not participate in what could turn into a major undertaking involving
all our closest partners? If the greater part of NATO supported the
United States tangibly in the war against terrorism, it could be awkward
for Norway to stay out in the short term, and even dangerous in the
long run.
Norway’s main worry since the Second World War has been its
geographic isolation from the European mainland—contending with
Russian maneuvers alone is not a comfortable thought. Hence, regardless
of the feasibility of a coalition operation in Afghanistan, Norway had
to participate. Even if operations ended in a quagmire, it would serve
Norway’s interests to be part of the debacle rather than stay home. A
dysfunctional NATO with a tangible US presence was preferable to no
NATO and the possibility of American isolationism.
Consequently, the new minister of defense, Kristin Krohn Devold,
of the Conservative Party, saw it as her mission to get Norwegian boots
on the ground in Afghanistan as soon as possible: “It was important
to signal our support to the Americans by deploying forces quickly. To
be relevant, we needed to be over there by Christmas.”5 But in the fall
of 2001, boots suitable for Afghan terrain and American needs were
not available. After some months of preparation, the Norwegian
government sent a small detachment of special forces to operate from
Kandahar as part of Task Force K-Bar, a unit of mine clearers for
the airports at Kandahar and Bagram, and a contingent of one C-130
Hercules cargo aircraft and six F-16 Fighting Falcons to be stationed
at Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan.6 While small in number, the initial
Norwegian contribution was significant in terms of skills and quality.
Norway’s first participation in an operation “outside the wire” occurred
on January 15, 2002.7

5      Kristin Krohn Devold in John Inge Hammersmark, “Norske spesialstyrker-Fra skjult ressurs til
politisk spydspiss,” Forsvarets Stabsskole, Militære Studier 3 (2015), 71.
6      Norwegian Commission on Afghanistan (NCA), A Good Ally: Norway in Afghanistan 2001–
2014, Official Norwegian Report NOU 2016:8 (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Ministry of Defense, June 6, 2016), 70.
7      NCA, Good Ally, 55.
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Increased Contributions and Success
With the call for convening a Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) in Kabul in
December 2003, US pressure on allies for further contributions increased.
The Ministry of Defence recommended in October [2003] that Norway
offer a company to carry out security and guard duty. This would be a highprofile assignment that would [further] demonstrate Norway’s ability and
willingness to support [the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
and] alliance efforts in Afghanistan. The assignment was also well suited to
the [newly reorganized] Telemark Battalion.8

Norway was willing to let the company stay in Kabul for one year
after the end of the Loya Jirga. Moreover, in the summer of 2004, Norway
also volunteered to take the lead of one of the three battle groups in the
Kabul Multinational Brigade. The Norwegian Battle Group 3 (BG3)
was a significant contribution to the mission. The headquarters staff
comprised 40 officers including 31 Norwegians, 8 Hungarians, and 1
Italian. In the Norwegian context, this was a robust staff, resembling
a staff for a Norwegian brigade.9 Furthermore, BG3 included three
maneuver elements reflecting the composition of the headquarters
staff—one Norwegian, one Hungarian, and one Italian company.
In many ways, BG3 was a success story. The Norwegian Army
found the mission important, feasible, and militarily relevant, and
experiences drawn from this mission could be utilized back home. It
was soon evident, however, that Norway would have to get involved
in establishing the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). As a result,
Norway came to an important juncture where military considerations
pointed in one direction, that is, stay the course in Kabul, while political
considerations pointed another, that is, operate a PRT.

Failures and Complications

According to the Norwegian Commission on Afghanistan, “in
December 2003, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked
Norway directly to participate in establishing new PRTs.”10 In essence,
the choice was to join either a British or a German PRT in northern
Afghanistan. For several reasons, Norway chose the British-led PRT
being established in Meymaneh in the Faryab province in northwestern
Afghanistan together with Finnish forces. Approximately 30 Norwegians
deployed to the PRT in July 2004.11
While the PRT deployment added to Norway’s main contribution in
Kabul, the NATO secretary general signaled expectations that countries
such as Norway should not only participate in PRTs but eventually
assume command of one. The Norwegian military leadership was
highly critical of taking on such a responsibility and recommended,
8      NCA, Good Ally, 58 (italics in the original).
9     NCA, Good Ally, 58; and Lars Lervik, “Norwegian battlegroup 3/Kabul Multinational
Brigade/ISAF: Erfaringer fra multinasjonal bataljonstridsgruppe i Kabul,” Norsk militært tidsskrift 176, no.
2 (2006): 13.
10      NCA, Good Ally, 59.
11      NCA, Good Ally, 59.
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instead, continuing efforts in Kabul with a brigade command element
and a company-sized unit. According to the Norwegian defense staff,
considerations involving budgeting, personnel, security, competencies,
materiel, and profiling, all pointed toward continuing to concentrate
efforts in Kabul rather than assuming responsibility for a PRT.
The military was also concerned that assuming responsibility for
the PRT in Meymaneh would give rise to expectations Norway would
take on further obligations in the event of the withdrawal of other
actors, particularly Britain. Having responsibility for a province, such
as Faryab, could make withdrawing difficult, if it became necessary.
Moreover, the military had no previous experience mentoring, advising,
and reconstructing on foreign soil while simultaneously defending
against enemy attacks. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Defense saw it as
politically desirable to take a more active role in the ISAF expansion
by concentrating Norway’s presence in the north while simultaneously
reducing its presence in Kabul considerably in the spring of 2006.12
In addition to employing the PRT in Meymaneh during March
2006, Norway also “deployed a robust company battle group of roughly
200 troops, including a battalion staff, to Mazar-i Sharif in order to
relieve a British force. This new company was a quick reaction force
under German command in Regional Command North [the ISAF
command with responsibility for northern Afghanistan].” 13 Compared
to the BG3, the quick reaction force was bigger and more mechanized.
While BG3 had been based on foot patrols in an urban setting, the
quick reaction force needed to be able to support PRTs and other units
in the region, and thus be more resilient and mobile. This was also a
deployment well-suited for Telemark Battalion, which was in a process
of converting from a conscription-based unit to a fully professional unit,
something new to the Norwegian armed forces.14 But in 2008, as the
size of the PRT steadily increased, Norway terminated its contribution
to the quick reaction force and concentrated efforts in Meymaneh and
the wider Faryab province.
Unlike the BG3 experience, the PRT endeavor was not a success.
Neither the Norwegian government nor the military leadership initially
knew what a PRT was or what it should do. And although at its strongest
point the Norwegian PRT counted several hundred soldiers, this force
was nonetheless insufficient to meet the demands of a province the size
of Faryab, and no coherent Norwegian strategy was developed for it.
Instead, the PRT commanders filled their six months in the theater
with whatever they found reasonable. Moreover, the experience was not
especially relevant for the Norwegian Army’s tasks back home.
Complicating matters further, the Norwegian government
instituted a clear separation between civilian and military activities
12      NCA, Good Ally, 59.
13      NCA, Good Ally, 60.
14      Arne Opperud, “Ledelse i strid-spørsmål om krig,” i Intops, norske soldater-internasjonale operasjoner,
ed. Dag Leraand (Oslo: Forsvarsmuseet, 2012), 330.
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in Afghanistan. Particularly, the major Norwegian nongovernmental
organizations, heavily subsidized by Norwegian taxpayers, did not
appreciate Norwegian soldiers doing their organization’s work, arguing
military personnel are not trained for development assistance tasks and
therefore, tend to take a short-term view of development work.
Ultimately, this civil-military compartmentalization was inconsistent
with the strategy of counterinsurgency operations that came to guide
ISAF operations. The lack of clear guidelines from Oslo on how to
bridge this gap led to frustration among Norwegian civilian and
military personnel on the ground. The Norwegian government’s 2009
Faryab strategy did not make matters any easier as it contained no clear
guidelines for practitioners.
In total, Norway spent about 20 billion Norwegian kroner
(approximately $3.17 billion) on its engagement in Afghanistan. From
2001 to 2014, military expenditures accounted for about $11.5 billion
and civilian aid accounted for about $8.4 billion. This amounted to a
mere 0.26 percent of the estimated total international military effort,
and 2.3 percent of the total international aid in the period.15 Norway was
thus a relatively much bigger civilian than military contributor, ranking
ninth among civilian contributions.

Major and Minor Contributions

From 2002 to 2009, Norway experienced two main stages in its
deployments to Afghanistan. The first stage was Kabul-centric, which
then evolved into a second, PRT-centric stage in Faryab. After 2009,
the third and last stage took an Afghan security forces-centric approach
where Norwegian forces concentrated most of their efforts on training
and mentoring Afghan forces in support of ISAF’s plans to transfer
“responsibility for national security to Afghan authorities and security
forces by the end of 2014.” 16 The main instruments for this effort were
the operational mentoring and liaison teams.
Apart from these larger stages of Norwegian involvement in
Afghanistan, Norway also contributed additional forces for shorter and
longer periods, such as the commander of the then Kabul International
Airport, provision of F-16s to ISAF, and support to different military
staffs and field hospitals.17 The most important of these, however,
was and still is the special forces training of the Afghan police Crisis
Response Unit 222 in Kabul. The Norwegian special forces and the
Intelligence Service also closely cooperated as part of the national
intelligence support team to develop a concept where the full resources
of the Intelligence Service were directly available to the special forces
in the field.

15      NCA, Good Ally, 213.
16      NCA, Good Ally, 139.
17      NCA, Good Ally, 70.
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Assessment and Lessons Learned

So far, this story about Norway’s military contribution to the
operations in Afghanistan presumably resembles that of many midsize
European states. But in November 2014, the parliament decided to
appoint an independent commission to evaluate the entire Norwegian
endeavor. The Norwegian Commission on Afghanistan, established by a
royal decree on November 21, 2014, worked for 18 months with a broad
mandate to evaluate and to draw lessons from all parts of the Norwegian
engagement in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014.18
The ten-member commission was chaired by retired Labour
politician Bjørn Tore Godal, who had been both minister of foreign
affairs and minister of defense. Lieutenant General Torgeir Hagen was
the only other nonacademic expert in the group. A Dane, Professor
Sten Rynning, from the University of Southern Denmark served on
the commission. And several members were well-known critics of
the operations in Afghanistan. A full-time secretariat of five, later six,
members supported the commission in its work.
The report, which was translated into English, gives an historical
overview of Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan from 2001 to
2014 that includes chapters on military engagement, development aid,
the PRT in Faryab, peace diplomacy, and international law.19 While
neither Norwegian nor other attempts to negotiate a settlement were
successful, Norway was one of the first countries to develop contacts
with the Taliban, and peace diplomacy was an important Norwegian
contribution. In the last part of the report, the commission spells out its
conclusions and draws a range of lessons.
The commission argued Norway had three overarching objectives
in Afghanistan: support the United States and NATO, help combat
international terror, and assist in building a stable and democratic
Afghan state. The commission found, by and large, Norway had achieved
the first objective, that is, supported the United States and bolstered
NATO’s continued relevance. After a slow and reluctant start, Norway
behaved like a good ally. The nation realized only partial success in
achieving the second objective, fighting international terror. It failed to
rid Afghanistan of international groups, and international terrorism is
still an issue worldwide. The final objective, build a stable and democratic
Afghanistan, was and continues to be a downright failure. Democratic
institutions are still fragile, and the war continues.
In summary, the commission was clear the Norwegian contribution
was a very small piece in a very large puzzle: Norway could make little
overall difference in Afghanistan. There are many reasons why so
many nations with so many resources achieved so little in Afghanistan.
Presumably, the most important reason is too many of the objectives

18      NCA, forematter to Good Ally.
19      NCA, Good Ally, 21–47.
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and approaches used in Afghanistan were internally inconsistent
and contradictory.
The report did not stir much political controversy. All major
parties in the parliament had been in the cabinet for the duration of
the Afghanistan War, and as a result, there were no incentives for
political finger-pointing in the parliament. The initial media response
to the report’s findings, however, was significant and concerned
civilian engagement in Afghanistan to a much greater degree than
military engagement.
As stated above, Norway was a bigger player on the civilian side of
the Afghanistan engagement than it was on the military side, suiting
Norwegian politicians quite well. But the Norwegian press persistently
focused on the fact military expenditures in Afghanistan exceeded those
of civilian expenditures. In order to counterbalance this publicity and
the strong military footprint in Afghanistan more generally, in 2007, the
Stoltenberg government decided to spend the same amount on civilian
aid as it did on military activities in Afghanistan. Consequently, Norway
poured 750 million Norwegian kroner annually into a system with
low absorptive capacity.20 Despite assurances to the contrary, aid had
been pushed by political needs in Norway, not pulled by humanitarian
end developmental needs in Afghanistan. When the commission’s
report described how Afghanistan had been turned into one of the
world’s most aid-dependent countries, and how the enormous amount
of aid had contributed to widespread corruption, Norway’s media
responded harshly.
Even though the government invested time and money in the
commission’s work, the extent to which it had any impact on armed
forces’ doctrines and modus operandi is questionable. Few in the military
showed any misgivings regarding the appointment of the commission,
its members, or its findings. Most saw it as proper and reasonable
to use time and money to look at the entire endeavor. Even though
many recognized the important observations and recommendations
made by the commission, the military had already identified lessons
and implemented those relevant to future missions long before the
publication of the report.

Changing Warfare and Cultural Shifts

Thus far, this article has investigated Norway’s contribution
to Afghanistan. The article will conclude by turning the table and
examining what the Afghan endeavor did to Norway. During the
1990s, it was taken for granted in the armed forces that Norwegian
politicians would not accept a big butcher’s bill from far-off wars of
choice. Norway had suffered casualties in Lebanon, the Balkans, and
in UN operations elsewhere. But these were few and far between, and
most were caused by accidents. That changed when Norway joined the
coalition in Afghanistan.
20      NCA, Good Ally, 86.
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In all, over 9,000 Norwegian men and women served with the
military in Afghanistan. Ten lost their lives and 19 were seriously
injured.21 Compared to countries like Denmark, 10 is not a big number,
and the government and Norway could seemingly have stomached a lot
more. Coffins draped with Norwegian flags were not a political liability,
as we in the military previously thought. To the contrary: an important
part of being a good ally was political willingness to pay the price in
blood, not only in money.
In 1999, the Norwegian government had been uncomfortable
with Norway’s participation in Operation Allied Force against Serbia
over Kosovo. One of the senior cabinet members, Valgerd Svarstad
Haugland, was later harshly criticized for stating, “I don’t like bombs”
in the parliament, while her own government was sending Norwegian
F-16s to the area.22 Still, the F-16s did not participate in the actual
fighting, which was in-line with Norwegian traditions, equipment, and
national character.
After 10 years in Afghanistan, the situation had turned upside
down. Norwegian politicians had softened toward bombs and combat,
as demonstrated over Libya in 2011, and had reinvigorated the highestranking decoration for gallantry, the War Cross with Sword, in 2009.
Only heroes from the Second World War had been decorated with the
medal, which was shelved 60 years earlier in 1949.23 Furthermore, the
center-left government of Jens Stoltenberg reinstated the medal.24
If it was surprising the way the Norwegian government tolerated
casualties, it was not particularly surprising they practiced a form
of hands-off strategy. As we saw above, former Minister of Defense
Devold’s main concern was to get Norwegian boots on the ground in
Afghanistan. When they arrived, the political mission was accomplished,
so to speak. Military activities in theater were not on the political radar
back home. Every politician in Norway knew, regardless of the outcome
in Afghanistan, it would not decide Norwegian elections. For Norway,
Afghanistan was not a puzzle to be solved, and the challenge was left
to others, particularly the Americans and the British. Our puzzle, as a
medium-to-small participant in the operation, was how to be part of a
solution in Afghanistan and not part of the problem.
This situation meant, in principle, Norway had no caveats. But
in practice, it did, triggering tensions between the military and the
government. In particular, parts of the armed forces deplored the
government’s decision not to deploy to the southern part of Afghanistan
where the fighting was heavier than up north. Some in the armed
forces believed we should have been where our closest allies were,
not where Germans and Swedes were, so to speak. Additionally, the
strategic laissez-faire, favoring presence over practice, left considerable
21      NCA, Good Ally, 12.
22      Erik Solheim, Nærmere (Oslo: N.W. Damm, 1999), 413.
23      NCA, Good Ally, 203–4.
24      NCA, Good Ally, 204.
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operational leeway for Norwegian military units. Much of what we did
in Faryab was, in fact, military activity in search of a strategic plan or
political intention. And even though Norwegians like to be portrayed
as citizens of a peace-loving nation, our soldiers had no problems filling
their days with combat if they could find it, regardless of lack of strategy.
As stated in the commission’s report:
Frustration among some soldiers at never experiencing “troops in contact”
(TIC) situations before returning home can serve as motivation to actively
seek out combat, even though it may interfere with achieving strategiclevel objectives. This was also pointed out by some veterans themselves:
“The paradox is that all the shooting is what gets the attention,” said Tor.
“Exaggerating somewhat, one could say that we hand out medals and
awards to soldiers when there is shooting, not when we complete our task
in peace and harmony like we are supposed to.” This was a widely held view
also among soldiers in the field.25

Often, less recognition was given to soldiers who successfully
completed assignments with minimal or no use of force, although
decorations were awarded for actions not involving force. Perhaps due
to some form of bad political conscience, operations in Afghanistan
also gave a considerable boost to Norwegian veterans. Long before
2001, Norway had produced veterans from foreign wars, particularly in
Lebanon and the Balkans, but the veterans were not a very self-confident
group. This changed during Norway’s involvement in Afghanistan.
Even the Norwegian officer corps changed. Until recently, Norway was
the only NATO member without noncommissioned officers and other
ranks. As a rule, every military member in Norway, except conscripted
soldiers, has been an officer. This has changed too.

Transformation and the Way Ahead

Norway was initially a reluctant member of the coalition of the
willing. Afghanistan was not a place anyone had imagined Norwegian
soldiers would go. Nonetheless, Norway became deeply involved in both
military and civilian matters in Afghanistan. For a while, Norwegian
Kai Eide was even special representative of the Secretary General of the
UN to Afghanistan (2008–10).
During the years in Afghanistan, the Norwegian armed forces were
transformed, particularly the army. Traditionally Norwegians had been
peace supporters, and most of the military casualties it suffered after the
Second World War were traffic accidents and stray bullets. During the
years in Afghanistan, however, the Norwegian Army indeed became a
fighting force, but only in small and rather independent units. Accordingly,
combined arms and joint operations were not on the agenda and have
become something we have to relearn. Provincial reconstruction and
military observation teams will not be the answer if we have to fight for
our own country. It is obviously important to learn from our mistakes,
but it is just as important to learn from the relevant mistakes.
25      NCA, Good Ally, 65.

TOC

TOC

Afghanistan’s Lessons: Part II

Australia’s Lessons
Rhys Crawley
©2019 Rhys Crawley

ABSTRACT: This article analyzes Australia’s contribution to the
Afghanistan War from 2001 to 2014. It recommends policymakers
and practitioners consider applying a whole-of-government
approach, embedding personnel in coalition headquarters, and
limiting reliance on Special Forces soldiers in future interventions.

A

survey of Australia’s broader contribution to the Afghanistan
War highlights the complex considerations of a coalition
partner in a “war of choice” fought in an area geographically
distant from its immediate region of strategic interest. By examining
the many facets of Operation Slipper, Australia’s military engagement
in Afghanistan, three key lessons emerge that will help policymakers
and practitioners avoid past mistakes and build on programs that serve
Australia’s national interests.
When facing similar conflict scenarios, Australia should consider
the following: the need to look beyond the provision of security and
consider a whole-of-government (interagency) and development
approach from the outset; the reputational and experiential benefits
accrued by selectively embedding Australian personnel in coalition
headquarters; and the inherent hazards that accompany an overreliance
on Special Forces.

Australia’s War in Afghanistan: An Overview

The Australian public knows little of Australia’s contribution to the
war in Afghanistan. Few would be aware that between 2001 and 2014,
more than 25,000 Australians served in, or in support of, Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), which made the nation the ninth largest supporter of
the effort.1 Moreover, Australia was the largest non-NATO contributor
to ISAF.2 The war cost Australia AUD$8.3 billion.3 Tragically, 41
Australians were killed, and through January 2013, there had been

1      David Horner, “The Emerging Strategic Environment,” in On Ops: Lessons and Challenges for
the Australian Army since East Timor, ed. Tom Frame and Albert Palazzo (Sydney: University of New
South Wales Press, 2016), 49.
2      Michael G. Smith, “Australian Civil-Military Lessons from Afghanistan,” in Australia and
Canada in Afghanistan: Perspectives on a Mission, ed. Jack Cunningham and William Maley (Toronto:
Dundurn, 2015), 151.
3      Peter Hall, “The Cost of the War in Afghanistan,” in Cunningham and Maley, Australia and
Canada, 119.
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249 physically wounded.4 The full extent of psychological injuries is
unknown. But the numbers are clearly higher still, and suicide among
discharged veterans is a growing problem.5
The decades following the Vietnam War are known within
Australian defense circles as “the long years of peace.” 6 In the absence of
any major threat to Australia’s national security interests, the Australian
Defence Force (ADF) kept busy with exercises and niche contributions
to international peacekeeping missions.7 But in reality, exercises only
provided so much training, and peacekeeping contributions involved
only small numbers of ADF personnel.
By the early 1990s, as one commentator has written, an entire
generation of “officers and soldiers had not seen any form of operational
service.” 8 The East Timor crisis of 1999—the largest deployment of
ADF personnel since Vietnam—changed that. Since then, the ADF has
been “involved in almost continuous military operations.” 9 Afghanistan
was but one of many.10
Operation Slipper, the name given to the ADF’s contribution to
operations in Afghanistan, is perhaps best understood if separated into
four periods (see figure 1). The first, 2001–2, covered the initial response
following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The second, 2005–6,
saw Australia’s return to the war, this time with Special Forces in
Uruzgan province. In the third, 2006–10, Australia was part of the
Dutch-led Task Force Uruzgan, and in the fourth, 2010–14, Australia
was part of the American-led, and later took leadership of, Combined
Team Uruzgan.
From 2001 to 2006, Australia contributed forces as part of OEF.
But the majority of Australia’s Afghanistan experience from 2006 to
2014 was under ISAF’s banner and centered on Uruzgan. Australia’s
main contributions were by way of ground forces. But as figure 1 shows,
numerous other elements, notably naval assets; rotary and fixed-wing
aircraft; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; logistics; and a
bevy of Australian officers embedded in coalition headquarters worked
in support of Australian and coalition forces. These contributions were
spread throughout Afghanistan and the greater Middle East.

4      Australian Department of Defense (DoD), “Vale,” DoD, accessed November 7, 2019.
5      Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (IHW), National Suicide Monitoring of Serving and
Ex-Serving Australian Defence Force Personnel: 2018 Update (Canberra: IHW, 2018).
6      Horner, “Emerging Strategic Environment,” 34.
7      “Official History of Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post–Cold War Operations,” Australian
War Memorial, accessed November 7, 2019; John Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to
Howard (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2014); and David Horner, ed., Official History of
Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations, 6 vols. (Melbourne: Cambridge
University Press, 2019).
8      Tom Frame, “Lessons and Learning,” in Frame and Palazzo, On Ops, 3.
9      Horner, “Emerging Strategic Environment,” 33.
10      Frame, “Lessons and Learning,” 1.
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Figure 1. Operation Slipper11
11     Dr. Steven Bullard, Australian War Memorial

TOC

52

Parameters 49(4) Winter 2019–20

Australia’s 25th prime minister, John Howard, was in Washington,
DC, on 9/11, having met President George W. Bush for the first time
the day before.12 The impact of the terrorist attacks on Howard was
profound. Almost immediately, from a bunker in the basement of the
Australian embassy on Massachusetts Avenue, he announced Australia
“will stand by [the United States], we will help them, and we will support
actions they take to properly retaliate in relation to these acts of bastardry
against their citizens and against what they stand for.” 13
Howard knew that in all likelihood Australia would be going to
war in support of her great and powerful friend. His government soon
invoked the mutual defense clauses of the ANZUS Treaty (1951) between
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States as a practical show of its
“steadfast commitment to work with the United States in combating
international terrorism.” 14 Australia’s strategic objectives in contributing
to the war on terror were twofold—help defeat al-Qaeda and make a
down payment on the US-Australia alliance.15
Before long, Australia had committed military personnel to support
the war in Afghanistan. These came from each of the ADF’s three
services—the Royal Australian Navy, Australian Army, and the Royal
Australian Air Force. But the main role, and certainly the one that
provided the most visible and significant contribution, was Australia’s
Special Forces Task Force.16 Between October 2001 and December
2002, three rotations of predominantly Special Air Service Regiment
troops—each numbering some 200 personnel—worked alongside their
US counterparts in southern and eastern Afghanistan.
The task force was involved in some firefights, notably Operation
Anaconda. The main strength of the task force to OEF, however, was its
ability to undertake self-sustaining, long-range reconnaissance patrols,
some lasting for weeks, while liaising with and observing local Afghans.
The intelligence they gathered informed coalition plans and guided
coalition air support onto targets.17 The government never intended
for a long-term Special Forces commitment and brought the troops
home in late 2002. Until 2005, Australia maintained a small footprint in
Afghanistan—usually one, sometimes two, officers.18 Significantly, and
no less controversially, during this period Australia joined the United
States, Britain, and Poland in the invasion of Iraq.19
12      John Howard, Lazarus Rising: A Personal and Political Autobiography (Sydney: HarperCollins,
2011), chap. 31.
13      Howard, Lazarus Rising, 382.
14      John Howard, “Application of ANZUS Treaty to Terrorist Attacks on the United States,”
Parliament of Australia press release, September 14, 2001.
15      Karen Middleton, An Unwinnable War: Australia in Afghanistan (Melbourne: Melbourne
University Publishing, 2011), 38.
16      Horner, “Emerging Strategic Environment,” 43.
17      Middleton, Unwinnable, 58–66.
18      Nicole Brangwin and Ann Rann, Australia’s Military Involvement in Afghanistan since 2001: A
Chronology (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2010).
19      Albert Palazzo, The Australian Army and the War in Iraq, 2002–2010 (Canberra: Directorate of
Army Research and Analysis).

TOC

Afghanistan’s Lessons: Part II

Crawley

53

After a break, the ADF returned to Afghanistan in late August 2005.
As before, the Howard government chose to send Special Forces in the
form of a Special Forces Task Group (SFTG) consisting of elements
from the Special Air Service Regiment and commandos from the 4th
Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (Commando).20 Working within a
US Special Forces construct, their operations focused on Uruzgan and
Daykundi provinces in central southern Afghanistan.21
The strategic rationale for Australia’s involvement was similar to that
offered in 2001—Howard favored an in-and-out approach, that is, the
SFTG would return to Australia after 12 months.22 Throughout those 12
months, three rotations of approximately 200 personnel were engaged
in a myriad of tasks—long-range, vehicle-mounted reconnaissance;
security patrols; direct action assaults; clearance operations; and civic
action programs. It was a busy time operationally and intellectually as
the SFTG attempted to both understand and close with the enemy—
known at the time as the “anti-coalition militia.” 23
On schedule, although not without debate about whether it was
the right move, the SFTG returned home in September 2006.24 That
12 months represented the highest intensity of combat and prolonged
battlefield stress faced by the ADF since Vietnam. In the eyes of senior
ADF leaders, it set the conditions for Task Force Uruzgan to begin its
work in Uruzgan province as part of the ISAF Stage 3 expansion into
Regional Command South.25
In addition to the SFTG, in early 2006, Australia also committed
two of the army’s CH-47D Chinook helicopters to the coalition pool
in Kandahar. Initially these were largely confined to logistic support.
But as time progressed, the helicopters were configured and approved
for combat missions. Significantly, both Chinooks were involved in a
joint Canadian-Australian direct action assault in July 2006, which saw
the Chinooks insert and extract the Canadians under extremely heavy
fire.26 Australia maintained its Chinook deployments on and off for the
remainder of the war.27
When the Australian government announced its intention to deploy
the SFTG, it also told the public it was looking at the possibilities of
contributing to an ISAF-led provincial reconstruction team.28 After some
delay, it settled on partnering with the Dutch as part of the Dutch-led
20      John Howard, “Press Conference Parliament House, Canberra,” transcript ID 21821, Prime
Minister and Cabinet, July 13, 2005.
21      Steven Bullard, “Australia in Afghanistan 2001–13,” Wartime 64 (Spring 2013): 17.
22      Howard, “Press Conference.”
23      Chris Masters, No Front Line: Australia’s Special Forces at War in Afghanistan (Sydney: Allen &
Unwin, 2017), chaps. 5–7.
24      Angus Houston, “SOCAUST Media Briefing Post Op Slipper,” Australian Department of
Defence transcript no. MECC 60927/06, Parliament of Australia, September 27, 2006.
25      Houston, “SOCAUST Media Briefing.”
26       Bernd Horn, No Ordinary Men: Special Operations Forces Missions in Afghanistan (Toronto:
Dundurn, 2016), chap. 5.
27      Brangwin and Rann, Australia’s Military Involvement.
28      Howard, “Press Conference.”
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task force in Uruzgan. As noted earlier, this saw a shift in Australia’s
commitment from OEF to ISAF.
The deployment of a 400-strong reconstruction task force (RTF)
also marked a shift in Howard’s preferred strategic concept of deploying
Special Forces for a short, defined mission and then withdrawing them
before they got involved in peacekeeping, stabilization, and nation
building.29 Howard’s actions revealed he realized Afghanistan would not
be a quick fight.30 Indeed, the RTF was the first of what would amount
to 13 conventional Australian task forces to Uruzgan.31
Between August 2006 and October 2008, Australia sent four RTF
rotations to Uruzgan.32 The RTFs were engineer heavy, with a significant
force-protection element, and were increasingly employing combined
arms theory and practice. Over the course of more than two years, the
RTF, in the words of its first commanding officer, “worked to rebuild
the physical infrastructure of Uruzgan province, to build an indigenous
capacity to undertake engineering activities there.” 33 The latter was
achieved through a trade training school which focused on providing
carpentry skills to Afghan youth.34
On top of its own work, the RTF was ultimately in Uruzgan “to
support the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team.” 35 It was, in essence,
an effort to win “hearts and minds” and thus turn people away from the
insurgency.36 From the start, the RTF concept of operations was to take
a “top down, bottom up” approach by rebuilding government infrastructure
as well as doing small-scale missions requested by villages.37 The projects,
which included the construction of schools, bridges, health facilities,
and patrol bases, grew in size and scope. In 2008, the RTF briefly left
Uruzgan to work on higher coalition construction priorities in Zabul
province.38
During May 2007, a Special Operations Task Group of 300 soldiers
returned to Uruzgan. Australia had wanted it to operate as part of OEF.
The Netherlands insisted otherwise. Australia relented; the 17 task group
rotations through the end of the war were therefore part of ISAF’s effort
and reported to ISAF special operations forces headquarters rather than
Task Force Uruzgan (ISAF special operations forces were commanded
on a rotational basis by British and Australian officers).39 The troops in
29      Hugh White, “Why Australia Needs a Much Bigger Army,” The Age, July 20, 2005.
30      White, “Why Australia.”
31      Gareth Rice, “What Did We Learn from the War in Afghanistan?,” Australian Army Journal
11, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 7.
32      Brangwin and Rann, Australia’s Military Involvement.
33       Mick Ryan, “The Other Side of the COIN: Reconstruction Operations in Southern
Afghanistan,” Australian Army Journal 4, no. 2 (Winter 2007): 126.
34      Ryan, “Other Side,” 134.
35      Ryan, “Other Side,” 126.
36      Ryan, “Other Side,” 126.
37      Ryan, “Other Side,” 130 (italics in original).
38      Bullard, “Australia in Afghanistan,” 18; and Stuart Yeaman, Afghan Sun: Defence, Diplomacy,
Development and the Taliban (Brisbane: Boolarong, 2013).
39      Middleton, Unwinnable, 185.
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the task group, most of whom did multiple tours, “carried the burden
of taking the fight to the Taliban . . . by targeting key leaders, insurgent
compounds, weapons caches, bomb-making facilities, and drug-related
criminal elements.” 40
By 2008, Australia had a new government. At his first meeting of the
National Security Committee of Cabinet, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd
asked the ADF’s senior leaders for an explanation of Australia’s strategy
in Afghanistan. At first he “was met with blank looks.” 41 Eventually, it
emerged that since 2001, Australia’s strategy, as Rudd understood the
situation from conversations with the Chief of the Defence Force, “had
largely been a matter of honouring our alliance obligations and going
where the Americans thought we could make the best contribution, given
the type and size of our military resources.” 42 Rudd said Australia had
to find a better reason to be in Afghanistan than just keeping the United
States happy.43 His government then commenced a strategic review but
held off implementing its findings until the Obama administration made
its intentions clear.44
The combination of Rudd’s desire to do something different and the
coalition’s adoption of a counterinsurgency strategy caused a slight shift
in Australia’s focus. In October 2008, a mentoring and reconstruction
task force replaced the RTF. Over two rotations, the task force continued
with its reconstruction tasks.
Based on an infantry battalion rather than engineer regiment,
however, the task force shifted its—and therefore Australia’s—main
effort from reconstruction to mentoring an Afghan National Army
(ANA) kandak (battalion). It did this through an operational mentoring
and liaison team.45 The second rotation grew in size and responsibilities—
thus allowing it to mentor more ANA units and to provide combat
power in support of the 2009 elections. As such, the overall numbers of
ADF personnel in country increased to more than 1,500 (see figure 2).46
Australia’s efforts and focus underwent another shift in February
2010. Five rotations of the newly named mentoring task force (MTF)
focused solely on advising and developing the capacity of 4th Brigade,
ANA. Drawing on the experiences of the mentoring and reconstruction
task force, the MTF maintained an aggressive patrolling program, living
and working from patrol bases that now dotted Uruzgan’s landscape.
The added emphasis on mentoring saw Australian forces, along with
their Afghan partner units, push into parts of Uruzgan province that
hitherto had been the responsibility of Dutch and French operational
mentoring and liaison teams. This was especially the case from August
40      Bullard, “Australia in Afghanistan,” 18.
41      Kevin Rudd, The PM Years (Sydney: Macmillan, 2018), 12.
42      Rudd, PM Years, 13.
43      Rudd, PM Years.
44      Rudd, PM Years, 139.
45      Bullard, “Australia in Afghanistan,” 19; and Peter Connolly, Counterinsurgency in Uruzgan 2009,
Land Warfare Studies Centre Study Papers no. 321 (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2011).
46      Connolly, Counterinsurgency, 8; and Horner, “Emerging Strategic Environment,” 47.
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1, 2010, when the Dutch handed responsibility for Uruzgan to the
United States.
The United States commanded the newly named Combined Team
Uruzgan until Australia assumed that responsibility in late 2012.47 From
the perspective of one of its commanding officers, the MTF “sought
simply to get the Afghan Army to weaken the insurgents such that the
people would be left with no alternative but to collaborate with the
agencies of the Afghan Government.” 48 It did this by maintaining a
persistent presence in insurgent-controlled or insurgent-contested
areas, thus reducing insurgent freedom of movement, and by extension,
aiming to convince the population that Afghan government dominance
was inevitable.49 Of course, such efforts were designed to fulfill the
security pillar of ISAF’s campaign plan; governance and development
were mostly left to others.

Figure 2. Authorized ADF troop strength in Afghanistan50

Like the coalition more broadly, throughout this period the Australian
government was firmly focused on getting out of Afghanistan. Its exit
strategy was predicated on two factors: transitioning responsibility of
local security to Afghan forces and sticking to the coalition timetable
of 2014. An end date rather than end state would determine when
Australia’s job was done. In this regard, though, Australia was cautious
to set an end date before other coalition partners had shown their hand.
In line with its aims and appetite for risk, Australia gradually
shifted its focus from mentoring to advising. This was especially the
case when green-on-blue attacks increased the threat to ADF personnel
47      Nathan Church, Australia at War in Afghanistan: Updated Facts and Figures, Research Paper Series
2013–14 (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, December 13, 2013).
48      The Commanding Officer of an Australian Battle Group in Afghanistan in 2011,
“Commanding Officer’s Observations: Mentoring Task Force Three,” Military Operations 2, no. 2
(Spring 2014): 5.
49      Commanding Officer, “Commanding Officer’s Observations.”
50      Data collected by the Australian War Memorial.

TOC

Afghanistan’s Lessons: Part II

Crawley

57

living and working with their ANA counterparts. Australia also
assumed responsibility for the local provincial reconstruction team,
thus improving the whole-of-government presence on the ground and
allowing for a greater focus on capacity building.51 In December 2013,
the last Australians left Uruzgan. About 400 personnel remained in
training and support roles in Kandahar and Kabul.52 Today, around 300
Australians are still training, advising, and assisting in Afghanistan as
part of the Resolute Support Mission.53
In assessing Australia’s contribution in Afghanistan, the first point
to keep in mind is unlike the commitment of a brigade-size task force
and ownership of a province in Vietnam, Australia deployed small
elements as part of a larger coalition force. The fact the ADF was a
small cog in a larger coalition machine is an important piece of context
when examining Australia’s war in Afghanistan.
There was no Australian concentration of force in Afghanistan—no
Australian fast jets or artillery supported ADF elements on the ground
in Uruzgan. For this and more, Australia relied on coalition partners.
Instead, the ADF filled niche roles that reflected Australia’s appetite for
risk and its wider strategic priorities.54 As one commentator has written,
Australia’s participation was “carefully calibrated,” with successive
Australian governments balancing their aversion to casualties with the
reality that Afghanistan is not in Australia’s strategic area of interest.55
Next, most of Australia’s operational experience in Afghanistan
was at the platoon level or lower. The fact the ADF, and especially the
Australian Army, “had lost foundational war fighting skills at anything
above sub unit level,” was not lost on some in the ADF senior
leadership.56 Since at least 2004, elements of the ADF have recognized
the importance of and attempted to alleviate the potential of being
unprepared for the future by changing the structure of the army to
create all-arms brigades and to improve the force-generation cycle to
ensure the army can sustain long-term operations.57
Despite all of this, the high operating tempo in places such as
Afghanistan, has led to the ADF becoming “a far more sharp-edged
force” than the one that existed when the East Timor crisis hit in 1999.58
Whether or not Australia’s presence and contribution made a difference
or was worth the costs is open to debate. The answers vary depending
on who is asked and at what level of war the question is directed.
51      Church, Australia at War, 14.
52      Emma Griffiths, “Australian Soldiers Complete Withdrawal from Afghanistan’s Uruzgan
Province,” ABC News, updated December 16, 2013.
53      “Global Operations Afghanistan: Operation Highroad,” DoD, accessed November 7, 2019.
54      John Blaxland, “The Army and Government Objectives,” in Frame and Palazzo, On Ops, 283.
55      Blaxland, “Army and Government Objectives,” 283.
56      Lieutenant General David Morrison, Chief of Army, quoted in Luke Carroll, “ ‘Steward of
the Profession’: Making Generals,” in The Battles Before: Case Studies of Australian Army Leadership after
the Vietnam War, ed. David Connery (Newport, Australia: Big Sky, 2016), 78.
57      Major General Ken Gillespie (later Lieutenant General, Chief of Army) “The Challenges
Facing a Land Commander,” Australian Army Journal 1, vol. 2 (Winter 2004): 51–60.
58      Blaxland, “Army and Government Objectives,” 290.
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Admittedly, it is difficult to balance the achievements of the past with
news of Taliban gains and continued fighting in 2019.59

Lessons

“It is only through rapid adaptation that a military organisation
can keep pace with an adversary who is also evolving. Plainly, both
combatants seek an advantage over the other,” wrote Albert Palazzo.60
“To defer lesson learning,” he continued, “risks losing the contest for
ideas.” 61 At the tactical level, the ADF had various mechanisms to
identify and to disseminate lessons from Afghanistan, sometimes before
the next rotation deployed.62
The primary aim of these short-term lesson loops was to prepare
soldiers and subunits for what they might face on operations: adaptation
in tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as equipment.63 There is a
chance the niche nature of Australia’s contribution means the ADF did
not learn the right lessons or its lessons were incomplete.64 There is also
the reality that the wrong lessons might be drawn from a war that did
not feature enemy air power, artillery, counterintelligence capabilities,
high-end equipment, or cyberwarfare.
Nonetheless, the processes for identifying lessons at the tactical
level were not matched at the operational, strategic, administrative, or
institutional levels. No formal reviews, for instance, were conducted on
these aspects until after Australian forces had left Uruzgan.65 Senior
practitioners and military institutions should revisit, and not repeat,
this approach lest they lose the contest of ideas or forget those lessons
encountered and insights from the “longest war.” 66 The above survey,
as well as work undertaken to date for the Official History of Australian
Operations in Afghanistan, identifies three key lessons that deserve further
consideration before Australia next finds itself as a junior partner in a
coalition counterinsurgency effort.

Lesson One: Consider a Whole-of-Government Approach from
the Start

The truism that military action alone would not bring stability
or security to Afghanistan was not lost on those planning Australia’s
contribution.67 When it came to deploying civilians, however, the
59       Bill Roggio, “US Military Downplays District Control as Taliban Gains Ground in
Afghanistan,” Long War Journal, January 31, 2019.
60      Albert Palazzo, “Postscript,” in Frame and Palazzo, On Ops, 301.
61      Palazzo, “Postscript.”
62      Palazzo, “Postscript,” 285–86.
63      Palazzo, “Postscript,” 303.
64      Blaxland, “Army and Government Objectives,” 3.
65      Palazzo, “Postscript,” 299, 307; and “Army Institutional Lessons Study,” Australian Army,
September 7, 2016.
66      Richard D. Hooker and Joseph J. Collins, eds., Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2015); and several articles in Parameters 49, no.
3 (Autumn 2019).
67      Frame, “Lessons and Learning,” 6.

TOC

Afghanistan’s Lessons: Part II

Crawley

59

Howard government decided it was too dangerous, preferring instead
to leave nation-building work to other entities, such as the United
Nations, nongovernmental organizations, or the Dutch. This should
not downplay the significance of Australia’s aid donations, which
totaled over AUD$1.2 billion.68 But Australia’s war in Afghanistan was
dominated by the military, which carried the burden both in funds and
risks. Australian diplomats, development experts, and civilian police
were not seen in any meaningful numbers until after the Dutch departed
Uruzgan in 2010.
The lessons to be learned from Australia’s experience, as well as
those of the coalition in general, are numerous. First, if Canberra really
wants to make a difference on the ground, it needs a greater interagency
commitment as soon as the security situation permits. Moreover, it
needs to be willing to take outright responsibility for more than the
security pillar of a counterinsurgency campaign. It should ensure
better multiagency cooperation and the integration of the whole-ofgovernment efforts with those of coalition partners, and it needs to
resource the commitment appropriately.69 By the time these realities were
implemented in Afghanistan, Australia was already working toward its
exit strategy of transitioning responsibility to Afghan authorities.

Lesson Two: Maintain a Selective Embed Program

A defining feature of Australia’s war was the visibility and
effectiveness of its embedded officers in coalition headquarters across
OEF and ISAF. Anecdotally, it was not unusual to have an Australian in
ISAF headquarters briefing another Australian in Regional Command
South, both speaking with the weight of their respective coalition
commanding generals. American General Stanley McChrystal had
Australians spread throughout his headquarters. A two-star general was
his senior military adviser to the Afghan defense minister. A one-star
general coordinated the ISAF security response for the 2009 Afghan
elections. And another one-star general was a senior intelligence officer.70
Being a non-NATO member, Australia was able to bypass the flagsto-task ratios and take a strategic approach to select where it placed
its well-trained, highly proficient officers. Consequently, the ADF’s
leadership focused on getting people into positions that increased
Australia’s exposure to high-level decision-making and theater operations
and then keeping an Australian in those jobs so long as it suited national
interests. This program also benefited those individuals, exposing them
to significant coalition machinations, personalities, and pressures.
These few well-placed people often were more visible than the
hundreds of troops in Uruzgan. Several coalition generals have spoken in
surprise about Australia’s successes in this regard and have commented
68      Church, Australia at War.
69       Australian Civil-Military Center, Afghanistan: Lessons from Australia’s Whole-of-Government
Mission, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2016).
70      John Faulkner, “Australian Appointed as the Senior Military Advisor to the Afghanistan
Defence Minister,” Parliament of Australia, February 26, 2010.
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they wished they would replicate that access. Notably, they have also
invariably praised those officers.71 It was a deliberate policy, enabled
because of Australia’s historic links with the Five Eyes intelligence
partnership countries that dominated Regional Command South and
ISAF Headquarters, as well as the performance of those individuals.
This selective embed program delivered huge benefits to Australia.
Aside from exposing a generation of senior officers to coalition warfare
at the operational and strategic levels, it allowed Australia to have a say
in shaping the war at the tactical level without having to deploy too
many people, expend large sums of money, or put people unnecessarily
in harm’s way.72 It delivered strategic bang for the buck, allowing the
ADF to meet the government’s objective of supporting the United
States without undue risk. The lesson, therefore, is Australia, leaning on
the reputation it has gained in Afghanistan, as well as its access to Five
Eyes intelligence material, should continue to maintain a highly targeted
program of embedded officers.
Australia must be careful, however, not to develop a reputation for
contributing embeds at the expense of boots on the ground. In Iraq,
for example, the ADF was criticized for having a highly capable battle
group with restrictive rules of engagement. Such an approach did not
win Australia any favors among its coalition counterparts.73 The Iraq
example shows that a successful embed program has to be paired with
adequately sized forces engaged in operations, with few caveats. It mostly
achieved this in Afghanistan. Tied to lesson one, Australia should aim
to expand its embed program outside military channels, to include more
civilians, and to use the exposure and the experience gained to engender
a greater whole-of-government approach on the ground.

Lesson Three: Be Careful of Overreliance on Special Forces

As noted earlier, Special Forces were the force of choice for Howard.
He saw in them less risk, less cost, and greater flexibility. Undoubtedly
their smaller footprint, perceived lower casualty rates, high operations
security, and familiarity with coalition Special Forces, appeals to riskaverse governments, especially those embarking in wars of choice, as
opposed to wars of necessity.74
It is no surprise then that Howard used them to spearhead his
commitments to Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, and Afghanistan
again in 2005. Recent media reports of cultural issues within the Special
Operations Command and an ongoing inquiry by the Inspector-General
of the ADF into alleged war crimes committed by Special Forces soldiers
in Afghanistan, however, suggest successive governments may have
overused, and even misused, Australia’s Special Forces.
71      Interviews conducted by the author.
72      M. A. Thompson, “An embedded staff officer in Afghanistan: observations from ‘the engine
room’,” Australian Defence Force Journal 196 (2015): 41–43.
73      Jim Hammett, “We Were Soldiers Once . . . The Decline of the Royal Australian Infantry
Corps?,” Australian Army Journal 5, no. 1 (Autumn 2008): 44–45.
74      Blaxland, “Army and Government Objectives,” 291.
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By 2004, it was apparent to the Chief of Army Lieutenant General
Peter Leahy that “too much of the burden” during recent operations was
falling on a small portion of the ADF, in particular the Special Forces.75
Their operating tempo was high, their wider responsibilities (which
included domestic counterterrorism) equally taxing, and their numbers
finite. Yet in 2005, they were again sent to Afghanistan. As discussed
above, with the exception of a brief period during 2006 and 2007 when
the ADF’s senior leadership had been convinced they needed a rest, the
Special Forces were constantly deployed in Uruzgan for the remainder
of the war. Twenty Special Forces deployments between 2005 and 2014
largely fell to the Special Air Service Regiment and what became 2nd
Commando Regiment. The bulk of two deployments were undertaken
by the Army Reserve-heavy 1st Commando Regiment.
It is not uncommon to hear of these soldiers doing more than half a
dozen tours.76 The implications of multiple deployments to a high-stress,
high-threat environment, with the attendant constant exposure to the
horrors of war, for those soldiers and their families is another theme that
appears to be under investigation at the moment. Only time will tell.
Like concerns about overuse, the view that Special Forces were
misused in Afghanistan is not new. Indeed, a 2008 article in the
Australian Army Journal complained that rather than reserving Special
Forces for missions of strategic importance, the ADF was using them in
conventional infantry missions with tactical outcomes.77 The result was
deep frustration within the wider Australian Army, especially among
the ranks of the infantry, that the infantry was seen as “a distant second
choice for combat operations behind the Special Operations Forces.” 78
This frustration could also be felt among Dutch and Australian
commanders who, despite owning the area of operations and being
accountable for the success of the mission inside it, were rarely consulted
and often unaware of what the Special Forces were doing. Such a lack
of cooperation is worrisome when one considers the Special Operations
Task Group’s main purpose was to create and to maintain conditions
that allowed Task Force Uruzgan, and its Australian component, to
perform its functions. Lastly, there is also the fact of stress and pressure
on the units of Special Operations Command. It is evident some of
the overuse discussed above could have been avoided if more of these
combat missions had been given to the broader army.
It would be foolish to think the Special Forces will not be one of
the first options governments consider whenever war is on the table. It
would also be incorrect to conclude there was no place for Australian
Special Forces in Afghanistan. Many tasks they performed were
appropriate, such as long-range reconnaissance, clandestine operations,
75      David Beaumont, “Logistics and the Failure to Modernise,” in Frame and Palazzo, On Ops,
152.
76      Masters, No Front Line.
77      Hammett, “We Were Soldiers,” 41.
78      Hammett, “We Were Soldiers,” 40.
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and intelligence-led precision targeting against significant insurgent
leaders. There is also the reality that in the world of special operations
forces, elite units tend to want to work solely alongside of and share
information with other elite units.79 Despite these factors, the lessons
for the government and their ADF advisers should be to pause and
consider long-term ramifications for elite units and the wider Australian
Defence Force before committing Special Forces to war. It should also
ask whether Special Forces are the right choice for the task required.

Conclusion

A short article like this cannot do justice to the complicated and
nuanced story of Australia’s contribution to the Afghanistan War. It
can, however, provide readers with a contextualized account of that
commitment and present insights into coalition partner considerations
in a war of choice. It has also not attempted to identify or discuss all of
the many lessons stemming from that experience. Indeed, the Official
History of Australian Operations in Afghanistan, currently being written with
access to classified records, will have nearly one million words to canvass
such issues across political, strategic, operational, tactical, institutional,
and interagency divides.
That historical project, however, is still many years from completion.80
Awaiting its detailed analysis before attempting to identify lessons,
adapt, and implement change, accordingly risks, as Albert Palazzo
wrote, deferring institutional learning and losing the contest for ideas.
Yet this is precisely what has happened within the Australian Defence
Force above the tactical level. This reality provides the first lesson for
Australia: it must actively implement formal mechanisms to capture the
lessons of Afghanistan and adapt at all levels and across all arms of
government. It cannot afford to have those lessons confined solely to
the realm of informal corporate knowledge, where it risks evaporating
as senior public servants and military officers retire.
By focusing on three key lessons arising from Australia’s war in
Afghanistan, this article has provided a starting point for Australian
policymakers and practitioners. Afghanistan highlighted the importance
of development and governance to any counterinsurgency effort.
Consideration, therefore, should be given to implementing a wholeof-government strategy—paired with an interagency effort on the
ground—early in any future Australian commitment.
So, too, should policymakers and military practitioners realize
the benefits that accrue from a highly selective embed program. Such
a strategy should be maintained in times of peace and war. It must,
however, be balanced against the needs and wants of coalition partners,

79      Ian Langford, “Australian Special Forces in Afghanistan: Supporting Australia in the ‘Long
War’,” Australian Army Journal 7, no. 1 (Autumn 2010): 24–25.
80      “Official Histories–Iraq, Afghanistan & East Timor,” Australian War Memorial, accessed
November 7, 2019.
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Australian national interests, and the propensity to deploy embeds at the
expense of—rather than in addition to—ground forces.
Finally, careful thought should be given to the government’s default
position that Special Forces are the force of choice for such missions.
The constant rotation of ADF Special Forces units through Afghanistan
invariably strained a finite, strategic asset. Greater consideration should
therefore be given to the institutional and individual impact of deploying
Special Forces when another force element might suffice. This is as true
for preserving the capabilities of the Special Operations Command as it
is for developing those of the wider Australian Defence Force.
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ABSTRACT: This article argues West Point responded to the
changing strategic environment from the end of the Cold War
through the post-9/11 period by innovating its curriculum. Over
the past several decades, however, the academy’s educational model
has remained remarkably stable, rooted in an enduring commitment
to a rigorous liberal education as the best preparation for officers
confronting the inherent uncertainties of future wars.

T

he United States Military Academy has been developing
commissioned officers for the US Army since the academy’s
founding in 1802. While the objective has always been to
produce second lieutenants prepared for a career in uniform, West Point’s
approach to its leader development mission has changed dramatically over
the past two centuries, and much of that story has been told elsewhere.1
This article focuses on the decades since the end of the Cold War, a
period of profound shifts in the strategic landscape, and the changing
expectations at home about the strategic problems our military leaders
must be prepared to tackle. As a result of these factors, the past three
decades have been marked by deep reflection among academy leaders
over whether the curriculum is adequately preparing our cadets for the
professional demands placed on their shoulders after graduation.
This article emerged from a joint project that began in 2015 among
a group of faculty members from different North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) military academies who met periodically to
discuss their respective academic curricula. Our initial goal was to share
best practices for officer education at the precommissioning level. Even
though our graduates have been working together in Afghanistan for
years, and they share a stake in NATO’s reinvigorated focus on territorial
defense after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, each academy knew very
little about how its counterparts were preparing young officers for
service, particularly in collective security initiatives.
Over the course of numerous meetings, we identified profound
differences in how NATO members approach this task. This discovery
led to a new set of comparative questions for discussion. First, how have
changes in the international strategic context since the end of the Cold
War shaped each academy’s educational model, if at all? Second, how
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has the domestic political context of each member state shaped the way
its military academies responded to the changing security environment?
This article contributes to the larger comparative study of strategic
context and NATO military academies, and it addresses these questions
for the United States Military Academy (USMA). This analysis is not the
official position of the USMA, but rather my personal assessment after
nearly two decades on the faculty. My goal is to pull back the curtain
a bit to explain how this institution has wrestled with the fundamental
questions of educating future US Army officers within a broader
domestic and international strategic setting.
The article focuses on the impact of changes in the global
distribution of power at the end of the Cold War that created new
opportunities American leaders sought to exploit and the changing
perceptions of the twenty-first century threat environment. Together,
these threats and opportunities invariably expanded the mission of the
US Army and forced USMA leadership to confront a central question:
What capabilities do graduates need to carry into the field? Real-world
events, including the Persian Gulf War and the subsequent focus on
preparedness to fight major regional conflicts, in Korea and the Middle
East; humanitarian intervention in cases like Somalia and Kosovo;
nation-building and counterinsurgency missions in Afghanistan and
Iraq; and a renewed emphasis on readiness for high-intensity conflict
against near-peer competitors such as Russia and China, suggest the
answer to this question is simply “more.”
Further, domestic sentiment, favoring an activist foreign policy
and continued investments in America’s global reach, created a strategic
culture that encouraged expanding the capabilities of the US Army. This
article pulls these elements of strategic context together to explain the
academy’s response to the most basic questions of education and leader
development in recent decades. In the end, it shows that despite changes
in the international environment and in Army operations, West Point’s
educational model has remained remarkably stable, rooted in an enduring
commitment to a rigorous liberal education as the best preparation for a
career of service as a US Army officer.

America’s Strategic Context

We begin our assessment of America’s strategic context by bluntly
acknowledging a few, perhaps obvious, facts: among the 29 member
states within the NATO Alliance, America stands out in several ways—
its power, its geography, and its self-defined role in the international
system. While the United States and Canada share strategic benefits
offered by geographic separation from most of the world’s hot spots, the
magnitude and global reach of American economic and military power
in support of its enduring, post-World War II interests puts the United
States in a unique strategic position relative to its NATO partners.
America’s distinctive strategic context, characterized by the
relationship between its power and its geography and its strategic culture,
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directly influences the USMA program. Scholars have been working
with the concept of strategic culture for decades, highlighting how ideas,
identities, “patterns of habitual behavior,” assumptions about the way
the world works, and assumptions about “what strategic choices are
the most efficacious,” shape the decisions states make.2 Thomas Berger
defined “political-military culture” as the ideas and identities that shape
“how members of a given society view national security, the military as
an institution, and the use of force in international relations.” 3 In the
United States, a distinctive strategic culture gives purpose to its great
power, and in turn reinforces military and economic investment in
sustaining that great power while geography creates the conditions for
many of the operational features of American power abroad.
The key ideas and identities that constitute America’s strategic
culture can be summarized through a few statements that reflect a
deeply engrained and widely shared perspective on national security:
• Despite the continental scale of its landmass and its rich natural
resource base, American prosperity, and the national strength that
prosperity makes possible, depend on unfettered access to key regions
of the world, primarily western Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East.
• Historically, America’s political leadership has been highly sensitive to
perceived security threats in distant lands that could be projected to
the American homeland or disrupt access to key geographic regions
in other parts of the world.
• Power projection with forward-deployed military forces makes
it possible to defuse, deter, or defend against these threats at great
distances from American territory, thereby greatly reducing the risks
to American interests.
• America as an uncontested leader in multilateral political, economic,
and military endeavors is a core identity, but not a guaranteed state of
affairs for the twenty-first century.
• Historically, Americans have seen themselves as problem solvers,
willing and able to take on the challenges many states cannot, or are
not willing to, take on without US leadership or assistance.
The roots of contemporary American strategic culture are found in
the early twentieth century, as the pressures of a changing international
system made it impossible for the United States to maintain the largely
isolationist grand strategy it had pursued since the founding. After
suffering through the pain of the Great Depression and being drawn into
World War II, American leaders increasingly came to believe fixing the
problems that had spawned such a violent period in human history was
essential for securing future American interests. In essence, if the United
2      Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security 19, no. 4
(1995): 36, 46.
3      Thomas U. Berger, “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan” in The
Culture of National Security, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996),
325–26.
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States could not remain detached from the dangerous dysfunctions of
the old world order, then it had no choice but to transform the character
of political, economic, and security relationships within the international
system into a more congenial environment. John Ikenberry describes
this new world order as an open order that allowed for liberal trade
across continents, a friendly order free from hostile revisionist states,
and a stable order in which institutions help facilitate cooperation across
multiple issue areas.4
The Cold War helped cement this new strategic perspective and
America’s emerging identity as a global leader. This emergent globalist,
problem-solving impulse was evident in 1950 in the most important
strategic document of the early Cold War. National Security Council
Report 68, which contains an alarming assessment of the Soviet threat,
evaluated the strategic options available in response and presented
a strong case for containment as the only viable way to confront the
new threat environment. But in a largely overlooked passage, NSC 68
distinguished containment from what it called “our overall policy,”
which can “be described as one designed to foster a world environment
in which the American system can survive and flourish.” While
containment was one “subsidiary” element, NSC 68 declared “the policy
of striving to develop a healthy international community is the longterm constructive effort which we are engaged in.” And it was an effort
America would “probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat.” 5
President John F. Kennedy captured this global problem-solving spirit
and what it meant for America’s Army officers during his West Point
commencement speech in June 1962:
Whatever your position, the scope of your decisions will not be confined to
the traditional tenets of military competence and training. . . . The nonmilitary
problems which you will face will also be most demanding—diplomatic,
political and economic. . . . You will need to know and understand not only
the foreign policy of the United States, but the foreign policy of all countries
scattered around the world who 20 years ago were the most distant names
to us.6

Perhaps the best evidence these strategic ideas and this identity had
become deeply embedded in the political fabric of the United States came
with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. There was great enthusiasm
in the early 1990s for reaping the benefits of a so-called peace dividend,
the potential for significant reductions in the costs of global leadership
made possible by a dramatic decline in the Soviet threat. But the end of
the Cold War did not lead to a wholesale drawdown of America’s global
commitments. Instead, American leaders quickly pivoted on the axis of
US strategic culture to engage new threats and embrace new opportunities

4      G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 166.
5      National Security Council, United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, National
Security Council Report 68 (NSC 68) (Washington, DC: NSC, April 14, 1950), sec. VI a.
6      John F. Kennedy, “Remarks to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point,
New York, 6 June 1962” (speech, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, June 6, 1962).
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to exercise leadership “abroad, in search of monsters to destroy.” 7 The
absence of a peer competitor simply broadened the geographic scope
for extending American influence and ambitions. A draft version of the
Bush administration’s 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, for example,
bluntly called for sustaining a one-superpower-world to prevent allies
like Germany and Japan from challenging America’s leadership of the
existing order, extending America’s European defense commitments
further eastward to include former Warsaw Pact nations, and stopping
the spread of nuclear weapons by such states as Iraq, North Korea,
India, and Pakistan.8 Less than a year later President George H. W.
Bush delivered his farewell address to the cadets at West Point. In it, he
acknowledged,
The United States should not seek to be the world’s policeman. . . . But
in the wake of the cold war, in a world where we are the only remaining
superpower, it is the role of the United States to marshal its moral and
material resources to promote a democratic peace. It is our responsibility,
it is our opportunity to lead. . . . Our objective must be to exploit [this]
unparalleled opportunity . . . to work toward transforming this new world
into a new world order, one of governments that are democratic, tolerant,
and economically free at home and committed abroad to settling inevitable
differences peacefully, without the threat or use of force.9

When Bush delivered this speech in January 1993, American
forces had been in Somalia for just one month, executing the first
major humanitarian relief mission of the post-Cold War period.
President Bill Clinton quickly embraced this general trend of expanding
America’s global commitments such as promoting democracy and
market economies, deterring states that might oppose these trends;
promoting the liberalization of these same states, and advancing a
humanitarian agenda.10
Over the years, public support for American engagement abroad
has certainly had its highs and its lows. And during the 2016 presidential
election, Donald Trump successfully tapped into a more restrictive view
of US military and diplomatic intervention abroad held by a percentage
of American voters. But despite President Trump’s challenge to longstanding beliefs about America’s role in the world, the general consensus
on American global engagement, particularly among elites, has been
resilient. This consensus is clearly reinforced by enduring support within
the broader national security community, and by the leadership of the
Department of Defense and the US Army, which expects America’s
military forces to be fully prepared to sustain global commitments and
grapple with a wide range of problems in all regions of the world. In
7      John Quincy Adams, “An Address to Congress” (speech, United States Congress, Washington,
DC, July 4, 1821).
8      Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Ensuring no Rivals Develop,” New York Times,
March 8, 1992.
9      George H. W. Bush, “Address at West Point” (speech, United States Military Academy, West
Point, NY, January 5, 1993).
10      Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” (speech, School of Advanced
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, September 21, 1993).
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this broader story, NATO clearly remains a top priority for the United
States. But the Alliance is just one part of a larger global picture that
keeps American leaders focused on multiple priorities.
While this relatively stable strategic culture has sustained basic
expectations that America’s Army and its officers must be prepared
to engage globally on behalf of America’s diverse strategic objectives,
expectations for the specific types of problems they must confront have
changed since the late 1980s. Changing expectations have followed shifts
in the global power structure, America’s problem-solving ambitions,
and the character of threats that have flared and receded over time.
Taken together, these variables provide tremendous insight into how
the leadership and the faculty at West Point have thought about the
academy’s program for developing each class of new second lieutenants.

West Point’s Adaptation

In many ways, West Point now resembles a typical four-year
American undergraduate academic institution, with a core curriculum
and academic majors that result in each graduate being awarded a
bachelor of science degree. Military and physical development programs
are woven throughout the cadet experience, as is a character-building
program designed to develop ethically grounded leadership. For much of
the post-World War II era, and into the 1980s, the West Point curriculum
remained relatively stable. All cadets took the same set of courses, with
just a few elective options introduced in the 1970s, while much of the
core curriculum reflected the legacy of West Point’s distinction as the
first engineering school in the United States. While cadets could select
fields of study or academic majors by the mid-1980s, the intellectual
experience for every cadet was highly standardized with academic
majors not becoming a graduation requirement until 2005.
As the Cold War was winding down, two external sources of
pressure forced the academy’s leaders to think more critically about
cadet education. Abroad, the Persian Gulf War and the Somalia
intervention demonstrated in rapid succession just how broad an Army
officer’s professional skill set needed to be. The Persian Gulf War was
a victory for the post-Vietnam US Army. It provided dramatic, madefor-television proof American prowess in the realm of high-intensity
conflict was unmatched. Through the 1990s, American defense priorities
and force structure remained anchored in the threat of renewed conflict
against Iraq or Iran in southwest Asia and in the enduring potential for
war on the Korean peninsula.
Readiness for large-scale conventional combat operations in
these two major regional conflicts, and perhaps fighting them nearly
simultaneously, supported the notion that continuity in officer
education was necessary despite the end of the Soviet threat.11 And
the Gulf War victory could be read as indisputable confirmation the
11      John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995 (Washington
DC: Department of Defense, 1995), ii.
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Army’s programs for developing combat leaders were getting the job
done. On the other hand, Somalia and the string of messier post-Cold
War military interventions that followed in other places, convinced
many that American military leaders had to develop a much broader
range of competencies, beyond the capabilities needed to prevail in
conventional warfare.
At home, a 1989 review by a reaccreditation team from the Middle
States Commission on Higher Education set the stage for a fresh look
at West Point’s educational model. In a blunt finding, the commission’s
assessment team asserted “the institution lacked any discernible
justification to describe why students were required to complete a
particular set of courses.” According to one academy official responsible
for addressing this finding, “We . . . leveraged this accreditation concern
to transform the West Point experience.”12
By the late 1990s, the guiding document for West Point’s academic
program, aptly titled Educating Future Army Officers for a Changing World
(known locally by the gangly acronym EFAOCW), reflected the
changing missions—in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo—that were
redefining the very purpose of America’s armed forces. In a way, this
document was another manifestation of America’s deepening strategic
culture embracing with evermore enthusiasm the notion of America’s
natural role in the world as liberal hegemon.America the problem solver
was, in Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s words, the “indispensable
nation,” a force for progress destined to shape the international system
and repair broken states that were sprouting up in greater numbers as
the decade wore on.13 And with this embrace of liberal hegemony in
a one-superpower-world came the belief, as articulated in EFAOCW,
America’s Army officers must be prepared “to anticipate and respond
effectively to the uncertainties of a changing technological, social,
political, and economic world.” 14
It is fair to point out technological, social, political, and economic
change was not a historical phenomenon introduced by the 1990s.
But the pace and the scale of the changes occurring in this decade,
along with America’s expanding strategic ambitions, begged West
Point’s leaders to reconsider the right education for future officers
who would be ordered to take on missions, to serve highly complex
strategic objectives in complex political and social settings, and to apply
a rapidly evolving set of technological tools.The EFAOCW answered
this question by reaffirming the value of a liberal education at the core
of the cadet experience, rather than tailoring cadet education to meet
the specific needs of peace enforcement or nation-building missions
12      Bruce Keith, “The Transformation of West Point as a Liberal Arts College,” Association of
American Colleges & Universities 96, no. 2 (Spring 2010). See also G. B. Forsythe and B. Keith, “The
Evolving USMA Academic Curriculum: 1952–2002,” in West Point: Two Centuries and Beyond, ed.
Lance Betros (West Point, NY: 2004), 370–89.
13      “Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Interview on NBC-TV ‘The Today Show’ with
Matt Lauer,” U.S. Department of State, February 19, 1998.
14      United States Military Academy (USMA), Educating Future Army Officers for a Changing World
(West Point, NY: USMA, 2002), 6.
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that American political leaders embraced in this decade. As the larger
Army was debating, and introducing, changes in force structure and
training to prepare and equip soldiers for these unique tasks, West Point
was recommitting to an educational model better suited for complex
and ambiguous problems.15 This effort sought to develop critical and
creative thinking skills that could be applied to whatever specific tasks
its graduates would face in the years to come.
The academy’s commitment was reflected in the rigorous,
standardized core curriculum that cut broadly across the sciences,
humanities, and social sciences and remained a requirement for every
cadet. But the academy also introduced diverse academic majors and
concentration fields to the curriculum. The idea was to harness the
benefits of disciplinary depth as part of the academic experience, which
would not only diversify the academic backgrounds available within
each graduating class, but also help stimulate deep learning, rather than
just broad learning. The intent was to inspire a commitment to lifelong
learning that comes from intellectual exploration of a field the individual
cadet found most interesting.
This broad liberal education aligned with the advice offered by
Sir Michael Howard, one of the preeminent military historians of the
twentieth century, in a lecture he delivered in 1961. As Howard noted,
“Wars are not tactical exercises writ large. They are . . . conflicts of
societies.” While the military-technical aspects of warfare are essential
components of military expertise, as the Army Profession doctrine asserts,
Howard emphasized, “The roots of victory and defeat often have to
be sought far from the battlefield, in political, social, and economic
factors.” As a result, he argues, military professionals “must study war
in context.” 16 H. R. McMaster expanded on this point by arguing any use
of military force must be “understood in [its] social, cultural, economic,
human, moral, political, and psychological contexts.” And these fields
must be part of every cadet’s education.17 This appreciation for studying
the context of the deployment of military armed force reflects the three
other domains of military expertise in the Army profession: politicalcultural, moral-ethical, and human-leader development.18

Long Wars’ Impact

Despite the firm commitment to liberal education already in place
as the academy entered the twenty-first century, its self-conscious link to
15      Nina M. Serafino, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement,
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report RL33557 (Washington, DC: CRS, January 24, 2007).
16      Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” Parameters 11, no. 1 (1981): 14
(italics in original).
17      H. R. McMaster, “The Need for a Coherent Interdisciplinary Approach to the Study of
War and Warfare at West Point” (unpublished paper, 2012), 2. Also see H. R. McMaster, “Thinking
Clearly about War and the Future of Warfare,” introduction to US Army Operating Concept: Winning
in a Complex World, by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC), TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Washington, DC: HQDA, October
31, 2014), 9.
18      See HQDA, The Army Profession, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1 (ADRP 1)
(Washington, DC: HQDA, 2015).
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the new kinds of missions young leaders were confronting in the postCold War world, Afghanistan and Iraq rattled the confidence of many at
West Point. The interventions of the 1990s were a poor comparison to
what the academy’s graduates faced at the turn of the century. Previous
missions had relatively small footprints, few resources were devoted to
the problems, and they were of short duration and limited ambition.
Afghanistan and Iraq became all-consuming problems at the center
of American foreign policy for years on end. In each case, young officers
were given increasingly more complex counterinsurgency and nationbuilding missions, tasked to pursue immensely more ambitious strategic
goals that included, at least initially, nothing less than the wholesale
political, social, and economic transformation of these foreign lands.
In turn, junior officers had to grapple with a complicated mixture of
political, social, cultural, and economic variables affecting the behavior
of adversaries, allies, and neutral actors alike. And to be effective, Army
officers had to figure out how to manipulate these variables to achieve
the strategic goals set by higher policy—and do so without simply
resorting to the brute force at their disposal.
As the 2007 version of EFAOCW declared,
The intellectual demands placed on the modern Army officer are
unprecedented in our history. Today, more than previously, our graduates
must deal with complex technologies, rapidly developing situations in
complicated multicultural scenarios, and a host of non-traditional missions
that demand innovative solutions. This reality requires graduates to be
informed, responsible, self-directed learners who can anticipate and respond
effectively to challenges that we can predict only imperfectly today.19

But was West Point actually offering an adequate program to help
our graduates manage the tasks they were given in these two post-9/11
operations? As the Army’s strategic challenges in Afghanistan and Iraq
mounted, recent graduates and former academy instructors launched a
steady stream of feedback on the nature of these missions to faculty and
staff at West Point. And it seemed the existing developmental program
might not meet the exacting demands of strategic thinking and action
the young officers were being expected to exercise.
The Army’s formal endorsement of mission command—“the
exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission
orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent
to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land
operations”—in 2013 reinforced the imperative to ensure academy
graduates were prepared to take on these tasks.20 In introductory
remarks, then US Army Chief of Staff General Raymond T. Odierno
observed this concept was implemented out of operational necessity
in Afghanistan and Iraq. It was then codified as a formal leadership
philosophy with significant implications for leader development, unit
training, and warfighting.
19      USMA, Educating Future Army Officers for a Changing World (West Point, NY: USMA, 2007), 1.
20      HQDA, U.S. Army Mission Command Strategy FY 13-19 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2013), ii.
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Army leaders have since recognized widespread adoption of
the mission command philosophy require a cultural shift because
commanders must “become comfortable with decentralizing control in
order to foster initiative and adaptation by allowing subordinates the
greatest freedom of action in determining how best to accomplish the mission.” 21
To make this concept work, it is critical commanders have confidence in
decentralization of control. They must be convinced it will not lead to
disaster. But more importantly, they must be convinced junior officers
have the intellectual competence across the fields of military expertise
to deserve to be granted the authority to exercise initiative and adapt
operations to best achieve strategic ends. The US Army’s Operating Concept
of 2014 explained effectiveness depends on the ability to innovate under
conditions of ambiguity and “innovation is the result of critical and
creative thinking and the conversion of new ideas into valued outcomes.
Innovation drives the development of new tools or methods that permit
Army forces to anticipate future demands, stay ahead of determined
enemies, and accomplish the mission.” 22
Understandably, the feedback from officers in the field inspired a
range of initiatives at West Point to fill the perceived gaps in the cadet
experience before their first deployments. The faculty and staff engaged
in drawn-out debates about cultural literacy and language training.
Programs to cultivate diplomatic and negotiation skills and increase
cadet exposure to the political and economic problems associated with
counterinsurgency and nation-building operations were introduced.
Academic departments added more language classes and new elective
courses tailored to the changing missions. Additionally, summer military
training now included role-playing scenarios meant to replicate the peace
enforcement and counterinsurgency problems the cadets would face as
officers in the field. The number of cadets sent to foreign universities for
a semester abroad swelled after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.
Hundreds of cadets were sent abroad for cultural immersion experiences
each summer to learn and to work with diverse local communities in
Africa, Southeast Asia, central Asia, and Latin America.
As these piecemeal initiatives accumulated, by 2013 the dean of the
academic board decided it was time for a comprehensive review of the
academic curriculum, the first since the 1980s. The goal was to ensure
the academy was keeping up with best practices in higher education
and producing the flexible and adaptive leaders needed to work toward
the complex strategic objectives of post-9/11 operations. But even as
this review was underway, the strategic environment continued to
change dramatically. In August 2010, President Barack Obama declared
America’s combat mission in Iraq had ended. And by December 2011,
the last American troops serving in Iraq were home, meeting the
withdrawal deadline negotiated by President George W. Bush in 2008.
Likewise, the American forces who had surged into Afghanistan during
21      HQDA, Mission Command Strategy, 4 (emphasis added).
22      TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 20.
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2010, gradually transitioned from a large, direct combat mission to a
small force serving primarily as advisors for Afghan security forces.
Russia’s seizure of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 sparked an
eastward push for NATO that resulted in new roles for American forces.
Army offers rotated through many of the newest, post-Cold War NATO
member states, participating in presence missions and exercises that until
recently had seemed like a relic of Cold War history. American priorities
signaled a stark shift in December 2017 with the release of President
Trump’s National Security Strateg y, which stated bluntly that readiness to
deter and fight near-peer competitors, rather than counterinsurgency,
was now the most important task for the American military. When
the long-standoff on the Korean peninsula flared dangerously in 2017,
Army leaders once again designated high-intensity land warfare as the
top priority and the lethality of US forces the most important measure
of readiness.
Back at West Point, which continued to deliver about 1,000
new second lieutenants to the Army every year, the comprehensive
curriculum review came to an end, and the discussion of the value
of a rigorous, broad liberal education had come full circle. The core
curriculum was adjusted in places, the academic goals were refined, and
additional elements were added to the cadet experience for the class of
2019 and beyond. But completing the process, the academy’s leaders had
reaffirmed one essential claim: a rigorous, broad liberal education is the
best preparation for officers serving in an inherently uncertain future,
on any mission, and in any part of the world.

The Future’s Complexity

Eighteen years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
sparked the initial invasion of Afghanistan, West Point has moved
beyond worrying about the distinct demands of counterterrorism,
counterinsurgency, and nation building, and how the responses to
these types of operations must shape the curriculum. The vision for
the academic program released in June 2018, Educating Army Leaders,
recognizes the reality that flows from America’s strategic culture. As
long as Americans see themselves as forward-engaged problem solvers
with diverse global interests, “the roles, responsibilities, and missions
of the Army [will] continually shift, requiring graduates to have deep
disciplinary knowledge as well as the agility and imagination to work in
a variety of venues and across any number of disciplines.” 23 But beyond
reaffirming the importance of a broad liberal education that “teaches
cadets how to think about problems in varied and adaptive ways as
they learn to navigate and succeed in an increasingly complex world,”
West Point as an institution continues to lean forward with an emphasis
on innovation, both by its faculty and its cadets.24 The curriculum
increasingly emphasizes independent student research and an enhanced
23      USMA, Educating Army Leaders: Developing Intellect and Character to Navigate a Diverse and Dynamic
World (West Point, NY: USMA, 2018), ii.
24      USMA, Educating Army Leaders, 13.
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writing program, along with new threads that tie several courses
together on the study of war, region-culture, and gender, sexuality, and
respect. Moreover, West Point is now home to the Army Cyber Institute,
and the academy more broadly supports cadets preparing to join the
Army’s new cyber branch. The capstone MX400 Officership Course
is now formally embedded in the core curriculum and includes a new
“Integrative Challenge” designed to give cadet teams complex problems
to solve that depend on their ability to draw from across the academic
program, and across other aspects of the West Point experience as well,
just as they will be expected to do as military officers grappling with the
complex challenges of an unpredictable future.25

25      USMA, Educating Army Leaders, 15.
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ABSTRACT: This article examines how well military education at the
Royal Military Academy of Sandhurst delivers lieutenants capable
of coping with the complexities of their operational environment
and the strategic implications of their decisions.

I

n the late 1990s, US Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak
introduced the concept of the “strategic corporal,” which emphasized
the idea that even lower-level military leaders must be mindful of
the possible strategic implications of tactical and operational decisions.1
Krulak maintained militaries in post-Cold War operations had to be
prepared to engage in full-scale military interventions, peacekeeping
operations, and humanitarian aid missions. In complex and fluid
operating environments, waiting for orders from higher up the chain of
command could jeopardize time-critical decision-making and negatively
impact operational outcomes.
Krulak’s strategic corporal concept led to a shift among Western
militaries on the subject of strategic thinking. Increasingly, leadership
responsibilities were transferred down the chain of command, even to
the level of corporal. Fostering strategic thinking at the lower levels of
command presents threats and opportunities, but also calls for training
and education beyond traditional soldiering skills.2
Building on the notion of the strategic corporal, this article explores
the concept of the strategic lieutenant and asks to what extent military
education for young officers reflects new strategic and operational
realities. Specifically, it examines whether the British Royal Military
Academy of Sandhurst (RMAS) produces strategic-minded officers. The
RMAS Commissioning Course aims to train and educate officer cadets
to become strategic lieutenants imbued with a substantial amount of
knowledge and understanding of the complexities of an ever-changing
operational environment. The academy’s applied learning approach to
military education represents an integrated model of military training
and education and aims to enhance the strategic mindedness of young
British Army officers.
The aim of this article is threefold. First, it explores the extent to
which key changes in Britain’s strategic context since the end of the Cold
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1      Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines international conflict
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management, African
2      Johan W. J. Lammers, “Commanding the Strategic Corporal” (working paper, Department of security questions, and
military education.
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War are reflected in Britain’s military educational programs for young
officer cadets. As the article demonstrates, lessons learned from recent
operational deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan have been among the
key drivers for change, and have helped fuel the enhanced focus on
education in the professional development of young officers.
Second, this article addresses the specific educational model
Sandhurst applies to enhance strategic mindedness in British Army
officers and considers some challenges this model represents. It explains
how RMAS prepares strategic lieutenants through blended learning—
an integrated approach to training and education, where classroom
learning is put into practice and applied in exercises. The yearlong
Commissioning Course is augmented by extended academic learning
through the recently launched Army Higher Education Pathway
(AHEP), a mechanism to optimize officers’ professional development
during the first stages of their career.
Third, this article takes a first step toward measuring the effectiveness
of the Sandhurst model in educating strategic lieutenants, while also
considering the difficulties of evaluating educational outcomes.

Strategic Context

The British strategic context since the end of the Cold War has
witnessed both continuity and change. Immediately after the end of the
Cold War, Options for Change, the 1991 defense review, used the “peace
dividend” as an opportunity to cut defense spending from 4.1 percent
to 2.4 percent of the gross domestic product.3 Despite concerns the
proposed cuts lacked strategic vision and excessively limited operational
capability, especially following the Persian Gulf War, the focus on
downward budget pressure preoccupied the minds of government
leaders led by Margaret Thatcher and John Major.4
When the Labour Party took office in 1997, it committed to a new
defense review, which reflected the refusal to give up capabilities and
the desire to remain prepared for all eventualities in an uncertain and
unpredictable security environment.5 While the Franco-British St.
Malo declaration (1998) demonstrated more continuity than change
and an enduring preference for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the Labour Party added the “force for good” element to Britain’s
traditional foreign policy ambitions, embodying a liberal interventionist
approach under the banner of intervening for the global good.6

3      International Security Information Service (ISIS), Options for Change: The UK Defence Review,
1990–1991, no. 21 (Brussels: ISIS, 1991).
4      Timothy Garden and David Ramsbotham, “About Face—The British Armed Forces, Which
Way to Turn?,” RUSI Journal 149, no. 2 (2004); and Mitch Mitchell, Decline, and Fall? The Influence
of Military Thinking on Britain’s Strategic Culture, Seaford House Papers (London: Royal College of
Defense Studies, 2013).
5      Ministry of Defense (MOD), Strategic Defence Review, Command Paper 3999 (London: MOD,
1998).
6      Mitchell, Decline and Fall?; and MOD, Strategic Defence Review.

TOC

Strategic Lieutenants

Jacobs

79

The global ambitions and responsibilities resulting from such an
approach soon became visible in deployments in Kosovo, Sierra Leone,
Afghanistan, and Iraq.7 Yet, the reputation of the British Army was
dented somewhat as a result of experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Substantial human and financial costs combined with limited operational
successes caused domestic public support and political appetite for
British deployments to wane, seemingly leading to the end of the “era
of interventionism.” 8
When the Cameron government took office in 2010, questionable
levels of success in Iraq and Afghanistan had already left their mark.
Cameron proposed a foreign policy based on national priorities, economic
interests, and rationality; however, this instrumentalist approach was
criticized as a mismatch between ambitions and resources.9 Indeed, while
public opinion and political appetite for deployments had decreased,
global ambitions and the global threat picture had not. Accordingly, the
2015 defense review emphasized threats facing Britain were larger, more
diverse, and more complex, thus requiring greater resourcing.10
Today, the British government is confronted with a list of daunting
challenges: balancing a shrinking defense budget with global foreign
policy ambitions, dealing with the challenges of “Brexit” negotiations
and related uncertainties, reassessing the meaning of the “Special
Relationship” with the United States under the Trump administration,
and ensuring preparedness for the Russian threat. Indeed, General
Nicholas P. Carter, then chief of the general staff, in January 2018 described
Russia as the biggest “state-based threat to [the UK] since the end of the
Cold War,” and the “most complex and capable security challenge.” 11 As
a result of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s increasing assertiveness,
the shift in British foreign policy away from deployment to armed
conflicts overseas never materialized.12
Despite foreign policy shifts and changes in the nature of global
conflict following the end of the Cold War, Britain’s role in the wider
strategic context in which it operates has seen more continuity than
7       Adrian L. Johnson, ed., Wars in Peace: British Military Operations since 1991 (London: Royal
United Services Institute for Defense Studies and Security Studies, 2014).
8      Frank Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2011); and Johnson, Wars in Peace.
9      Office of the Prime Minister, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security
Strategy, Command Paper 7953 (London: Office of the Prime Minister, 2010); and House of
Commons, The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy: Sixth
Report of Session 2010–12, H.C. Rep. No. 761 (2011).
10      Office of the Prime Minister, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review
2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, Command Paper 9161 (London: Office of the Prime
Minister, 2015).
11      Nick Carter, “General Nick Carter: Dynamic Security Threats and the British Army,”
RUSI, streamed live on January 22, 2018, YouTube video, 1:10:15. https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=C1O6NswL4iA
12      Matthew Ford, “Influence Without Power? Reframing British Concepts of Military
Intervention after 10 Years of Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 25, no. 3 (2014):
495–500; United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development, UK MOD, and UK
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Building Stability Overseas Strategy (London: MOD, 2011); and
MOD, International Defence Engagement Strategy (London: MOD, 2013).
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change, and long-standing traditions remain prominent in British
strategic thinking. At the forefront of these traditions are Britain’s selfidentification as a country that endeavors to continue playing a powerful
role in the world with a high level of ambition to exert global influence
and with a security and defense policy predominantly aligned with and
through NATO and alongside the United States. Nevertheless, Britain
had to reflect on its role in a changing international context, and how
best to educate its young officers to operate effectively within it.

Educational Adaptation

At Sandhurst, program adjustments can materialize through
formal, informal, academic, and military channels. Lessons learned and
suggestions for change may come top down, bottom up, or sideways,
making it a flexible system that allows for an inclusive approach.13 The
implementation of changes, however, may take time to materialize and
to be reflected in the Sandhurst educational program.
Formal change processes can start as high as the defense secretary or
cascade down via the chief of the general staff, the Capabilities Branch,
and the Department for Personnel (DEPERS). Within DEPERS, the
Individual Development Branch sets the standards for individual officer
development throughout an Army career, and more specifically, the
standards on training requirements are set by the Training Requirements
Authority.14 The Sandhurst Group then translates these requirements
into a program of education and training through the Training
Delivery Authority.15
Sandhurst leadership is responsible for the specifics of course
programming and educational requirements, and the faculty has
substantial flexibility to design courses while ensuring compatibility
with military training.16 The course may also undergo adaptation as
a result of suggestions made by RMAS senior (military and civilian)
management, higher ranks of the Field Army, subject matter experts
in the relevant academic departments, and officers returning from
operational deployments. In practice, all staff members associated with
the educational program at Sandhurst monitor wider developments and
trends and suggest changes when deemed appropriate.
An historical assessment of the changes in military education at
Sandhurst since the 1970s demonstrates the recent culmination of a trend
toward an enhanced focus on academic study and reflects some lessons
learned from recent military operations. The Cold War period witnessed
two landmark changes in the approach to officer education. In the early
1980s, three academic departments were established: political and social
studies, war studies and international affairs, and the communications
department. The establishment of these departments reflected changes
13      Interview 4. 2017. Staff
14      Interview 1. 2017. Staff
15      Interview 2. 2017. Staff
16      Interview 5. 2018. Staff

Member RMAS, November 27, 2017.
Member RMAS, September 21, 2017.
Member RMAS, October 16, 2017.
Member MOD, January 30, 2018.
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in the academic world (where international politics was becoming a
separate discipline) and assumptions regarding necessary knowledge and
skills for young British Army officers.
A few years later, a second groundbreaking decision was made to
merge military training and education into a blended learning approach,
to maximize officer cadet time at the academy and to ensure the practical
application of learning outcomes.17 While there have been content-related
changes since, such as courses on counterinsurgency and stabilization,
the overall format and approach of the blended learning Commissioning
Course has remained largely unchanged.18
Discussions during the 1990s focused on the importance of military
education for enhancing young officers’ understanding of the new
strategic context and preparing them for a wide range of operational
deployments. But apart from some changes to course content, these
discussions did not develop into policies, and it was not until 2015
that the Sandhurst educational program underwent notable structural
changes. Until 2015, academic education for all officer cadets at RMAS
was taught at the undergraduate level only. But in January, Sandhurst
implemented its biggest educational change in decades and, for the
first time, offered separate but parallel undergraduate and postgraduate
programs.
It is important to note Sandhurst is not a university, but a military
academy where training and education exist alongside each other. The
decision to offer both programs in a training-intensive environment
demonstrates the enhanced importance given to officer education.
Soon after the postgraduate program was launched in 2018, AHEP was
introduced. The pathway offered degrees in leadership and strategic
studies throughout the first years of service to maximize the potential
of young British officers.
A wide array of factors influenced major changes in the Sandhurst
higher education program—particularly the decision to introduce the
postgraduate course and AHEP: the personal interests and beliefs of
those in leadership, recruitment and retention policies, and the need to
maximize learning and reflect diversity in backgrounds at RMAS. But
the lessons learned from operational experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan
also played an important role in recent decisions regarding the British
Army’s higher education policy.
As a result of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has
more “battle hardened and experienced officers and soldiers than [it]
has had for several decades.” 19 Many returning officers have provided
17      Interview 3. 2017. Staff Member RMAS, November 27, 2017; and Richard Holman Thain,
Ambrose McDonough, and Alan Duncan Priestley, “The Development and Implementation of
a Teaching and Learning Strategy at a Modern Military Academy,” Journal of Further and Higher
Education 32, no. 4 (2008): 297–308.
18      Ian F. W. Beckett, “British Counter-Insurgency: A Historiographical Reflection,” Small Wars
& Insurgencies 23, no. 4–5 (2012): 781–98.
19      James K Wither, “Basra’s Not Belfast: The British Army, ‘Small Wars’ and Iraq,” Small Wars
& Insurgencies 20, no. 3–4 (2009): 611–35.
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valuable feedback to RMAS on how to improve the professionalism
of the British Army in contemporary conflicts. Although much of the
blame for recent operational failures went to the political level, where
the Army’s general weaknesses and gaps in the training and education of
young officers received fierce criticism, there was a growing belief that
standards of training and education needed adjusted to deliver officers
who were fit for purpose.20
Indeed, Iraq and Afghanistan have “severely tested assumptions
of [the UK’s] competence in counter-insurgency and the ability of its
institutions to adapt to unconventional conflicts.” 21 Such criticisms
posed the question of a need for institutional reform not only in the
wider Army as a whole but also in officer education more specifically.22
The drivers behind the resulting changes included military and civilian
actors, working through both formal and informal structures, with a
strong impetus from lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Sandhurst model of developing young officers through a
one-year intensive and integrated course is substantially different from
most other NATO military academies, which often offer four years of
academic study alongside military training. Recent changes, however,
demonstrate a trend toward increased importance given to academic
study. While also reflecting the needs of recruitment and retention,
this trend demonstrates an increased desire on the part of the British
Army to develop young officers who are not merely good tactical-level
decisionmakers but also cognizant of the potential strategic implications
of their decisions—in other words, strategic lieutenants.

Blended Learning

The Sandhurst interpretation of strategic mindedness is executed
through an approach of “blended learning,” in which military training
and education are integrated to allow cross-fertilization in the learning
process and maximize student potential. It reflects the RMAS ethos
of a student-focused and active learning environment.23 While not an
academic course, the Sandhurst Commissioning Course is a yearlong
intensive and highly integrated program where academic subjects
delivered by three academic departments (Defence and International
Affairs, Communications and Applied Behavioral Science, and War
Studies) are taught alongside military training, and where classroom
learning is applied in military exercises. This intensive civil-military
cooperation helps develop strategic-minded lieutenants.

20      Graeme Lamb, “Operational Success—Strategic Failure,” British Army Review 137 (Summer
2005): 48–51; Wither, “Basra’s Not Belfast”; and E. J. R. Chamberlain, “Asymmetry: What Is It and
What Does It Mean for the British Armed Forces?,” Defence Studies 3, no. 1 (2003): 17–43.
21      Johnson, Wars in Peace.
22      Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars.
23      An Jacobs and Norma Rossi, “Best Practices in Academic Contributions to UK Defence
Engagement: Teaching International Conflict Management in Chile,” Wish Stream Journal (2018):
76–77.
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The Commissioning Course is taught across the junior, intermediate,
and senior terms with the blended learning approach omnipresent
throughout the year. Under this construct, students may, for example,
have military tactics, physical training, and academic study all in one
morning. While certain academic subjects are taught in classroom
settings such as seminar groups, interactive lectures, or centralized
lectures, the blended learning approach comes to life in exercises.
The first comprehensive exercise where blended learning is applied
is Exercise Normandy Scholar, which takes place at the end of the junior
term and is delivered jointly with academic and military personnel from
the War Studies department. It covers two main themes: military decisionmaking through the combat estimate and developing an understanding
of the realities of war. While an initial lecture provides the strategic,
operational, and tactical overview, cadets also receive a realistic problem
for a combat estimate prior to deploying to the exercise, on which they
receive feedback afterward through a staff-led discussion. By the end of
the exercise, students are expected to have a better understanding of the
history of the battle, its military-tactical details, and the usefulness of a
combat estimate.
Second, Exercise Agile Influence is a multiagency negotiation
exercise led by the Communications and Applied Behavioral Science
department that enhances cadets’ understanding of the human terrain
and the relationships between different actors in a conflict-affected
village reflecting tribal dynamics, state actors, nongovernmental
organizations, government departments, and indigenous peoples. This
daylong exercise exposes the cadets to role-playing and is predominantly
influence focused.
Third, and building upon Agile Influence, the weeklong Exercise
Templar’s Triumph is a stabilization exercise in a complex human terrain
comprised of regular forces and various insurgent groups. Cadets must
create an environment of sufficient stability to allow government forces
to flourish. Cadets are asked to take the roles of government forces,
opposing forces, and the civilian population by expanding on skills
and knowledge acquired through previous exercises. They are expected
to learn to think like the enemy and to conduct estimates on how to
unhinge rival forces. The multiagency context they are provided has
additional assets in this exercise, such as search teams and dogs, media
teams, political advisers, and bomb disposal teams. This exercise is also
the key testing ground for the concept of the law of armed conflict.
Finally, Exercise Dynamic Victory exposes the officer cadets to a
truly complex and mixed operational environment of states, insurgents,
proxy forces, and state-controlled deniable forces (“little green men”).
Exercises are also being converted to the Decisive Action Training
Environment to include elements of contemporary operations such
as cyberwarfare and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and to learn
lessons from partners in conflict. This allows students to apply their
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knowledge and skills to solve tactical problems in a range of scenarios
derived from actual threats.
The exercises at Sandhurst, in general, reflect the mission command
culture of the British Army, where initiative, responsibility, and trust are
central ingredients. The elements of initiative and trust are especially
relevant as they underscore the need for a thorough understanding of
operational complexities and the wider strategic picture at all levels
of decision-making.24 The Information Age generates circumstances
where this interpretation of mission command is the fundamental basis
of success.25
In sum, the Sandhurst approach puts thinking at the forefront, and
applied knowledge and intellectual skills are valued higher than academic
knowledge in the narrow sense of the word. Blended learning and exercises
enhance the strategic mindedness of officer cadets by exposing them
to complex environments. In addition, the blended learning approach
provides flexibility, allowing RMAS to make adjustments when necessary,
so students are exposed to relevant operational challenges. As a result,
the design of the exercises themselves reflects the growing complexity of
the British strategic context and its operational requirements with regard
to context, skills required, and types of deployments.26

The British Army Higher Education Pathway

While blended learning was adopted as the educational practice
at Sandhurst before the end of the Cold War, British officer education
has also witnessed substantial adaptations more recently. At the start
of 2015, RMAS introduced postgraduate education alongside its
already existing undergraduate strand, to allow students with a relevant
educational background to embark on a master’s degree in the early
stages of their officer career. This marked the beginning of a broader
acknowledgment of the importance of military education in the wider
Sandhurst curriculum, and in 2018, pathway was set in motion.
This new mechanism awards young officers the opportunity to
complete BSc and MSc degrees in leadership and strategic studies
through the RMAS partnership with the University of Reading during
the first years of their service. It seeks to “maximise . . . talent and
develop individuals with higher conceptual and analytical skills to
support future roles.” 27
As discussed above, launching AHEP was driven to some extent
by the British Army’s aspiration to regain its domestic and international
standing after failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, which resulted in a
renewed focus on the education of young officers from the very early
24      Sergio Catignani, “‘Getting COIN’ at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing CounterInsurgency Adaptation in the British Army,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 4 (2012): 513–39.
25      Jim Storr, “A Command Philosophy for the Information Age: The Continuing Relevance of
Mission Command,” Defence Studies 3, no. 3 (2003): 119–29.
26      Interview 5. 2018. Staff Member MOD, January 30, 2018.
27      Maj Gen Paul Nanson, quoted in British Army, Army Higher Education Pathway: Lead and
Learn—Degrees While You Serve (London, British Army, 2018), 2.
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stages of their educational path in the Army.28 While some suggested
the most urgent educational requirements existed on the midranking
officer level, the decision was made to adjust the educational structure
early in officers’ careers, starting at Sandhurst. This approach sought to
tackle what had been criticized as a “deeply entrenched anti-intellectual
tradition. . . . that discourages critical thinking.” 29
The AHEP mechanism implemented through the Individual
Development Branch and related courses will continue during the early
stages of an officer’s career to link training, education, and professional
roles. It also seeks to enhance military education within the British
Army and to develop higher-level conceptual and analytical skills to
support future responsibilities. Its purpose is to maximize talent and to
professionalize thinking in the Army, create agile minds, and enhance
diversity in the officer corps. It reinforces relevant theories as well as
historical and current military events through reflective and applied
learning. The pathway adopts an integrated approach, where credits can
be earned through education, training, regimental duty, and operations, to
support the young officer in “being professionally capable, intellectually
eager and able to adapt and learn to succeed in a complex and rapidly
evolving world.” 30
This “lead and learn” pathway, as AHEP is also referred to, aims to
strengthen the British Army’s lifelong career leadership and professional
development opportunities. The rationale behind it is to evolve and adapt
“to changing environments. . . . by developing conceptual and intellectual
capacity. . . . and enable[ing] Officers to approach novel situations and
develop creative and effective solutions to volatile, uncertain, complex
and ambiguous problems.” 31
In practice, the AHEP means officer cadets at Sandhurst can,
depending on their qualifications, step into a BA or MA in leadership
and strategic studies in partnership with the University of Reading and
its Henley Business School. Thus, “for the first time, the majority of
early career courses from [the Sandhurst Commissioning Course] to
the [Intermediate Command and Staff College] will be academically
recognized.” 32 The courses delivered by the academic departments at
Sandhurst are validated as one-third of the total degree (see figure 1).
Although the degrees will start at Sandhurst, they will continue
during the early stages of an officer’s career by adopting a unique
approach that links training, education, and leadership experience. As
such, AHEP underscores once more the philosophy behind the flexible
and applied blended learning approach at Sandhurst.
28      Interview A. 2015. Staff Member MOD, June 25, 2015.
29      Daniel Marston, “Force Structure for High- and Low-Intensity Warfare: The AngloAmerican Experience and Lessons for the Future” (discussion paper, National Intelligence Council
2020 Project, Washington, DC, 2004); and quote in Tom Mockaitis, “Losing Small Wars: British
Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 24, no. 4 (2013): 760–62.
30      Interview 6. 2018. Senior Officer, Sandhurst Group, May 7, 2018.
31      British Army, Army Higher Education Pathway.
32      British Army, Army Higher Education Pathway.
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Figure 1. BSc/MSc in “Leadership and Strategic Studies”

Challenges of the Sandhurst Model

While the British Army and wider Ministry of Defense have
expressed great confidence in the value and effectiveness of the blended
learning approach and the wider educational pathway, they do present
challenges specific to the Sandhurst model.
Firstly, academic departments at RMAS only have a limited amount
of time with the officer cadets during their Commissioning Course.
While other military academies may follow more traditional academic
structures and approaches, officer cadets spend no more than a year at
Sandhurst, during which they are exposed to an extremely demanding
program of both military training and education.
Finding a perfect balance between a demanding and stimulating
course, on the one hand, and leaving time and space for reflection to
allow students to internalize learning processes, on the other, is therefore,
a continuously challenging task. It is an ongoing quest to find ways to
maximize students’ learning potentials and to find the most effective
and suitable balance between training and education. This challenge has
been mitigated to some extent by the launch of the AHEP mechanism,
which allows for a continued blended approach beyond RMAS.
Secondly, the approach requires close civil-military cooperation
between academic departments and military instructors. Especially
when change processes are taking place, all relevant stakeholders need
to be mindful of the direction of change, to adjust academic courses,
military training, and joint exercises. In addition, with a tight time
schedule and a lot to fit in during the duration of the Sandhurst course,
effective programming reflective of the desired learning outcomes is
also a challenging task. This need for close cooperation between civilian
and military personnel increases mutual understanding and respect to
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further support linking strategic and operational knowledge key for
developing strategic lieutenants.
Thirdly, while students at other military academies commence
officer training and education after secondary education, and with little
or no previous academic experience, students arriving at Sandhurst
come from a variety of educational and professional backgrounds. The
majority of cadets have already completed an undergraduate degree in
areas as diverse as humanities, natural sciences, engineering, and sport
science prior to arriving at the academy. Most of these students will
enroll in the postgraduate strand. The remaining students will enroll
in the undergraduate course, as they have come up through the ranks,
completed A-levels, or come with work experience, and therefore have
been exposed to less academic study.33 This factor demonstrates the
diversity of the background represented in the student cohorts.
While there is value in training and educating an already diverse
cohort of students, doing so also poses challenges for the academic
curriculum. The student diversity encourages the academic staff to adopt
innovative teaching styles such as problem-based learning, classroom
debates, group work, and learning through exercises to ensure that
collective learning takes place and the student diversity works as a tool
to maximize individual learning outcomes.

Measuring Effectiveness

Measuring the effectiveness of the blended learning approach and
the AHEP is challenging for various reasons. While RMAS continuously
conducts evaluations regarding the Commissioning Course as a whole,
student evaluation forms do not inquire about the effectiveness of the
program and the learning outcomes at later stages of officers’ careers.
Similarly, the academic evaluations are predominantly concerned with
content-related feedback, and to what extent the students feel that they
enhanced their academic skills, knowledge, and understanding as a
result of the Sandhurst military education program.
The blended learning approach has stood the test of time since
the 1980s, demonstrating the long-standing support for this approach
across military ranks. A number of senior military officers—including
the current Commandant of the Sandhurst Group Major General
Paul Nanson—have emphasized the value of incorporating academic
learning into military training and expressed appreciation for the
military education they were exposed to while at Sandhurst during later
stages of their career.
As the introduction of a postgraduate strand and the implementation
of the AHEP are such recent developments, it is too early to measure
their impact and to assess the effectiveness of the current curriculum
throughout officers’ career. But monitoring young officers’ first year of
33      An Jacobs, “Teaching IR at Sandhurst: Blended Learning through an Integrated Approach,”
in “International Relations in Professional Military Education,” special issue, Infinity Journal (Winter
2016): 50–55.
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service over the next decade will shed some light on this. Captains and
majors can reflect on the value of their learning at Sandhurst and beyond,
and how AHEP has helped them develop as strategic-minded officers.
For the purpose of this article, a sample group of 75 students was
asked to complete a questionnaire anonymously with specific reference
to strategic thinking skills. The students were asked to assign a value of
1 (not at all) to 5 (very much) to the following statements:
1. The Sandhurst approach of delivering military education and training
alongside each other and bringing them together in exercises has given
me the ability to put classroom learning into practice.
2. The Sandhurst approach has given me the ability to see the bigger
strategic picture in operational situations.
3. I feel confident about my ability to understand the bigger strategic
picture in operational situations.
4. The Sandhurst program has helped me to better understand the
complexities of operational environments.
5. I consider myself a strategic-minded young officer/officer cadet.
While the results are preliminary and incomplete, they nevertheless
provide interesting initial insights into students’ perspectives of how the
Sandhurst program contributes to strategic thinking. In addition, a few
interesting observations can be made about the initial data.
Firstly, as a general point, the answers demonstrate the majority of
the students have answered the above questions with a four (considerably)
or five (very much). Not a single student has responded “not at all” to
any of the questions, and only an average of 4.2 percent of the students
responded with “to some extent” across the five questions. We can,
therefore, assume the sample group overall sees a positive correlation
between the Sandhurst course and developing into strategic-minded
officers.
Secondly, while for three out of five questions, 20 percent or less
of the student sample selected “moderate,” 30 percent percent or more
selected “moderate” for question one (has the Sandhurst approach
given the student the ability to put classroom learning into practice)
and question five (do the students consider themselves strategicminded officers) scored. This feedback may suggest there is room for
improvement in these areas.
Furthermore, some of the students who “moderately” considered
themselves a strategic-minded officer, also said the Sandhurst program
“very much” helped them to understand better the complexities of
operational environments. Such responses demonstrate the students
do not necessarily equate understanding complex realities with “being”
a strategic lieutenant. Ensuring the knowledge and understanding
acquired through military education is internalized and adopted in a
way that influences a young officers’ decision-making may be something
to consider in this respect.
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Acknowledging the limits of this questionnaire and the related
findings, we can draw no definitive conclusions from these data. But
these initial student responses can provide a starting point to plan and
execute future targeted questionnaires on a larger scale. Sandhurst can
then gather more data and conduct accurate statistical analysis to be
better informed about the impact and effectiveness of the Sandhurst
Commissioning Course in developing strategic lieutenants.

Conclusion

This article has shown there are elements of continuity and change
in Britain’s strategic context, as well as its approach to military education
at Sandhurst. While the link between changes on the strategic level and
changes in military education is hard to detect, at least certain recent
structural changes to the curriculum have been influenced by strategic
experiences. The increased importance given to military education,
reflected in the introduction of a postgraduate course in 2015 and the
launch of the AHEP in 2018, was influenced by—among other factors—
lessons learned from operational experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The Sandhurst educational philosophy is firmly based on interactive
and applied learning, as reflected in the blended learning approach that
combines training and education through flexible and active pedagogy.
The blended learning approach has been a consistent tool to enhance
officer learning since the 1980s and has been applauded for its worth
by all military ranks. Only time will tell whether the recent changes in
military education will be considered equally effective.
The initial questionnaire provides some useful directions for future
evaluations and further research. Firstly, more than 30 percent of the
students labeled the Sandhurst approach only moderately conducive to
putting classroom learning into practice and considering themselves
only moderately as strategic-minded officers. Making further inquiries
about the reasons behind these scores through more extensive
questionnaires will help RMAS understand what measures can be put
into place to improve this score. This is linked to the wider theme of this
volume—how are strategic lieutenants developed successfully, which is
an underexplored but valuable research topic.
Secondly, student responses suggest there is a discrepancy between
developing strategic thinking, on the one hand, and actually being a
strategic-minded officer, on the other. Future evaluations would benefit
from exploring this issue further. In addition, further research on how
to internalize learning in fast-paced, intensive, and demanding military
environments; to adopt skills and knowledge in everyday life; and employ
learning outcomes in professional tasks will offer useful insights for the
study of military education. Enhancing the understanding of the impact
of blended learning can feed into the design of the Sandhurst curriculum
to improve further the quality of the strategic-minded British officer.
Finally, the blended learning approach overall has been applauded
and appreciated by officers at later stages in their career. But at the same
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time, more than 30 percent of students at Sandhurst label its effectiveness
for applied strategic mindedness as “moderate.” This might imply a delay
in the learning process between Sandhurst and the subsequent courses
at the Defense Academy in Shrivenham. As the AHEP offers a more
continuous process of military education, it will be a valuable exercise
to measure not only its impact over the next two decades but also the
effectiveness of RMAS and the overall British approach to military
education.

TOC

Book Reviews
Defense Studies
War in 140 Characters: How Social Media Is
Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century
By David Patrikarakos
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

L

ondon-based correspondent David Patrikarakos was initially
inspired to write War in 140 Characters by his reporting in eastern
Ukraine during the spring of 2014. There he saw firsthand how Twitter
was providing more up-to-date information than traditional print and
television media (2). He then studied ensuing events in Gaza between
Hamas and the Israel Defense Forces as well as the rise of the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria. These situations confirmed his suspicion that
the nature of conflict was changing due to the weaponization of social
media. Hence, as the author states, “This book was formed in the
crucible of twenty-first-century-war” (255). It chronicles the rise of
what Patrikarakos terms the “Homo digitalis”—the hyperempowered
individual who is networked, globally connected, and able to use social
media (via narrative construction and deconstruction) to influence the
outcome of conflict directly in a posttruth world (9).
The book is divided into an acknowledgments section, an
introduction, eleven chapters, a conclusion, notes, and an index. Each
chapter chronicles the impact of social media on a specific conflict and
discusses the profile and activities of a major figure. The first chapter
pertains to the Gaza conflict and the impact of the July–August 2014
tweets of the Palestinian teenager Farah Baker. The second and third
chapter address the Israeli side, focusing on the counternarrative
activities of Israel Defense Forces members Aliza Landes and Peter
Lerner, respectively.
The fourth and fifth chapters focus on the 2014 Facebook exploits
of the civilian Anna Sandalova to obtain supplies and other goods in
support of Ukrainian forces. The sixth chapter discusses the late-2014
social media activities of Vitaly Bespalov, a Russian troll in St. Petersburg.
The seventh chapter discusses the use of social media by Vladimir
Putin’s regime to help destabilize Ukraine and then seize Crimea.
The eighth and ninth chapters chronicle the metamorphosis of
Eliot Higgins. He was initially an obsessive World of Warcraft (massively
multiplayer online role-playing game) player who established the
Bellingcat website. Higgins became a respected and innovative opensource intelligence researcher following his involvement in tracing the
downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine in July 2014 to
the Russian military (167).

New York: Basic Books,
2017
220 pages
$30.00
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The tenth chapter highlights the online recruitment of Sophie
Kasiki—born in Senegal and then living in France—by Islamic State
operatives. It also details the journey of her and her young son into, and
their subsequent life in, the Caliphate as well as their eventual escape
from Raqqa and repatriation back to France.
The eleventh chapter provides an overview of the 2012–15 activities
of Alberto Fernandez, who headed up the US State Department’s Center
for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. This center produced
content directly aimed at attacking the narratives of al-Nusra and the
Islamic State.
The introduction and conclusion are well-developed with the
book’s findings squarely postmodern in their orientation: social media
is individually empowering and exploitative, offering both control and
freedom, and anti-state in nature in portraying the power of nonstate
networks over hierarchies (257–58). In this regard, Alec Ross’s quote is
very telling: “Good ideas die in hierarchies. Social media does not lend
itself to the clearance process. It fundamentally degrades the effectiveness
of diplomatic institutions” (263). Still, autocracies appear to be adapting
to this disruptive technology quicker than liberal democratic states. The
work is filled with useful information and nuanced insights into how
not to cede “social media space” to your opponents and identifies useful
open-source intelligence sites and apps such as SunCalc.net, PixiFly,
and Slack.
The book is extremely well-written and an easy, relatively quick, and
pleasurable read. The citations are adequate with a conceptual reliance
on Mary Kaldor’s book New and Old Wars (2012) and P. W. Singer and
Emerson T. Brookings’s pre-Like War article “War Goes Viral” in
the Atlantic (2016). Of these constructs, Kaldor’s view of twenty-first
century military success as being able “to avoid battle and to control
territory through political control of the population” is greatly evident
within some chapters of the work (261).
While the reviewer was initially put off by the specific major figure
treatment within each chapter (or within successive chapters), it allowed
each social media weaponization vignette—be it set in Gaza, Israel,
Ukraine, Russia, Syria, or the United States—to become more readily
digestible and contextually grounded around each character’s life story.
Since the work is now a few years old, it can be purchased at a
discounted price. It should be read in conjunction with Clint Watt’s
Messing with the Enemy (2018) and P. W. Singer and Emerson T. Brookings’s
Like War (2018)—both of which it predates—for maximum impact
concerning the changing nature of conflict and the weaponization of
social media.
This subject matter is having an immense impact on how
contemporary warfare (and gray zone conflict) is being conducted by
authoritarian states, such as Russia and China, and radical Islamist
terrorist entities, such as Hamas and the Islamic State. Senior military
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officers and defense policymakers would be highly remiss in not
educating themselves on such an ascendant phenomenon.

Dark Commerce: How a New Illicit Economy
Is Threatening Our Future
By Louise I. Shelley
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

D

ark Commerce builds upon decades-long research conducted by
Louise Shelley—a contemporary of Moisés Naím, author of Illicit
(2005)—and a multilingual heavy hitter in the world of transnational
organized crime scholarship. She is presently a professor at George Mason
University and the founder and director of its Terrorism, Transnational
Crime and Corruption Center established in 1998. Dr. Shelley’s earlier
works include Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime and Terrorism
(2014) and Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective (2010). The thesis
of this new work is that “old forms of illicit trade persist, but the newest
forms of illicit trade, tied to computers and social media, operate as if
on steroids” (2).
It is much in line with perceptions earlier developed by Nils Gilman
and his colleagues in Deviant Globalization (2011) and other scholarly
works that argue the illicit economy is growing far quicker than the licit.
And it represents a means to obtain much higher levels of profit than
formal economic activities. Supporting this assertion is the modeling of
this evolution in the tables on “The Stages of Illicit Trade” and the licit
and illicit “Entrepreneurship and Trade” operations within the business
cycle (113, 121). While earlier stages of physical-based illicit trade have
not subsided, they have been augmented with computer-facilitated crime,
then solely computer-based illicit trade focused on virtual and intangible
cyber commodities—such as botnets, passwords, social media influence,
malware, data, and digital pornography. Interesting components of the
work also concern new constructs—such as dysfunctional selection as “nonevolutionary change [due to illicit activities] that results in survival of
the less fit” akin to the tuskless elephant (5)—and newer terms have
appeared due to the effects of planetary resource degradation, such as
water mafias and climate refugees (6).
The book is divided into an acknowledgments section, an
introduction, eight chapters, a conclusion, notes, and an index. The
introductory chapter provides an overview of “the fundamental
transformation of illicit trade” that is now taking place. The following
three chapters provide background and processes related to illicit trade
from ancient times to 1800, 1800 to the end of the Cold War, and from
1993 to the present. Chapter 4 offers a detailed study of the exponential
growth of the rhino horn trade (between South Africa and Asia) while
chapter 5 discusses illicit trade business models.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2018
376 pages
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Chapter 6 focuses on how illicit trade destroys people, and chapter 7
illustrates how it is killing our planet. Chapter 8 summarizes the complex
picture of illicit trade proliferation in our globalized world and concludes
with ways to counter the challenges illicit trade poses for humanity and
the planet. The book is very well researched and highlights the most
cutting-edge work produced in the field of transnational organized
crime today. It contains 100 pages of detailed endnotes and represents
a multiyear effort by Dr. Shelley, utilizing online, depository, and field
research supported by university and foundation grants.
Where the work falls short, however, is in the concluding chapter.
While vertically and horizontally integrated and unconventional
approaches are called for, the book ultimately provides what amounts
to a listing of recommendations. These items relate to legal and
regulatory policy, awareness and education, changing sociopolitical and
environmental mentalities, and some strategies to address environmental
and cyber-related illicit trade and to curb corruption. We are left with
the less-than-satisfying “Hail Mary” proclamation: “The challenges are
great and the windows of opportunity to reverse the planet’s present
tragic course are limited. Let us hope that the mundane but important
acts of ordinary citizens, combined with the extraordinary acts of the
few, help reverse the current growth trajectory of dark commerce” (250).
It is the reviewer’s opinion that far more time and effort was
placed into modeling and analyzing the rise of the new illicit economy
(primarily computer assisted and cyber based) and too little—including
any serious modeling or analytics—was spent on the so-what, backend-response component.
In summation, Dark Commerce does a first rate job of identifying the
threat of a new illicit economy as well as the historical processes and the
more recent technological drivers further fueling it. Still, the work would
have benefited from far more structure and analysis related to developing
mitigation and response strategies concerning the emergence of a new
illicit economy, rather than the fact we desperately need them. Dr. Shelley
does a commendable and vital service of providing field grade military
officers, strategists, and policy analysts with a strategic early warning
related to this new threat. Hopefully, in her next work, she will focus on
providing guidance on how to address dark commerce effectively.

Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics
of Nuclear Proliferation
By Alexander Lanoszka
Reviewed by Dr. Mark Duckenfield, Department of National Security and
Strategy, US Army War College
Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press
216 pages
$49.95

A

lexander Lanoszka’s monograph, Atomic Assurance, has as its central
thesis “alliances are more effective in deterring potential nuclear
proliferation than in curbing actual cases of nuclear proliferation” [italics
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added] (9). The crucial role for an alliance is in providing a potential
proliferator with enough credible assurance for the alliance partner to
defend it adequately; as a result, the proliferating ally need not take the
path of self-help and pursue an independent nuclear deterrent.
West Germany, Japan, and South Korea are the three primary cases,
but the question arises as to how much variation there is in the dependent
variable as none of these American allies actually ended up developing
nuclear weapons. Lanoszka attempts to resolve this through tracing the
in-depth historical analysis of the steps in the proliferation decisionmaking process. Atomic Assurance is at its strongest in its discussion of
US foreign-policy making. The frustrations, stratagems, and triumphs
of US policymakers are closely tracked through the extensive use of
primary American sources from Presidential libraries, as well as an array
of State Department and National Security Council documents.
A short-coming of this approach—a common one in security
studies—is it provides an American perspective on the problem
of alliance management and nuclear proliferation. The prism for
information and interpretation is often an American one as the
primary documentation for information from abroad is that which
is communicated to the United States from its allies. Especially in as
contentious an area as nuclear proliferation, there is reason to question
whether the concerns German, South Korean, and Japanese governments
conveyed were themselves designed to extract concessions from the
United States rather than truly reflecting the strength of concerns of
the allies.
Atomic Assurance’s central argument emphasizes that security
considerations and domestic politics of the potential proliferator are the
real agency; merely imputing them from American records and (usually
American) secondary accounts thus weakens the evidentiary foundation
of the case. In fact, from the source material, it is unclear alliances
actually do prevent a potential proliferator from pursuing enhancement
of nuclear capabilities as all of the countries in the study, by its own terms,
pursued some degree of nuclear proliferation. To ascertain effectiveness,
some cases where an allied country should have had reason to pursue
nuclear proliferation but did not even start would be helpful in providing
leverage on the crucial question. Dogs that do not bark are often as
important as those that do.
There is another anomaly in the research design: Lanoszka only
examines alliances that include the United States. He does note Cold
War-era proliferation issues affected both NATO and the Soviet Bloc.
Considering there were proportionately more potential proliferators in
American-led alliances than in Soviet-dominated ones might suggest
a crucial variable is the nature of the alliance and the underpinning
relationships between its members.
As a result, it is probably no accident the three nuclear-curious
countries in the Soviet alliance were the three most independent from
the Soviet Union—China, North Korea, and Romania. Likewise, the
TOC

96

Parameters 49(4) Winter 2019–20

lining up of the USSR’s Warsaw Pact allies, as well as almost all of
its Arab proxies as initial signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), indicates formal and informal arrangements can facilitate some
degree of alliance coordination.
There are also variations in the types of American-led alliances—
ranging from the multilateral alliance of NATO to the bilateral
arrangements the United States has with Japan and South Korea.
However, the definition of alliance used here is confined to written
agreements. While this is both parsimonious and provides a clear
definition, it also obscures the ebbs and flows a more flexible definition
of alliance might reveal.
At first glance, this might appear to preclude a less rigorous analysis
of cases where the rationale for variations is the writer’s assessment
of commitments implied in unwritten understandings, rather than
the hard realities of a written treaty commitment. But in process
tracing, Lanoszka makes precisely these assessments about domestic
politics and perceptions of the international threat environments and
alliance coordination.
The Warsaw Pact crushing of the Prague Spring doubtless raised
German security concerns not just about German domestic politics.
West German ratification of the NPT occurred at the same time as Italy
and the Benelux countries due to intra-European and NATO alliance
coordination, an aspect not mentioned. Atomic Assurance addresses
several of these variations in five shadow cases—Australia, France,
Great Britain, Norway, and Taiwan—ranging from one page (Australia)
to five pages (Great Britain). The brevity of the coverage of these cases
prevents a fuller assessment of the important questions they raise, but
Lanoszka is to be commended for including them as a starting point for
further inquiry.
This book makes clear contributions to discussions in both academic
and practitioner communities. It widens the field of academic discussion
by breaking free of data sets and delving into some of the dynamics and
contingent processes through which policy is made. Lanoszka avoids
concluding on a pessimistic note, emphasizing continuity of American
military and technological predominance can alleviate security concerns
among its allies if policymakers are attentive to demonstrations of
alliance commitment.
The book’s final paragraph contains a strange typographical error
referring to potential “Teutonic shifts” in the international balance
of power (158). Given the tectonic shifts in international security
accompanying the fall of the Berlin Wall and the earlier tremors
emanating from Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik (easing the path to ratification
of the NPT), one could choose to believe this is the author’s subtle
joke about the prospects for sudden change in the international system.
Nuclear proliferation could have just such a consequence.
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Plutocratic Insurgency Reader
Edited by Robert J. Bunker and Pamela Ligouri Bunker
Reviewed by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz, professor of international relations
and comparative politics, Georgia Southern University and adjunct research
professor, US Army War College

A

ccording to the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field
Manual (2007), an insurgency is “an organized movement aimed at
the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion
and armed conflict” (2). Bard E. O’Neill, in his seminal work Insurgency &
Terrorism, defines an insurgency “as a struggle between a nonruling group
and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses
political resources . . . and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the
basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics” (15). There are
several types of insurgencies, such as anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist,
apocalyptic-utopian, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, preservationist,
and commercialist.
With the publication of the Plutocratic Insurgency Reader, Robert J.
Bunker, adjunct research professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, US
Army War College, and Pamela Ligouri Bunker, nonresident fellow in
terrorism and counterterrorism at TRENDS Research and Advisory, Abu
Dhabi, add an additional layer to an already extended list of insurgencies.
But unlike other insurgencies that attempt to overthrow legitimate
governments to establish their fiefdoms, plutocratic insurgencies depend
on the existence of the state as well its institutions for survival. As
Bunker and Bunker clearly state:

Bloomington, IN: Xlibris,
2019
376 pages
$19.99

plutocratic insurgency arises wherever you see financial and economic elites
using [their created enclaves] as staging areas for making war on public goods.
. . . the defining political-economic feature of plutocratic insurgency [is an]
attempt on the part of the rich to defund the provisioning of public goods,
in order to defang a state which they see as a threat to their prerogatives (2).

Like guerrillas fighting a war of the fleas, plutocratic insurgents do
not want to obliterate the state. They simply, like parasites, want to carve
out de facto zones of autonomy by crippling the state’s ability to constrain
their freedom of economic action (13). These zones of autonomy then
enable individual, tribal, or interest group enrichment (23).
One direct, unintended consequence of globalization is the
advancement of predatory capitalism, which plutocratic insurgents
have ingeniously integrated into their arsenal of tools to advance their
causes. Predatory capitalism is exploitive and oppressive to those below
the top one percent. Predatory capitalists use bribery, corruption,
coercion, and cooptation to maximize gains and minimize loss.
Additionally, to generate profits both nationally and transnationally,
plutocratic insurgents use lawyers and lobbyists, rather than violence
or overthrowing the state, to create a shadow governance in pursuit of
plutocratic policy objectives (219).
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Plutocratic insurgents turn the public into their own fiefdom
through privately owned public spaces (141). These so-called pseudopublic spaces are former public spaces now in the hands of corporate or
plutocratic elites, and they are governed by restrictions drawn up by the
landowner, with private security companies or gangs usually enforcing
the rules (141–42).
At this junction, it is important to emphasize a plutocratic insurgency
is not the same as a kleptocracy. While both organizations’ primary goal
is to siphon the wealth of the states, the process by which they achieve
their goals and objectives are different. As Bunker and Bunker point
out, kleptocracies use the institutions of state to loot the population,
whereas plutocracies neutralize those institutions to facilitate privatesector looting (2).
Regardless of whether we call them kleptocracies or plutocracies,
the impact of their nefarious activities on the social fabric of society
is the same. Their malfeasances destroy the social fabric of society by
creating a system of impunity. They create a judicial system that has no
authority. They create a government that lacks authority, autonomy, and
the capability to address some of the most heinous crimes in a democratic
society. Most importantly, it undermines the democratic process.
As John Sullivan states in Plutocratic Insurgency Reader, “ ‘criminal
insurgencies’ and ‘crime wars’ are altering the nature of sovereignty
and governance” (286). Furthermore, Sarah Chayes argues in her book,
Thieves of the State, “corrupt government practices contribute to severe
economic distortions, threatening financial sector stability” (186).
The end of the Cold War and the “end of history” have led to a
more interconnected and globalized world in the twenty-first century.
At the same time, the democratization of technology has created a new
environment in which previously suppressed actors can exercise greater
power via the internet in a dark, deviant globalization. When corrupt
politicians join forces with plutocratic insurgents, nation-states pay the
price because corruption threatens national and global security.
I recommend Bunker and Bunker Plutocratic Insurgency Reader to our
future military leaders at the US Army War College. The 27 readings,
ranging from September 2012 through February 2019, provide a
longitudinal view of the development of plutocratic insurgency for
learners. While the concept of plutocratic insurgency may seem “like old
wine in a new bottle,” its impact today is more pervasive than ever, and
its forms are also morphing to adapt and adjust to the changes within
the unstable international system of the post-Cold War.
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Strategic Leadership
Red Teaming: How Your Business Can Conquer
the Competition by Challenging Everything
By Bryce G. Hoffman
Reviewed by Dr. Charles D. Allen, professor of leadership and cultural studies,
US Army War College

R

ed Teaming is a book where readers can learn what business leaders
have culled from the US military experience over the past two
decades. It is an organizational “how-to” that provides tactics, techniques,
and procedures to improve decision-making and performance for leaders
and managers. As such, the process of red teaming is a component
of organizational development with the goals to achieve successful
organizational change and improved performance through the alignment
of organizational learning and knowledge management.
Bryce Hoffman is a former financial journalist who transitioned
to a career as an organization consultant and author. His first book,
American Icon (2012), is a best seller cited by senior US Army leaders
for its key takeaways about leading and managing change in a large
enterprise. In 2015, Hoffman gained the distinction of being the first
non-US government civilian to attend the Red Team Leaders Course at
the Army’s University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
Through that unique experience, Hoffman learned of the origins,
challenges, and evolutions of red teaming. As a result, he embraced
the concept and wrote this book to expand upon and provide methods
for any organization to “stress-test its strategy, perfect its plans, flush
out hidden threats, identify missed opportunities, and avoid being
sandbagged by unexpected events or new competitors” (250). While the
author is ambitious in such claims, he provides a well-written presentation
of concepts, an effective narrative of their application in military and
civilian organizations, and useful caveats for leaders and managers.
The book is well-organized as it begins with a critical reflection by
the US Army and the intelligence community in the wake of the terror
attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. When strategies, plans, and operations failed to
achieve desired outcomes, it was necessary to reexamine processes and
structures, as well as individual factors of decision-making—hence, the
need for red teaming. The reader learns through historical accounts that
red teaming is not a new concept, nor is it unique to the US Army.
The author identifies the core problems red teaming addresses
when the biases of individuals are compounded in groups and within
organizations. Chapter 3 presents “the Psychology of Red Teaming”
with well-researched and established findings on individual cognition

New York: Crown Business,
2017
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that lead to inappropriately applied heuristics, biased judgments, and use
of logical fallacies.
The purpose of red teaming is linked to its description in Command
Red Team, US Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-16, where the command
red team is a “cross-functional organizational element comprised of
trained members that provide the commander with an independent
capability to explore fully alternatives in plans and operations and
supporting intelligence, and to enhance staff decision-making through
the simulation for critical and creative thought” (I-2).
In chapter 4, “How to Start Red Teaming,” Hoffman directs the
reader to consider key questions of the type of red-team model to use, as
well as how to staff and to support the team. The three subsequent chapters
reveal red teaming is the application of strategic thinking—specifically
creative thinking, critical thinking, and systems thinking—which are
familiar to senior-level war college graduates. New to military readers
will be the compilation of tools and techniques to frame problems, to
discern underlying assumptions, and to generate alternative perspectives.
Hoffman provides several such tools with practical applications and
examples of their use in well-known business organizations. To employ
red teaming effectively requires the understanding of organizational
culture as well as organizational climate. It also requires an appreciation
of team and group dynamics in the decision-making process.
Hoffman asserts that for a red team to be effective, it must be
accepted as providing value to the organization. Given that red teams, by
design, are not invested in derived plans, courses of action, and selected
solutions, the teams are inherently contrarian and viewed as disruptors
to organizational processes. Providing value is evident when the red
team voice is sought and listened to. While the red team interjections
and assessments may not change the organizational strategy, plan, or
solution, its engagement can clarify assumptions, generate exploration of
potential consequences, and inform contingency development. Hence,
red teaming becomes a necessary organizational capability to improve
performance of the organization and its members.
Perhaps chapter 10, “The Rules of Red Teaming,” is the most
insightful: like in American Icon, Hoffman provides caveats for leaders
with pithy taglines. Of the seven rules, “Rule 1: Don’t Be a Jerk” and
“Rule 6: You Don’t Always Have to Be Right—But You Can’t Always
Be Wrong” are useful to consider regardless of the type of team or
organization—military or civilian.
National security professionals may be more comfortable with
former senior fellow of the Council of Foreign Relations and political
scientist Micah Zenko’s treatment of the topic in Red Team (2015).
Hoffman’s work, however, is more accessible to members of the defense
community with engaging vignettes that clearly illustrate the how-tos of
red teaming for the military pragmatist. Senior defense leaders will readily
find parallel opportunities in warfighting and enterprise organizations
within our military to apply red teaming in pursuit of better strategies.
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How Militaries Learn: Human Capital, Military
Education, and Battlefield Effectiveness
By Nathan W. Toronto
Reviewed by Marc R. DeVore

F

ew questions are more preoccupying to military professionals than
why some militaries perform better than others. Certain states, such
as Muammar Gadhafi’s Libya and Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire, suffered
disaster when they fought smaller and less well-armed opponents, such
as the Libyans in Chad during the 1970s and 1980s and the Rwandans
in Zaire during the 1990s. Other states, such as Israel, performed better
in their engagements with conventional Arab militaries than a material
“bean count” would suggest.
What explains these wide variations in military performance?
Scholarship on this issue has flourished in recent years, with Kenneth
Pollack highlighting culture’s role, Caitlan Talmadge demonstrating civilmilitary relations’ impact, and Stephen Biddle advancing the adoption
of combined arms tactics as a sine qua non. Despite these works, we are
still far from attaining a holistic understanding of military performance.
Nathan Toronto’s recent book, How Militaries Learn contributes to this
ongoing endeavor.
Militaries will underperform, according to Toronto, unless their
officers have first developed the intellectual habits needed to adapt their
weaponry and training to changing battlefield conditions. Military higher
education therefore contributes powerfully to battlefield performance
by instilling in officers the requisite intellectual flexibility.
Although Toronto makes a broad-based argument for prioritizing
military education, he champions one particular form of education as
separating the world’s most efficient armed forces from all others. Socratic
teaching methods, as practiced in Western academic institutions, are the
key to success. Rote learning, by way of contrast, cannot develop the
cognitive skills officers need. Ultimately, a successful system of military
higher education system—based on Socratic teaching methods—will
develop the essential habits of institutional introspection and critical
analysis within an officer corps to prevail at war.
While Toronto advocates Socratic pedagogy in general, he specifically
champions the education of midlevel officers. Although most states
possess military academies—often organized along the lines of France’s
Saint-Cyr, the United States Military Academy, or Britain’s Sandhurst—
that educate junior officers Toronto advocates postgraduate military
education play a greater role in shaping battlefield performance. Toronto
devotes his attention to the family of institutions whose progenitor was
the Prussian War College and which includes such diverse American
bodies as the National Defense University, the Command and General
Staff College, and the School of Advanced Military Studies.

Lanham, MD: Rowman &
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Toronto competently demonstrates his argument’s plausibly in a
variety of ways. He begins with a statistical test demonstrating that states
possessing staff colleges are more likely to win wars under ceteris paribus
conditions. He then offers brief case studies of Prussia, France, Turkey,
and Egypt. These cases show states deliberately developed staff colleges
as a means of enhancing their military power, frequently in the aftermath
of catastrophic defeats or periods of military underperformance. Staff
colleges’ emergence, moreover, often coincided with periods of economic
growth and improving human capital in society. Toronto, finally, offers a
longer study of the ongoing effort of the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
to create a National Defense College.
Toronto does an admirable job at shedding light on postgraduate
military education as an important, yet neglected, factor contributing to
military power. While Toronto’s effort is notable, it nonetheless leaves
important questions unanswered. I, in particular, would have appreciated
greater clarity on the mechanisms whereby military postgraduate
education translates into battlefield outcomes and on the question of
whether the classroom environments needed to develop intellectual
flexibility in the armed forces can thrive in societies that lack a modicum
of political pluralism.
Although Toronto postulates military postgraduate education
improves battlefield performance, he never explicitly states how this
occurs. Three responses, however, could be offered—for example,
armies with better educated midrank officers may win because they
excel at the operational level of war. In a slightly different vein, the real
advantage of such armies may lie in the superior adaptability of battalion
and regimental commanders when facing unexpected circumstances.
Finally, the value of well-educated officers may manifest itself at the
strategic level, when it comes to making long-term decisions about force
structure and doctrine.
While these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, Toronto’s failure
to discuss how military postgraduate education yields battlefield results
becomes perplexing once one contemplates his case studies. France’s
poor performance during the Franco-German War, for example, was a
product of incompetence at the operational level, which the oftentimes
adroit tactical improvisations by midranking officers could not remedy.
The Egyptian case, however, suggests tactical adaptability is the
primary value of military postgraduate schools. In this case, Egyptian
generals developed an ingenious war plan prior to the Yom Kippur
War (1973) despite Egypt not possessing an adequate system of military
postgraduate education, yet midlevel Egyptian officers’ inflexibility in
changing circumstances ultimately led to defeat. Toronto, meanwhile,
suggests better peak-level defense policymaking is one of the advantages
postgraduate education provides, yet also shows how capable rulers—
Turkey’s Ataturk and Egypt’s Mohammed Ali—excelled in this regard
despite possessing a comparatively undereducated officer corps.
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Just as Toronto fails to address how military postgraduate education
produces results, he also vacillates as to whether such education systems
are compatible with states lacking political pluralism. Authoritarian
governments understandably wince at inviting officers to engage in
free-ranging Socratic debates. Toronto acknowledges this factor when
he argues “stable” civil-military relations are a prerequisite for first-rate
military education institutions. He also shows in his chapter on the UAE
how students and faculty members eschew examining certain important
regional security issues for fear of upsetting authorities. Despite these
strong suggestions that some level of pluralism is a precondition for
the institutions Toronto advocates, he at times suggests the reverse. He
suggests, for example, that regime type is irrelevant to the quality of
military postgraduate education and claims, without support, illiberal
societies, such as Russia and China, possess military postgraduate
schools on a par with the best in democratic states.
Toronto’s work, How Militaries Learn, in sum, merits a place on
the bookshelves of commanders and scholars preoccupied with
understanding military performance. The book makes an important
and original argument. While it fails, at times, to answer the questions it
poses, those lacunae should spur further debate rather than detract from
the book’s value.

Lessons in Leadership: My Life in the US
Army from World War II to Vietnam
By John R. Deane Jr.
Reviewed by Dr. George J. Woods III, COL, US Army (Ret.), professor of strategic
leadership, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, US Army
War College

W

ith the US Army’s reinvigoration and reorganization of the
Center for the Army Profession and Leadership, the memoir
by General John R. Deane Jr., which reflects lessons in leadership from
his distinguished 36-year US Army career, could not be timelier. He
attained four-star rank having served as the deputy assistant chief of
staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition (1973–75) and as
the commander of Army Materiel Command, which was redesignated
Development and Readiness Command under his command (1975–77).
The lessons emerge through stories of the major events that shaped
his development as an officer in a variety of assignments in war and peace.
Five years after his death at the age of 94 in 2013, Deane’s memoirs were
published through the committed effort of his editor, Jack C. Mason.
While the book emphasizes events from World War II and Vietnam,
the first and final chapters capture key moments in Deane’s life before and
after those wars. The first chapter describes the influence Deane’s father,
a general officer, and his contemporaries had in the young Deane’s life
as an army brat. Deane’s early exposure to the Army lifestyle influenced
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his pursuit of admission to the United States Military Academy at West
Point and eventual Army career. Failing to meet the physical standard
for admission, Deane enlisted in the Army where he “learned more in
that year about leadership—about what men aspire to, what influences
them, what motivates them—than in any other year in [his] life” (11).
Admitted to West Point the next year and graduating with the
Class of 1942, he was commissioned as an infantry officer, serving
with the 104th Infantry Division, deployed to the European Theater
of Operations in 1944. Initially serving as the regimental intelligence
officer, he became a battalion commander within the year. The 104th
Division was commanded by the legendary Major General Terry de la
Mesa Allen—a friend of Deane’s father. Allen represented another aspect
of Deane’s professional life and development—exposure to key mentors
who provided invaluable advice and examples for Deane to follow.
Following his tour in Europe, Deane served in US Army, European
Theater of Operations where he devised a counterespionage program
to keep Soviets operating in Germany in check. He performed a
similar role to counter North Korean threats after the Korean War. His
subsequent Pentagon assignments afforded him influence in important
budget expenditures and investments in research and development. His
assignments in the Washington, DC area included service as the deputy
director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and his career-culminating
assignment as the commander, Army Development and Readiness
Command at Fort Belvoir.
Military professionals can glean important themes throughout
the book that offer timeless lessons in leadership. Appropriately, Don
Snider’s 2005 The Future of the Army Profession defines four identities for
Army professionals (warrior, leader of character, member of profession,
and servant of country). Deane’s memoirs are replete with examples of
each in the stories from his assignments in World War II (1944–45)
and Vietnam (1966–67) in which he was duly recognized with several
decorations for valor.
Illustrating leader of character, Deane recounts several events
in which he displayed physical and moral courage. Deane displayed
character when making tough decisions—whether taking bold actions
to test East German resolve when the Berlin Wall was first erected or
during contentious budget debates in the Pentagon.
He demonstrated character by holding himself and others
accountable to standards—be it defending his response to a challenge
his regimental commander presented or in describing stories of General
William E. Depuy’s relief of officers in Vietnam. Similar acts of courage
occurred when he stood up to superiors and underwrote mistakes his
subordinates made while learning to become better soldiers.
As servant of the nation, Deane’s acceptance of assignments like
the deputy at the Defense Intelligence Agency or when assigned to the
Defense Communication planning Group demonstrated his willingness
to place service to the nation above his personal desires. Furthermore,
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his service highlighted instances in which he executed his duties in spite
of disagreement with policy or policymakers. The dilemmas exemplify
difficult challenges professionals face at the most senior levels of defense.
Finally, as a member and steward of the profession, Deane embraced
two critical obligations. First, he internalized the responsibilities of
stewardship as defined in the US Army’s The Army Profession “to strengthen
the Army . . . to care for the people and other resources entrusted . . .
by the American people. . . . [and] accomplish every mission ethically,
effectively, and efficiently” (2015, 6-2). Second, he mastered “expert
knowledge” (professional competence) and invested in the development
of others through mentoring, training, preparation, and holding people
accountable for achieving standards.
Deane’s service rendered throughout his career should inspire those
who currently serve, and military professionals should widely read the
lessons he offers in leadership. Using his memoir to spur discussions
among professionals would be a most fitting tribute to his work.
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Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO
and the Postwar Global Order
By Timothy Andrews Sayle
Reviewed by Dr. Joel R. Hillison, professor of national security studies, US Army
War College

Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2019
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T

he more things change, the more they remain the same in NATO.
This year NATO celebrated its 70th anniversary, a significant
accomplishment for any alliance. Despite many predictions over the years
of NATO’s imminent demise, the Alliance remains as relevant today as
it was in 1949 when the Washington Treaty was first signed. Timothy
Sayle’s new book, The Enduring Alliance, gives some of the reasons for
NATO’s continued relevance.
This well-written and thoughtful book examines the history of postWorld War II Europe and the evolution of NATO. It does so through
the lens of specific incidents that have put pressure on ties that bind the
Alliance. In each instance, NATO adapted, and members found a way
to compromise to keep the Alliance intact.
In order to understand why NATO endures, the author first examines
systemic forces. The bipolar world into which NATO was born required
the United States and its allies to confront the ideological, economic,
and security challenges posed by the Soviet Union. In the brief unipolar
moment that followed the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, contrary to
the prediction of many scholars, NATO played an important role in
ensuring stability in Europe during a time of dramatic disruption. Not
only did NATO provide an opportunity for many former Warsaw Pact
nations, and republics in the Soviet Union, to rejoin Europe, it provided
Russia with some assurance a reunited Germany would rise peacefully
within the constraints of the Alliance.
Sayle also spends a great deal of time discussing the importance of
domestic politics within the key member states. For example, Britain had
to juggle its desire for a special relationship with the United States with
its desire to join the European Economic Community. The United States
had to balance its competing global demands during the Vietnam War
with calls from Congressional leaders, such as Senator Mike Mansfield,
that Allies pick up more of the burdens of the Alliance or the United
States would bring its forces home. It also looked at struggles within
Germany to balance the need for greater nuclear reassurance with a
growing antinuclear, populist movement. Throughout NATO’s history,
national leaders had to balance these competing demands and justify its
continued relevance to an often skeptical public.
Finally, the book examines the role of key individuals in either
causing disruption in NATO or finding mechanisms to reach consensus
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and move the Alliance forward. Clearly, founding leaders played a
crucial role in standing up NATO. Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, General
Dwight Eisenhower, and Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery
were uniquely able to guide the Alliance through its initial stage of
development and provide a structure to meet its aspirations.
This mirrors the role of leaders such as French foreign minister
Robert Schuman and West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer in
enabling early European efforts such as the European Coal and Steel
Community. As NATO evolved, individuals within (German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl, US President George H. W. Bush) and outside of the
Alliance (President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbechev) played a
significant role in the survival of the Alliance. Activities of key individuals
inside the Alliance also caused unnecessary strains, such as US President
Jimmy Carter’s handling of the neutron bomb and French President
Charles de Gaulle’s withdrawal from the integrated military structure.
The book does a nice job in looking at several key incidents that
occurred that might have resulted in the demise of the Alliance such
as the Suez Crisis; the Soviet Union’s intervention in Hungary in 1956;
France’s departure from the integrated military structure; and the fall
of the Soviet Union. While the threat of the Soviet Union (and a future
revanchist Germany) were essential to the beginning of NATO, the
author argues NATO endured for much broader reasons. Throughout
NATO’s history, the real necessity was US leadership to maintain
security and stability among member states. This was not only for the
benefit of US Allies, but also for promoting vital US interests.
Paradoxically, in order to avoid war and the threat of war, alliances
have to be ready and willing to fight. Yet an equally important role for
NATO is maintaining the political unity of the Allies, for together, the
Allies are much more resilient against external threats and a sometimes
fickle electorate. NATO enabled the reconstruction of European
economies and provided the security umbrella under which Europeans
could pursue an ever-closer union. NATO endures because it enables
collective action to demonstrate strength against threats like Russia (and
perhaps China), to allow Germany to continue to take its rightful place
within Europe without invoking fears of its history, and to keep the
United States engaged in a region vital to US interests.
This book will be of interest to international relations scholars,
Europe enthusiasts, and those interested in Alliance dynamics. Foreign
policy practitioners will also find relevant historical analogies as the
Alliance routinely dealt with issues such as burden sharing, the role
of larger members, and the very purpose of the Alliance itself. It
also highlights the difficulties in justifying continued investments in
NATO to a domestic audience that is increasingly untouched by the
horrors of the World Wars of the twentieth century. The book is well
researched and clearly written. It is a quick but substantive read, delving
into sufficient detail to explain the nuances of each phase of NATO’s
evolution. The overarching takeaway is NATO endures because it serves
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members’ interests. Members gain greater influence and stability within
the Alliance than would be possible without it.

Peacemakers: American Leadership and
the End of Genocide in the Balkans
By James W. Pardew
Reviewed by Dr. Pat Proctor, a retired US Army colonel, who authored four
books including Blameless? The 1990s and the US Army’s Role in Creating the
Forever-Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (forthcoming)
Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky, 2018
424 pages
$39.95

A

mbassador James W. Pardew, a former military officer, had a frontrow seat for the American military and diplomatic interventions
in the Balkans from 1995 to 2008. He served as a high-level member
of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke’s negotiating team in 1995. After
the beginning of the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Pardew led the US training and equipping effort. As a
special representative, he led the international effort to record Serbian
atrocities in Kosovo. Pardew also served as the US special envoy to
Macedonia during tense negotiations to avert a civil war in 2001 and as
the US ambassador to Bulgaria from 2002 to 2005.
In this memoir, Pardew makes the case “American leadership of
the international intervention in the former Yugoslavia ended the most
destructive set of regional conflicts and humanitarian disasters in Europe
since World War II” (xiii). Peacemakers opens with the US intervention
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995). The book then provides a detailed
account of the US-led effort to overcome Serbian opposition to—and
US military reluctance toward—training, equipping, and unifying a joint
Croat-Muslim army in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pardew also recounts
the NATO intervention in the Serbian province of Kosovo in 1999,
focusing much more on events prompting the air war and negotiations
ending the bombing than the subsequent US-led peacekeeping mission.
This book truly shines in its account of the little-known crisis in
Macedonia and US-led negotiations narrowly averting a civil war there
in mid-2001. The dispute, primarily between ethnic Albanians and Slavs
in Macedonia, went largely unreported in the United States for a number
of reasons. First, by 2001, the American public had grown weary of
ethnosectarian conflict in the Balkans. Second, the new administration
of President George W. Bush came to power with promises of an end
to nation building; they were understandably reluctant to publicize
the possibility of a new nation-building mission in Macedonia. And,
only weeks after the signing of the agreement ending the conflict in
Macedonia, the events of September 11, 2001, turned the world’s
attention away from the Balkans to the Middle East and central Asia. In
Peacemakers, Pardew provides a long overdue examination of the events
and players pulling Macedonia back from the brink of war.
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As a firsthand account and primary source material for historians
of US policy in the Balkans, this book is without equal. Despite his
closeness to the subject matter, Pardew provides objectivity lacking in
other works such as Holbrooke’s To End a War (1998) or Christopher
R. Hill’s Outpost (2015). At the same time, Pardew’s closeness to the
events put the reader in the plane with Holbrooke and his team as they
discuss strategy and in the room during US negotiations with Slobodan
Milosevic and his cronies who were simultaneously committing genocide
and denying their involvement.
The military officer or defense policy professional reading
Peacemakers will be confronted with a number of uncomfortable truths.
Pardew recounts the repeated efforts of senior US military leaders to
block US military intervention in the Balkans. This book also details
the obstruction by US military leaders in Washington and in the field
against the effort to arm and to train the nascent Bosnian army after the
intervention began. Pardew does pull a few punches. He fails to note the
US military’s willful refusal to hunt down and to capture indicted war
criminals in Bosnia. And he stops just short of blaming the US Army’s
misguided post-Cold War focus on high-intensity conflict for causing its
incompetence in dealing with the low-intensity conflicts in the Balkans.
But Pardew’s honest appraisal of the US military’s obstructionism
throughout this period will still hit military professionals painfully close
to home.
Peacemakers, colored by Pardew’s role in these events from within
the US government, is not completely clear-eyed. It suffers from many
of the same maladies besetting US intervention policy then and now.
The author shares the delusional beliefs of the US diplomatic corps in
turning failed states into multiethnic, multicultural democracies and of
the State Department’s insistence on preserving borders drawn by aged
imperialists a century ago.
Moreover, Pardew accepts without question the US insistence on
appearing neutral toward all parties and refusing to pick a winner in
the conflict. Like the US government at the time, Pardew’s criteria for
judging the success of America’s intervention in the Balkans includes
single-digit US military casualties and an end to ethnosectarian violence
rather than the creation of a political solution facilitating the departure
of international peacekeepers. Peacemakers is silent on the international
military peacekeeping mission in Bosnia—currently under the auspices
of the European Union—continuing to this day with no end in sight.
These criticisms aside, Peacemakers is an essential book for anyone
wishing to understand the history of international interventions in the
Balkans. And as the American foreign policy establishment struggles
with how to end ethnosectarian civil wars in Syria and Yemen, this book
deserves close examination.
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The Struggle for Cooperation: Liberated France
and the American Military, 1944–1946
By Robert L. Fuller
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ust hours after the Germans left Paris, Charles de Gaulle made a
triumphant march down the Champs-Élysées to the Notre-Dame
Cathedral, a symbol of conservative, eternal France. Soon thereafter, he
gave an impromptu speech from a balcony on the Hôtel de Ville—a
symbol of left-leaning France. In doing so, he sent a message not just to
the French people, who had not yet decided upon him as their postwar
leader, but also to the Americans, who had not yet ruled out a military
occupation of France.
Suspicious of lingering collaborationist sentiment and worried
about powerful communist elements in the big cities, the Americans
had prepared a full occupation, including a military scrip. De Gaulle’s
coup de main and the enthusiasm with which the French people (left,
right, and center alike) received him, rendered those plans useless. But
the US Army remained in France in large numbers, and the two sides
would need to figure out a way to coexist to pursue the common interest
of defeating Germany.
In this highly detailed book, Robert Fuller studies the FrancoAmerican relationship on the ground in France. His chapters analyze
topics like requisitions, transportation, the use of ports (especially
Marseille, the second most important Allied port in Europe behind only
Antwerp), refugees, German prisoners of war, black markets, and the
occasionally ill-disciplined American soldier. There is more detail than
argument in this book. Fuller’s main theme is the largely uncontroversial
one that the Americans and the French had points of friction, but they
usually managed to work their difficulties out eventually. Both countries
saw the need for France to continue to sacrifice in order to bring about
Germany’s defeat.
Fuller gives short shrift to how devastated France was in 1944–46.
The defeat in 1940 had not only wounded French pride but also led to an
armistice that forced France to pay an enormous sum for its occupation
and accept a franc-to-mark exchange very much to Germany’s advantage.
By 1942, a mandatory labor scheme sent thousands of young French
men and women to Germany to work in factories, and the Germans
seized most French railroad stock.
Especially after June 1944, the Germans treated France as a larder,
taking all the food it possibly could and shipping it back to Germany.
American soldiers were shocked at how thin French men and women
looked, and General Omar Nelson Bradley finally decided to authorize
the dispatch of armed forces to Paris, in large part because he had reports
the city was on the brink of famine.
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Fuller also pays too little attention to the damage done to France
by the Allies. American and British bombers devastated the French
transportation network to secure the Normandy bridgehead from
German reinforcements. They also targeted Paris, the single most
important rail center in the country. Air raids over the La Chapelle
district killed hundreds and gave the collaborationist leader Philippe
Pétain a chance to argue France was the innocent victim of a war
between the Anglo-Saxons and the Germans.
Allied logistical problems after the Normandy landings created
further tensions. Needing to move forward, but short of almost
everything, the Allies quite naturally began to requisition food and
supplies from the people they were liberating.
The Americans wanted supplies to fight the Germans, and the
French wanted to return to normal life as quickly as possible. This
conflict of interest put France and the United States in competition for
the same finite set of resources. A lack of a common language, the small
number of Americans who broke the law or took more liberties than
they should have, and heavy-handed American policy exacerbated the
problems. These problems created tensions, but Fuller argues they never
got out of control or caused the US Army significant problems.
For all their differences, the two sides did share an important
common goal—winning the war. Lower-level French and American
officials, Fuller argues, worked hard to solve problems and find solutions.
American civil affairs officers, mostly majors, found themselves in
control of towns. They normally found ways to work with mayors, using
American resources to repair water lines, rebuild bridges, and help
stamp out crime. These acts built goodwill, but the French still looked
forward to the moment when the Americans would move on, letting
them rebuild their lives for themselves.
Although The Struggle for Cooperation does not present any new or
startling findings, it sheds light on an important, and often overlooked,
segment of America’s involvement in the Second World War. The images
of joyous French men and women celebrating their freedom masked the
real problems of daily life in the wake of war. Unsure what they would
find in France and anxious to keep fighting the Germans, American
officers had to improvise. Fuller shows us how they did so, usually with
success, in an incredibly difficult environment. Today’s civil affairs
officers would do well to learn from this period of American history.
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By Trent Hone
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t the risk of sycophancy, the core of Learning War: The Evolution of
Fighting Doctrine in the US Navy is a book which this reviewer once
wanted to write. During the Solomon Islands campaign in 1942 and 1943,
the US Navy perfected its tactics, methods which allowed it to defeat the
highly skilled Imperial Japanese Navy. For author Trent Hone, this result
was not the product of happenstance. Instead, the American Pacific War
victory had its genesis in the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, who
viewed naval strategy as a knowledge-based discipline, explained by a
set of common practices, a tactical doctrine, bred over the next two
generations. The Naval War College incubated the development of these
ideas, concepts tested by the fleet, all managed by a series of senior leaders
who saw the service needing a naval “combined-arms approach” (1).
Hone uses doctrine as a source to explain how and what the
Navy learned. The book studies the service’s “enabling constraints,”
which shaped its internal language and assumptions, making learning
possible (4). To create flexible tactics, the fleet experimented in a
“safe to fail” environment encouraging officers’ aggressiveness and
adaptability, which became and remained their common intellectual
frame (9). Learning paid off during the Navy’s wartime battles, whose
success Hone measures not by comparing ship losses for the sides in
each action, but by asking whether they met operational or strategic
goals. Aggressiveness and adaptability, acting as “heuristics” to permit
independent solutions, allowed the remaining fleet after Pearl Harbor to
recover, seize the initiative and win, admittedly at high cost: more than
5,000 sailors died off Guadalcanal, including two admirals (207).
As a management consultant, Trent Hone writes history as a sideline,
yet everything here is of professional quality. This book follows on the
heels of his previous essays and coauthored book, Battle Line (2006). His
sources, rooted in Navy officers’ published writings and exercise reports
between 1898 and 1941, battle experience between 1942 and 1944, and
vitally tactical publications, are complete. What Hone explores through
them is the evolution of tactics in the US Navy’s surface force and the
extension of combat doctrine to include the aircraft carrier portion of
the service later in World War II. At its roots, Hone convincingly argues
the US Navy created a “complex adaptive system” to collect evidence
from exercises and battles, assess it, posit solutions, distribute them to
the fleet, and then repeat the process.
The Navy’s core problem was its confrontation with rapid, continual
change. Both before and after 1915, when naval officer Dudley Knox
highlighted the military use of doctrine, the Navy integrated ever more
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tactical complexity. Gunnery exercise ranges lengthened threefold
just before World War I, then doubled in the next decade. Despite the
increasing distance challenge, artillery accuracy continually improved
under the enabling constraint of fire control taught by William Sims. The
Navy later added a linguistic shorthand for clearer correction of fire (63,
83). Torpedo tactics evolved as their ranges lengthened, too. As aviation
technically matured, initially for gunnery spotting then for strikes,
the Fleet Problems (21 large interwar exercises) allowed experiments
with it. Solving these problems reliably in peacetime meant, despite the
ruin at Pearl Harbor, the fleet took into stride the technology of radar,
while using the Combat Information Center and signals intelligence
respectively to manage and to improve its learning. The system defeated
the Imperial Japanese Navy, fighting on its preferred terms at night.
The human side gets its due here. The leading figure for Hone
is the oft maligned, admittedly mercurial, Ernest King. Service in
destroyers—as aide to Sims, a submariner, and a pilot (earning his wings
at age 48)—before becoming chief of naval operations in 1942, King was
arguably the best example of the Navy’s increased emphasis on learning
and education” who led his peers and subordinates (326). Other leaders,
only slightly less accomplished (Chester Nimitz, Raymond Spruance,
Marc Mitscher, Frank Fletcher, “Ching” Lee, and Arleigh Burke), ably
filled roles in wardrooms, and as ship, squadron, task force, and theater
commanders using the learning system. Plainly put, the Navy taught
officers how to solve problems. Only the Navy’s massive wartime
growth, requiring greater standardization for its enormous reservist
officer corps, trimmed the complex adaptive system, making late war
changes more incremental in nature (316).
Some of Learning War’s initial tables are disconnected from its
text; later ones become crucial (26, 86). The US Navy’s submarines are
largely absent. Fleet boats were meant to scout and support the battle
line, although history instead saw them conduct commerce warfare. But
submarine doctrine, focusing on what we now term the high-end fight,
needed reworking after the war’s start, another example of adaptability.
The Atlantic theater, where anti-submarine warfare also had a learning
curve, is not examined. Nor are the Navy’s torpedo problems analyzed.
For submarines and surface ships, torpedoes often failed: two destroyers
shot over a dozen Mark XV weapons to scuttle the USS Hornet in October
1942, but most misfired. Knowing fallibility of torpedoes undoubtedly
forced officers to emphasize gunfire during ensuing night battles.
Since 1996, a touchstone book for historians and naval officers of a
peacetime fleet failing to learn has been Andrew Gordon’s The Rules of
the Game (1996), studying the Royal Navy before the Battle of Jutland.
Learning War is so clear, and makes the case for American doctrinal
flexibility so well, this reviewer must argue we now have another book
of equal importance to comprehend. Daring to sound glib, before the
US Navy outfought the Imperial Japanese Navy, it had outthought it.
Members of any armed service will gain from studying Learning War, and
will recognize the Navy’s success when they read this book.
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